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PLATO'S

APOLOGY AND CRITO;

WITH

NOTES.

BY

W. S. TYLER,

GRAVES PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN AMHERST COLLEGE.

Nae ego haud paullo hunc animum malim, quam eorum omnium fortunas, qui de hoc judicaverunt. *Cic. Tusc. Disp.* i. 42.

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THIS EDITION OF THE APOLOGY AND CRITO

Is Dedicated,

AS A MEMORIAL OF PERSONAL FRIENDSHIP,

AND AS A TOKEN OF HIGH REGARD

FOR HIS DISTINGUISHED SERVICES TO CLASSICAL SCHOLARSHIP,

AND HIS PHIL-HELLENIC SPIRIT.

PREFACE.

THE "Græca Majora," which was all the Greek read in college by many successive generations of American students, contained Plato's Crito and the narrative part of the Phædo; and among all the extracts in that admirable collection, none are cherished in fresher remembrance or with a more reverential love than these inimitable productions of the great spiritual philosopher of ancient Greece. The simple beauty of the style and the almost inspired truth and grandeur of the sentiments, have graven these immortal compositions, as with the point of a diamond, on thousands of hearts, and entitle them to the high place which they have held among the select educational instruments of former generations. Many a scholar saw with regret *Plato* dropped for a time entirely out of the *academic* course, and accessible to American students only in the obsolete Græca Majora, or in the imported editions of foreign scholars. And, though their favorite classic author is now brought again within the reach

of American students, and restored in some measure to his proper place in college education, in President Woolsey's scholarly edition of the Gorgias, and Professor Lewis's profound Annotations on portions of the Laws, still many an older and many a younger scholar cannot but sigh to see the simpler and more Socratic Dialogues of Plato *superseded*, even by the more finished dramatic imitations of his middle life, or the more profound moral and political speculations of his riper years. It is to meet expressed regrets and felt wants of this kind, that the present edition of the Apology and Crito is given to the public.

While these pieces breathe in every part the moral purity, the poetic beauty, and the almost prophetic sublimity, which pervade all Plato's writings, and which have won for him the epithet "*divine*," they exhibit Socrates more adequately than he appears in any of the works of Xenophon, more truly and purely, just as he was, than he is seen in any of the other writings of Plato. They are therefore the connecting link between the two beloved disciples, and the clue to the interpretation of both. The Apology, especially, written shortly after the death of the Moral Philosopher, and under the full inspiration of his last words and last hours, gives us the very soul of Socrates speaking, as it were, with the very lips of Plato. Mr. Grote has

seen this, and, with characteristic wisdom, has made the Apology the corner-stone of his admirable chapter on Socrates. How superior to the cold and barren defence which bears the name of Xenophon on the one hand, and on the other, how pure from the impractical and impracticable speculations which Plato has interwoven in some of his later dialogues! It is doubtless a faithful representation of the defence, or rather justification, we might almost say, glorification, of his own life, character, and mission, which Socrates actually pronounced before his judges. At the same time, perhaps, it may be regarded as an exemplification of Plato's beau ideal of the true Orator, whose aim and office it is not to save the life of the accused by whatever means of falsehood, bribery, and seduction he can invent, but to set forth the claims of truth and justice in all their native right to command universal obedience. In this view the Apology may, perhaps, be considered as the counterpart of the exposure of rhetoric falsely so called in the Gorgias, and so take its place among the consecutive labors of Plato to realize the idea of all the arts and sciences; though it must be confessed, that the want of the introduction and the dialectic structure, which are so characteristic of the scientific dialogues, seems rather (not to set it aside, as Ast would set it aside, as un-Platonic, for it has all the palpable

and marked peculiarities of Plato's style), but to set it apart to the more specific and no less sacred purpose of a defence by a gifted and beloved disciple of his honored and revered master.

The exordium opens, if we may be allowed to go before the reader with a brief analysis of the piece, with an expression of the astonishment of Socrates at the misrepresentations of his accusers, who have represented nothing as it is, and a declaration of his purpose to speak the plain and simple truth, in the same plain and simple language which he has been accustomed to use in his every day conversations; and as this is his whole office as an orator speaking in his own defence, so it is their sole duty, as judges, to consider whether or not he speaks the truth. (17, 18, A.) This exordium, if it does not set forth Plato's beau ideal of true oratory, in contrast with the studied and false rhetoric of the forum and the schools, yet it no doubt exhibits the author's idea of the style and manner in which Socrates actually defended himself when on trial for his life. Accordingly, we shall find the Socrates of the Apology excluding all artificial rhetoric, all appeals to prejudice or passion, and declaring the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, with the simplicity and directness, the frankness and fearlessness of a phi-

losopher who values truth and justice far more than life.*

After this brief and plain exordium, Socrates asks leave to reply first to his first accusers, those less formal but more powerful and formidable accusers, to wit, who had been insinuating their slanders into the public mind during his life, and who had all the advantage of numbers and time, of a tribunal numerous and credulous, and of not being confronted with the accused; nay, of being personally unknown, except some one of them might chance to be a comic poet (18, B. C.), alluding especially to Aristophanes, whose name is mentioned further on, and his comedy of The Clouds distinctly pointed out. (19, C.) The charges thus informally brought against him were, that, "with a wicked and mischievous curiosity, he inquired into things in heaven above and things under the earth; that he made the worse appear the better reason; and that he taught others to do the same; in short, that he was a natural philosopher and a sophist." (19, B. cf. 18, B.) Socrates utterly denies the truth of these charges; declares his entire ignorance of natural philosophy as then taught, as well as of the sophist's art; offers to present witnesses in

* Cf. Valer. Max. VI., 4: Maluitque Socrates extingui, quam Lysias superesse—in allusion to the Oration which Lysias prepared for the use of Socrates, but which Socrates refused to deliver.

proof that he taught no such things to his disciples, and calls upon all present to testify against him, if they had ever heard from him any conversation, great or small, on such subjects. (19, C. D.) Moreover, he did not profess to be a teacher, like Gorgias the Leontine, Prodicus the Cean, Hippias the Elean, and Evenus the Parian, who drew away the young from the society of the wisest and best citizens (which they might enjoy gratuitously), to receive their instructions at a great price. He congratulated the possessors of such wisdom and power, and would doubtless be very proud if he possessed it himself. But truth obliges him to confess, that he has no part nor lot, great or small, in such knowledge. (19, E.; 20 C.) The modesty and irony which mark this passage, the short dialogue, into which he runs unconsciously, and which is given in the form and the words of the original conversation, and the unfavorable view which he takes of the vague and unprofitable speculations of the physical philosophers who preceded him, are all highly characteristic of the real Socrates, as he appears in the Memorabilia of Xenophon. (Cf. Mem. I., 1, 11, seqq.; I., 2, 3, seqq. et passim.)

"But what then is your business or profession? What have you said or done to raise all this hue and cry about you?" In answer to this question, Socrates admits that he bore the name of philoso-

pher, or wise man. But he pretended to merely human wisdom, such as man may properly aspire to, and such as pertains to the proper regulation of human life. (20, D. E.) This wisdom he did indeed possess. And in proof that he did, he would refer them to no less authority than the God at Delphi. (21, A.) He never supposed himself to be wise in any sense, till, in response to a question of his friend and the friend of the people (Chærephon), the Delphic Oracle declared, that there was none wiser than he. Not daring to discredit the Oracle, he then set himself to discover in what possible sense, if indeed in any sense, he was wiser than others. (21, B. C.) Accordingly he visited successively various classes of men in high repute for wisdom—politicians, poets, orators, philosophers, artisans, &c.; and he discovered to his surprise, that while they really understood pretty well their respective departments, they fancied they understood every thing else (22, D.), though, in fact, with a partial exception in favor of the artisans, they did not understand the fundamental principles even of their own profession. (22, C.) And they all, without exception, thought they knew a great deal more than they did know, while he was conscious that he knew almost nothing. (21, D.) And when he came to inquire whether he would choose to be as he was, or to have their wisdom with their want

of self-knowledge, he was constrained to answer, that he would rather be as he was, and so to assent to the truth of the Oracle (22, E.); though he modestly adds, that the chief intent of the Oracle was doubtless to teach this general truth, that *he* was the wisest of men, who preferred that kind of wisdom which Socrates cultivated, viz., the moral and practical, and who, *like* Socrates, was conscious of the poverty of his acquirements in knowledge, and the comparative worthlessness of all the wisdom of men. (23, A. B.)

In the course of the investigation which he thus prosecuted, he offended all he visited, by showing them that they knew far less than they supposed. At the same time, his pupils (or rather his young friends and followers, for, as in Xenophon, so in Plato, Socrates never speaks of his disciples) delighted themselves in exposing, after his example, the ignorance of the many pretenders to superior knowledge. (23, C.) And they were angry, not with themselves, but with the innocent occasion of their humiliation. Accordingly they began to call him a most impious fellow, a corrupter of youth, and the like. When asked how; what he did; what he taught; having nothing else to say, they took up and turned against him the prejudice and calumny which the multitude were so ready to entertain against philosophers in general. (23, D.) They

confounded him with the very naturalists and sophists whom he had ever labored to confute, and thus sought to concentrate upon him the suspicion and indignation which they had incurred.

So much for the informal charges. And these prepared the way for the formal indictment for corrupting the youth and endeavoring to subvert the religion of his country. Of his three accusers, Socrates informs the judges that Meletus was angry with him for exposing, as above described, the poets, Anytus for the artisans and politicians, and Lycon for the orators. (23, E.) They were all actuated by selfish and revengeful feelings. Anytus, it should be added, was a rich leather-seller, and a man of influence in the democracy; and when Socrates seeing signs of intellectual capacity in his son, endeavored to dissuade the father from bringing up his son to his own trade, Anytus was personally offended (Apol. Xen. 29), and was able easily to turn the passions of the populace against the reputed master of the tyrant Critias and the now hated Alcibiades. (Cf. Xen. Mem. I., 2, 12.)

In defence of himself against the charge of corrupting the youth, Socrates enters into a very characteristic dialogue with Meletus, asking, who it is that corrupts the youth, and who makes them wiser and better; whether the judges, senators, and members of the Assembly also corrupt them, or

whether he is their only corrupter, and whether it is likely to be the single individual that corrupts, and the multitude that instruct and reform, or quite the contrary, just as it is in the training of horses and the lower animals; and if he is such a corrupter of the young, whether he does it voluntarily or involuntarily, of which alternatives the former is quite incredible, since he must know that he could not corrupt them without injuring himself, and in the latter alternative, he ought not to be impeached and punished, but to be instructed and made wiser. (24, B.; 26, A.) The conclusion of this very Socratic piece of extemporized dialectics is, that Socrates, if not too wise and good to corrupt the youth, must be too ignorant to deserve punishment for it; and that Meletus, with all his assumed superiority in wisdom and virtue, neither knows nor cares, how young men can be made either better or worse. The argument, by which Socrates exculpates himself, will probably strike most modern readers as more subtle than conclusive in its reasoning, and somewhat dangerous withal in its practical tendency, since, carried out to its legitimate result, it would seem to prove that all crimes must be involuntary, and all criminals proper objects of commiseration and instruction, rather than of punishment. And we see not how the objection can be answered. It lies, however, not only against

the argument here, but against the doctrine of Socrates, which, everywhere, in Xenophon and Plato alike, resolves all the virtues into knowledge, and, by consequence, all the vices into sins of ignorance.

Taking up the other point in the indictment, Socrates now asks, whether his accuser means to charge him only with denying the gods of the state, or with downright atheism; and on being distinctly charged with the latter, he shows that this is utterly inconsistent with the language of the indictment itself, which charges him with recognizing and teaching "other divine things," and if there are "divine things," then surely there must be divinities. Just as he who speaks of human affairs, must needs recognize the existence of human beings, so in teaching *δαιμόνια*, he must needs recognize *δαίμονες*; and if *δαίμονες*, then, according to the prevailing Greek idea, either gods or sons of gods; and if sons of gods, then of course gods. (26, B.; 27, E.)

Having thus disposed of his principal accuser, Socrates boldly tells the Athenians, that he has to fear, not the indictment of Meletus, but the envy and jealousy of the multitude, which had destroyed many other good men, and would probably destroy him. "Why then persist in a course of conduct which you expect will occasion your death?"

"Because," such is the substance of the answer, "the great question for a man to ask, is not whether life or death will be the result of his conduct, but whether he is doing right or wrong, and acting the part of a good or bad man; as the heroes of the Trojan war, and all true heroes, have ever despised danger and death in the path of duty and glory." (28, B. C. D.) "I should behave strangely," he continues, "if when your commanders, Athenians, stationed me at Potidæa, at Amphipolis, and at Delium, I kept my post at the peril of my life, but when the God sets me down in Athens to spend my life in the pursuit of philosophy and in the examination of myself and others, then I should leave my post through fear of death. In that case, I might well and truly be charged with not believing in the gods, since I disobeyed the Oracle and feared death, and thought myself wise when I was not. For to fear death is to think one's self wise, when he is not; for it is to think one knows what he does not know. None know death. They do not know but it is the greatest good; yet they fear it, as if they knew it was the greatest of evils. I will never flee from what may be the greatest good, viz., death, into such base and criminal acts as must be the greatest evils." (28, E.; 29, A. B.)

"If you were to assure me of my acquittal in case I would pledge myself to abandon this philo-

sophizing and questioning manner of life, my reply would be, I respect and love you, but I will obey the God rather than you. While I live and breathe, I will never cease to proclaim the superiority of wisdom and virtue and the well-being of the soul, to riches and honor and the welfare of the body, to young and old, to citizens and foreigners, but especially to you, my fellow-citizens, as you are most nearly related to me, and because it especially becomes the honored name of Athenians. For this is the divine command, and this is for your highest interest. (29, c.; 30, c.) And if you put me to death, be assured you will not injure me so much as yourselves. Me none of my accusers could injure in the least; for I do not think it lawful, or possible, in the nature of things, for a better man to be injured by a worse man. I am therefore now defending, not so much myself as you; that you may not put me to death and so reject the gift of God to you, for you will not soon find another such. (30, D. E.) That I am the gift of God to the city, you will see from this. Does it seem merely human, that I have neglected my own affairs so many years and attended to your interests, persuading you like a father or an elder brother, to cultivate virtue? And all this without any pecuniary compensation; for among all their false accusations, they have not dared to accuse me

of receiving pay for my instruction; and if they had, my poverty would have been a sufficient witness against them." (30, E.; 31, C.)

If any were disposed to ask, why he went about and persuaded them privately and personally, instead of coming before the people and counselling them as a body, he had been kept back from the latter course by a certain divine monitor * which had attended him from his childhood—a sort of voice which always deterred him from doing what he should not do, and which had usually forbidden his participation in public affairs. And well it might, for if he had undertaken to act his part in public, he would have been put to death long ago, and that without having rendered any real service to them or to himself; for no man could be safe in publicly opposing the inclinations of the Athenian or any other popular assembly, and forbidding them to do wrong. (31.) In proof of this, he adverts to the imminent peril to which he was exposed in the only instance in which he had held an office, when, as senator and presiding officer in the popular assembly, he resisted the will of the *demus*, and defended the lives of the ten generals when they were intent on putting them to death by one sweeping and extra-judicial decree. (32, A. B.) He

* Touching the nature of this divine voice and monitor, see the discussion in the notes.

had also incurred a similar peril, and exhibited the same disregard for danger and death, in refusing to obey an unrighteous command of the oligarchy, when they possessed the government. (32, C. D.)

These were well-known facts, which might be proved by any number of witnesses. And such facts showed that he, or any one else who would contend strenuously for the right, must do it privately rather than politically, if he would preserve his life even for a short period. They proved also, that his influence over the young, by precept and especially by example, so far from corrupting, was suited to inspire them with an inflexible regard for justice. And if further proof was required, since his accusers had failed to bring forward the proper witnesses at the proper time, he would gladly yield the stand and let them bring forward now the fathers and elder brothers of the very young men who had been his most constant hearers and companions; for though the young men themselves might have some reason for withholding the truth, if he had corrupted them, certainly their fathers and elder brothers could have no such motive, and the judges ought to be put in possession of their testimony. (33, D.; 34, B.)

Having thus finished his defence, Socrates proceeds to excuse himself from any attempt to enlist the sympathies and excite the compassion of the

judges in his behalf. This practice had indeed become very common in the courts of justice—so common, that it might seem strange and even arrogant for him not to do likewise. He had a wife and children, and friends whom he tenderly loved, and whose grief at his death would doubtless be very great. But such weakness, worthy only of women, was especially unworthy of Athenian men; and if seen in their great men, particularly in one who, like himself, was reputed, whether justly or unjustly, to be a man of extraordinary virtue, it was not only dishonorable to him, but it would reflect dishonor on the whole people. (35, A. B. C.) Besides, it was doing a great wrong to the judges, who needed not entreaties, but instruction and persuasion, and whose duty it was, not to sacrifice justice to personal feelings and interests, but simply to execute the laws. And not justice, but piety also, forbade the offering of any inducements to them to violate their oath of office; and if he should hold out any such inducements, he would thereby teach them that there were no gods, and so convict himself of atheism in the very act of defending himself against the charge. They must therefore excuse him from resorting to such methods of securing his acquittal, which he could not but regard as at once dishonorable, unholy, and unjust. (35, D.)

With these noble sentiments, asking no favor of his judges, he submits himself to their sense of justice. They condemn him by a majority of only six votes. Resuming his address, he declares that he is neither grieved nor surprised by the result. He is only surprised by the smallness of the majority by which he was condemned. (36, A.) Pronounced guilty by his judges, the next question was, what should be the penalty. His accusers said, Death. In naming a counter-proposition, as the laws allowed him to do, if he looked simply at the justice and fitness of the thing, he should propose that he be supported in the Prytaneum (State-House) at the public expense, that he might devote himself without interruption to the instruction of the people. This was a suitable return for his disinterested devotion to their highest good in time past, and this would be for their highest welfare in time to come. If this honor was justly conferred on the victor at the Olympic Games, who did not need it and who ministered only to their seeming happiness, much more was it due to him, who needed it, and who had spent his life in promoting their real good. (36, B. C. D.) And with longer time, he might perhaps be able to persuade them of his innocence. (37, A.) He deserved only good at their hands. If he should suffer death, that would perhaps prove a good. Why then

should he propose an alternative penalty, which would be a certain evil? Should he propose imprisonment? That were to subject himself to the power and caprice of the Eleven, whoever they might chance to be. (37, B. C.) Exile? His countrymen could not endure his instruction and reproof, much less would strangers. (37, D.) And for him to keep silence, though they would not believe it, were to disobey the God, and for that reason it were quite impossible. (37, E.) To live without examining himself and others were no life to him—were a life not worthy to be lived by any human being. (38, A.) Should he then propose a fine? If he had property he would part with it cheerfully, for loss of property was no evil. But he had not property enough. If indeed a mina (about $17) would suffice, perhaps he could pay a mina. He would therefore propose a fine of one mina. And since his friends, Plato, Crito, Critobulus, and Apollodorus bade him propose thirty minæ, he would adjudge himself to pay a fine of thirty minæ, and give these friends as his security. (38, B.)

This high-toned vindication of his character and deserts, together with his virtual refusal to name any alternative punishment, sealed his death. He doubtless expected it would, and intended it should. The last chapter of Xenophon's Memorabilia is devoted to a statement of the reasons, and those

for the most part assigned in a conversation by Socrates himself, why it was better, in his own view—better for his happiness and usefulness as well as for his fame—that he should die now, rather than live to a more advanced age. With this deliberate preference and in full view of the consequences, he made his defence so as almost to necessitate the desired result. By an increased majority he was condemned to death. And in resuming the thread of his discourse, he tells those who condemned him, that he did not regret the result—that death would have come soon in the course of nature, and he would much rather die uttering such a defence, than live by such ignoble means as many use. (38, C. D. E.) It is not difficult to escape death—he could readily have escaped it *—but the difficulty is to escape sin, which is a swifter runner than even death, and has already overtaken his accusers, younger and swifter though they be than himself. (39, A. B.) And, as men are sometimes inspired with something like prophetic vision in their last hours, he warns his judges, who voted for his condemnation, that speedy vengeance will overtake them in the reproofs of their own conscience and of the numerous friends of virtue who would come after him; and the only

* Cf. Xen. Mem. iv. 4, 4: ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἀφεθείς, κ.τ.λ.

escape was not by cutting off their reprovers, but by reforming their own character and life. (39, C. D.)

Then turning to the judges who had voted for his acquittal, and who alone deserved the sacred name of judges, he labors to console them touching the issue, which they so much deplore, by giving them the true interpretation of it. (39, E.) He could not but argue that it was meant for good. For the prophetic voice—the voice of the divinity—which had often and always warned him heretofore when he was going to do wrong even in the smallest matters, now when life was at stake and he was exposed to what are commonly regarded as the extremest of evils, had given him no warning in the whole course of his trial. Hence he inferred that death was not, as it was commonly supposed to be, an evil, but a good. (40, A. B.)

The presumption thus suggested by the divine Providence towards himself, might be justified and confirmed by the following considerations: Death is either annihilation, or, which is essentially the same thing, a state of entire unconsciousness; or else it is a departure of the soul from this world to another. On the former supposition, death would be a wonderful gain; for how few of our days and nights are so happy as the hours we pass in sound sleep, undisturbed by so much as a dream; and in that case, all time would seem no more than one

such dreamless night. (40, C. D. E.) But if, on the other hand, death is a departure from this world to another, where dwell all the dead, what greater good could there be than this? There, freed from the power of judges falsely so called, he would find judges that deserved the name, such as Minos and Rhadamanthus; there he would associate with Orpheus, Musæus, Hesiod, and Homer; there he should meet with Palamedes, Ajax, and all who in past ages had fallen victims to perverted justice; and what was better than all the rest, there he should examine and put to the test Agamemnon, Ulysses, and a multitude of other men and other women, as he examined men here, to see if they were truly wise, or only supposed themselves to be so; and this would be immense happiness: nor would he be put to death there for the exercise of this prerogative, since besides their superior blessedness in other respects, the dwellers in that world are immortal. (41, A. B. C.) In conclusion, he assures his judges once more, that no evil can befall a good man in life or death, since the gods take care of his interests, and these events have not befallen him by chance, but have been ordered by a wise and kind Providence; tells them that he harbors no resentment against them, since, though they meant it for evil, they had done him good; entreats them to take vengeance on his sons, by inflicting on them

the same pains he had inflicted on his pleasure-loving countrymen, if they are ever seen caring more for riches or any thing else than for virtue, or thinking more highly of themselves than they ought to think, for this, and this only, will be a just recompense for what he has done for the Athenian people; and then he takes leave of them, saying, Now it is time to depart—I to die, you to live; and which of us is going to the better destiny is known only to the Deity.

Such, in substance, is the Defence of Socrates. So far from believing that we are indebted to the imagination of Plato for the lofty character of Socrates, as he appears in this Apology, we cannot but feel that we owe the elevation and eloquence of the Apology to the real greatness and heroism of its subject. The form and the words may be Plato's; but the substance and the spirit must be Socrates's; and we need only to have heard it from his lips to perfect the moral sublime. Profane literature has nowhere furnished a better delineation of the spiritual hero, rising superior to the fear and the favor of man in the strength of his own conscious integrity and of a serene trust in God. Faith in God, which had been the controlling principle of his life, was the power that sustained him in view of approaching death, inspired him with more than human fortitude in his last days, and in-

vested his dying words with a moral grandeur that "has less of earth in it than heaven." The consciousness of a divine mission was the leading trait in his character and the main secret of his power.* This directed his conversations, shaped his philosophy, imbued his very person, and controlled his life. This determined the time and manner of his death. And this abiding conviction—this "ruling passion strong in death," is the very life and breath and all-pervading atmosphere of the Apology.

Nor is the religious element less pervading and controlling in the Crito, though there social duty and political principle are also made prominent. This piece presents Socrates to us in prison awaiting the execution of his unjust sentence. There Crito—the friend and benefactor of his youth, the companion of his middle-life, and the stay and staff of his advanced years—calls upon him at break of day, and, finding him in sound sleep, sits down by his side in silent admiration of his calmness on the very eve of death. Socrates awakes, and a dialogue ensues, beginning in the natural and easy manner so characteristic of Plato, leading on easily to the discussion of the topic which lies nearest Crito's heart, viz., the release of his friend, and ending, like the Apology, in a strain of rapt and inspired

* Cf. Grote, Hist. of Greece, vol. viii. p. 558. Eng. Ed.

eloquence, before which Crito himself stands convinced, silenced, and overawed, as in the presence of some superior being.

After inquiring the hour, how Crito gained admission so early, and why he had not awaked him sooner, which leads him to remark upon the absurdity of shrinking from death, especially at his advanced age, Socrates asks the errand of his friend at that early hour. Crito replies, that the sacred ship (during whose voyage no one could be put to death at Athens) was drawing near on its return from Delos—that it would probably arrive that day, and on the day following, Socrates must die. (43, A. B. C. D.) Socrates expresses his readiness to die whenever it pleases the gods, but adds his belief that the ship would not arrive till the next day, and his execution would take place on the third day, assigning as the reason for that opinion a dream and vision, which he had just seen in sleep, and which it was well that Crito had not disturbed. A beautiful woman, dressed in white, had appeared to him, calling him and repeating the words of Homer touching the return of Achilles to his native land: "On the third day, Socrates, you will arrive at the fertile Phthia," which he interpreted as a divine intimation, and therefore infallible proof, that on the third day he would reach his *home* in a better world. (44, A. B.) Beautiful fiction, if the dream

was the offspring of Plato's imagination! More beautiful fact, if the dream was real! And we know not why we should doubt it. What more natural, than that such a notorious dreamer, so familiar with all the poetry of his country, especially that of Homer, and meditating of his speedy departure with lively and joyful imaginings by day, should dream of it under so poetical and attractive a form by night!

Crito now proceeds to press him with various and urgent motives—justice to himself, duty to his wife and children, regard to the affection and reputation of his friends, and the like—to bribe his keepers, forfeit his bail, and make his escape, declaring that it can be done at a very small expense, and he and the other friends would gladly meet any losses or dangers which might befall them in such a course, rather than lose such a friend, and moreover, incur the disgrace with the multitude of sacrificing him to the love of money. (44, c.; 46.) "But why, my dear Crito, why should we so much regard the opinion of the multitude? For the best men, whose opinion is most worthy of consideration, will *believe* that these things are, as they are in *reality*, and that not you, but myself, am responsible for my death." "Nevertheless, you see, Socrates, that it is *necessary* to pay attention to the opinion of the multitude, for the present circumstances show that the

multitude can effect, not the smallest of evils only, but nearly the greatest, if one is calumniated among them." "I could wish, Crito, the multitude were able to effect the greatest evils, that they might also accomplish the greatest good; for then it would be well. But now they can do neither of these. For they can neither make a man wise nor unwise." The same simple but sublime sentiment with which we have become familiar in the Apology: Character is the only thing pertaining to man that is of any account; and this his bitterest enemies cannot touch. "But they do just what they happen to do." (44, D. C.) That is, the conduct of the multitude, instead of being regulated by intelligent principle, is governed by blind chance; and such labors, however strenuous, are always fruitless. Accordingly, next to his great moral and religious mission, it was the perpetual study of Socrates's life to bring his countrymen, especially the young men of Athens, to a right understanding of themselves, their duties, and their pursuits, and thereby to an intelligent discharge of all the functions of proper manhood in the light of established rules and fixed principles.

The opinions of the multitude, he goes on to argue, are sometimes right and sometimes wrong; while the standard of rectitude is unchangeable and eternal. Our duty depends, not on the opinions of the multitude, nor does it change with the change

of our circumstances and interests. It has nothing to do with the consequences of our actions. Imprisonment, exile, death itself—these are bugbears to frighten children with, but they will not deter the true man from the performance of his duty, or swerve him in the least from adherence to principle. As to his escape from the prison without the consent of the rulers of the state, the great question, and the only question he can entertain is, whether it is right, since right reason is the only friend to whose solicitation he ever allowed himself to yield. The alacrity of his friends was very commendable, if rightly directed, but if not, the greater it was, by so much it was the more blameworthy. Against the dictates of reason and conscience, he could not be influenced in the least by a regard to the reputation of his friends or his own life. (46, B.; 47, A.)

A discussion ensues, in which Socrates proves to the conviction of Crito himself, that, in such a question, regard must be had, not to the opinions of the ignorant multitude, but of the truly wise, just as, in gymnastic exercises, the gymnast gives heed to the approbation or censure only of the physician or the master of the gymnasium (47, B. C. D.); that by acting unwisely and unjustly, the *soul* is corrupted and destroyed, which is a far greater evil than the disease or destruction of the body (47, E.; 48, B.); that it is not right to injure or retaliate an

injury in any case, least of all against one's country (49, A. seqq.); that the well-being of our country depends on the sacredness of the laws and the obedience of the citizens (50, B.), and our country should be obeyed and reverenced as a more sacred thing than father, or mother, or the dearest friends (51, A. B.); that a citizen by no means stands on an equal footing with his country, so as to have a right to treat her as she treats him, or to pronounce judgment on her acts as she does on his (50, E.); that every citizen who remains in a free country, which allows the inhabitants full liberty to emigrate when and where they please (especially if, like Socrates, he has remained during a long life, and never gone abroad at all, and never complained of the laws), has virtually assented to the justice of the laws, and has entered into a tacit compact to obey them, as interpreted and executed by their appointed guardians, unless he can persuade them to alter their decisions (52, A.; 53, A.); and that by escaping the penalty imposed upon him by the laws, he would convict himself of being a law-breaker, and make himself an object of suspicion as an enemy of law and justice, wherever he might go on earth, and even in Hades (53, B.; 54, B.). As the discussion proceeds, the laws seem to rise in dignity and sacredness, till they are seen embodied in a form more than human and enthroned in unearthly

majesty; and they are heard, in meek yet authoritative tones, expostulating with Socrates on the injustice, folly, and pernicious tendency of the course which his friends are recommending. Socrates, too, catches the spirit of the laws, becomes instinct, as it were, with their life, and, like the Pythian priestess or an inspired corybant, deaf to every other voice, can do only as the voice of law (which is the voice of God) commands him: "The voice of these expostulations rings in my ears, and I am unable to hear other arguments. Be assured, if you urge any thing of a contrary tenor, you will labor in vain. This way God leads; and in this way let us follow."

The Crito, like the Apology and the other dialogues that were written soon after the death of Socrates, has a twofold object—the one practical and personal, the vindication of Socrates from the charge of impiety, and corrupting the youth—the other ideal and universal, to exhibit the true idea of the good citizen, or the good man in his relation to the state. And, it is not too much to say, it accomplishes both these objects perfectly. It is a triumphant vindication of the character of Socrates, setting his patriotism in the strongest light, and showing that he sacrificed his life to what most men would deem an overscrupulous regard for the constituted authorities, even in an unjust and unright-

eous exercise of the power intrusted to them. At the same time, it sets forth the very beau ideal of the patriotic and loyal citizen, submitting to an unrighteous sentence (so long as it was according to the form of law, and since it concerned only himself, while no usurped authority of oligarchy or democracy could force him to do wrong to others), and with heroic, nay, religious devotion, laying himself a willing victim before the laws and on the altar of his country.

As a work of art, the Crito ranks very high—higher than the Apology; though, we think, the latter is capable of full vindication in this light, and stands on higher ground, simply as a work of art, than is commonly supposed. But the Crito, though the plot is exceedingly simple, and the *moral* of the dialogue is every where conspicuous, yet it is conformed to the most rigid rules of the drama. The unities of time, place and impression, are perfectly preserved. The scene is laid wholly in the prison—perhaps the same cell hewn out of the solid rock, near the Pnyx and the Agora, which now bears the name of "The Prison of Socrates." The hour is the morn of his anticipated execution, when he is awaked out of sound sleep by a visit of his most intimate personal friend, who comes, if possible, to persuade him to escape, as he easily may, the execution of his unjust sentence. The characters are

of the highest dignity and interest in themselves, and most intimately related to each other—Athens' wisest and best philosopher, and one of her wealthiest and most deserving citizens. The subject of discussion, as stated in the traditionary caption of the dialogue, and in the dialogue itself, is *περὶ πρακτέου*, or, WHAT OUGHT TO BE DONE, involving the whole duty of the citizen to the laws of his country, and, more remotely, the fundamental theory of government and society. On the result hang the life of the philosopher, the reputation and happiness of his numerous friends, and the interests of good order and good government, not only in Athens, but wherever Athenian influence shall be felt to the end of time. The persons, the principles, the interests involved, all awaken the liveliest sympathy. The affectionate solicitations, the persuasive arguments, the pathetic appeals, the generous friendship and self-sacrificing devotion of Crito, go to our hearts. While he speaks, we are more than half inclined to think, that not the desirable and the expedient only, but the true and the right, are on his side. But Socrates, forgetting himself, overlooking his family and friends, and looking beyond the mere reputation of Athens, and even the right and wrong of the present case in itself considered, holds us sternly to the consideration of the great principles of law and order which it involves, and

compels the assent of our reason and conscience, though against all our inclinations, and against the first dictates of our understandings. The conflict enters the breast of the reader. His judgment is perplexed with doubts and difficulties. His heart alternately hopes and fears the success of either party in the argument. As he feels constrained to assent more and more to the reasoning of Socrates, he wishes he could have decided otherwise. In the felicitous language of Stallbaum: "Etenim generosa Critonis amicitia æque afficiat et commoveat legentium animos necesse est, atque Socratis in virtute constantia et pia adversus leges publicas reverentia, ut velis idem et cum Socrate noluisse et cum Critone voluisse." And when, at the conclusion, Socrates, transported with veneration for the purity and dignity of the law, not of men only but of God also, and rapt with the vision of what awaited him beyond the grave, rises into something more than human, we sit looking on, by the side of his friend Crito and in the same state of mind, silenced, convinced against our will, no longer pitying, still less censuring, but admiring, envying, almost worshipping him, as he looks upward and longs to take his flight.

The Apology and the Crito bear unequivocal evidence of proceeding from the same author; and that author, Ast to the contrary notwithstanding, Plato, and Plato under the same hallowing and in-

spiring influence, and in the same happy state of mind. The language, the style, the constructions, the idioms, are all Platonic. The sentiments and the spirit are those of Plato under the immediate inspiration of the life and death of Socrates. They are both dramatic, and this marks them both as of Platonic origin. True, the one is a monologue, and the other is a dialogue. But thus only could he act his proper part in the different circumstances in which he is placed. In the one, he pleads his cause in open court before his judges; in the other, he argues his case in prison with his friend. But in both, we *see* him, we hear him, we sit at his feet, we drink in his words, we catch his spirit. In the one, he stands before us the impersonation of the true orator; in the other, the beau-ideal of the good citizen. But in both, the man rises far above his relations; the spirit overmasters the body and triumphs over all its outward circumstances. In both, we feel a spontaneous and irresistible conviction, that we see and hear the real Socrates uttering essentially his own sentiments, in essentially his own language, in two of the most real and most critical emergencies of his life. But in both we see him dramatized and idealized, at the same time that he is made real and represented as he is, with that inimitable skill and grace, which, together with his high spirituality, are the undisputed prerogatives of the divine Plato.

The present edition is, in the main, an exact reprint of Stallbaum's third edition, 1846. The few exceptions are specified in the notes, and the reasons given for the choice of a different reading. The notes of Stallbaum are so felicitous, especially in the illustration of Plato's peculiar idioms and constructions, that any one who has read them bears the results almost unconsciously with him in all his subsequent reading of the same author. Wherever I have consciously borrowed from him, I have given him credit in the notes. I have also had before me the editions of Bekker, Fischer, Forster, Heindorf, Ast, Schleiermacher, Buttmann, Nüsslin, Elberling, etc., together with versions in German, French, and English, too numerous to mention ; and have used them whenever they could be of use, though most of them have been of very little service. In conclusion, I can hardly leave a better wish for the student of these pages than that, with far less labor than they have cost me, he may receive some small portion of the pleasure and profit which I have derived from them. He must be more or less than human, who can rise from the study of these immortal works of Plato, without higher ideas of the authority of law, the sacredness of duty, the power of faith, and the dignity of man's rational, moral, and immortal nature.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

17 Cap. I. Ὅ τι μὲν ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πεπόνθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, οὐκ οἶδα· ἐγὼ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὀλίγου ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμην· οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καίτοι ἀληθές γε, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲν εἰρήκασι. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἓν ἐθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν ὧν ἐψεύσαντο, τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ ἔλεγον,
B ὡς χρῆν ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι, μὴ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατηθῆτε, ὡς δεινοῦ ὄντος λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυνθῆναι, ὅτι αὐτίκα ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξελεγχθήσονται ἔργῳ, ἐπειδὰν μηδ' ὁπωστιοῦν φαίνωμαι δεινὸς λέγειν, τοῦτό μοι ἔδοξεν αὐτῶν ἀναισχυντότατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα δεινὸν καλοῦσιν οὗτοι λέγειν τὸν τἀληθῆ λέγοντα· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο λέγουσιν, ὁμολογοίην ἂν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἤ τι ἢ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς εἰρήκασιν· ὑμεῖς δ' ἐμοῦ ἀκούσεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δί', ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κεκαλλιεπημένους γε λόγους, ὥσπερ οἱ τούτων, ῥήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν, οὐδὲ κεκοσμημέ-
C νους, ἀλλ' ἀκούσεσθε εἰκῇ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν ὀνόμασι· πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἃ λέγω, καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν προσδοκησάτω ἄλλως. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δήπου

πρέποι, ὦ ἄνδρες, τῇδε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, ὥσπερ μειρακίῳ, πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι. καὶ μέντοι καὶ πάνυ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ παρίεμαι· ἐὰν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκούητέ μου ἀπολογουμένου, δι' ὥνπερ εἴωθα λέγειν καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν, ἵνα ὑμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ ἀκηκόασι, καὶ ἄλλοθι, μήτε θαυμάζειν μήτε θορυβεῖν τούτου ἕνεκα. D ἔχει γὰρ οὑτωσί. νῦν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα, ἔτη γεγονὼς πλείω ἑβδομήκοντα· ἀτεχνῶς οὖν ξένως ἔχω τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως. ὥσπερ οὖν ἄν, εἰ τῷ ὄντι ξένος ἐτύγχανον ὤν, ξυνεγιγνώσκετε δήπου ἄν μοι, εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ ἔλεγον, ἐν οἷσπερ ἐτεθράμμην, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τοῦτο ὑμῶν 18 δέομαι δίκαιον, ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, τὸν μὲν τρόπον τῆς λέξεως ἐᾶν — ἴσως μὲν γάρ τι χείρων, ἴσως δὲ βελτίων ἂν εἴη — αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο σκοπεῖν καὶ τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγω, ἢ μή· δικαστοῦ μὲν γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετή, ῥήτορος δὲ τἀληθῆ λέγειν.

Cap. II. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δίκαιός εἰμι ἀπολογήσασθαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς τὰ πρῶτά μου ψευδῆ κατηγορημένα καὶ τοὺς πρώτους κατηγόρους, ἔπειτα δὲ πρὸς τὰ ὕστερα καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους. Ἐμοῦ γὰρ B πολλοὶ κατήγοροι γεγόνασι πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς λέγοντες· οὓς ἐγὼ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι ἢ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον, καίπερ ὄντας καὶ τούτους δεινούς. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοι δεινότεροι, ὦ ἄνδρες, οἳ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παίδων παραλαμβάνοντες ἔπειθόν τε καὶ κατηγόρουν ἐμοῦ οὐδὲν ἀληθές, ὡς ἔστι τις Σωκράτης, σοφὸς ἀνήρ, τά τε μετέωρα φροντιστής,

καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ἅπαντα ἀνεζητηκώς, καὶ τὸν ἥττω
C λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν. οὗτοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταύ-
την τὴν φήμην κατασκεδάσαντες, οἱ δεινοί εἰσί μου
κατήγοροι· οἱ γὰρ ἀκούοντες ἡγοῦνται τοὺς ταῦτα A
ζητοῦντας οὐδὲ θεοὺς νομίζειν. ἔπειτά εἰσιν οὗτοι οἱ
κατήγοροι πολλοὶ καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἤδη κατηγορηκό-
τες, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ λέγοντες πρὸς ὑμᾶς,
ἐν ᾗ ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε, παῖδες ὄντες, ἔνιοι δ'
ὑμῶν καὶ μειράκια, ἀτεχνῶς ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες, I
ἀπολογουμένου οὐδενός. ὃ δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι
οὐδὲ τὰ ὀνόματα οἷόν τε αὐτῶν εἰδέναι καὶ εἰπεῖν,
D πλὴν εἴ τις κωμῳδοποιὸς τυγχάνει ὤν. ὅσοι δὲ φθόνῳ
καὶ διαβολῇ χρώμενοι ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ
πεπεισμενοι ἄλλους πείθοντες, οὗτοι πάντες ἀπορώ-
τατοί εἰσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀναβιβάσασθαι οἷόν τ' ἐστὶν
αὐτῶν ἐνταυθοῖ οὐδ' ἐλέγξαι οὐδένα, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη
ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενόν τε καὶ
ἐλέγχειν μηδενὸς ἀποκρινομένου. Ἀξιώσατε οὖν καὶ
ὑμεῖς, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, διττούς μου τοὺς κατηγόρους
γεγονέναι, ἑτέρους μὲν τοὺς ἄρτι κατηγορήσαντας,
E ἑτέρους δὲ τοὺς πάλαι, οὓς ἐγὼ λέγω. καὶ οἰήθητε δεῖν
πρὸς ἐκείνους πρῶτόν με ἀπολογήσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ
ὑμεῖς ἐκείνων πρότερον ἠκούσατε κατηγορούντων, καὶ
πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶνδε τῶν ὕστερον.

19 Εἶεν. ἀπολογητέον δή, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ
ἐπιχειρητέον ὑμῶν ἐξελέσθαι τὴν διαβολήν, ἣν ὑμεῖς
ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἔσχετε, ταύτην ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ
χρόνῳ. βουλοίμην μὲν οὖν ἂν τοῦτο οὕτω γενέσθαι, εἴ
τι ἄμεινον καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοί, καὶ πλέον τί με ποιῆσαι

ἀπολογούμενον· οἶμαι δὲ αὐτὸ χαλεπὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐ πάνυ με λανθάνει οἷόν ἐστιν. ὅμως τοῦτο μὲν ἴτω ὅπῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστέον καὶ ἀπολογητέον.

Cap. III. Ἀναλάβωμεν οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τίς ἡ κατηγορία ἐστίν, ἐξ ἧς ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ γέγονεν, ᾗ δὴ καὶ πιστεύων Μέλητός με ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην. Εἶεν. τί δὴ λέγοντες διέβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες; ὥσπερ οὖν κατηγόρων τὴν ἀντωμοσίαν δεῖ ἀναγνῶναι αὐτῶν. Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ καὶ περιεργάζεται ζητῶν τά τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ τὰ ἐπουράνια, καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν, καὶ ἄλλους ταὐτὰ ταῦτα διδάσκων. Τοιαύτη τίς ἐστι· ταῦτα γὰρ ἑωρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κωμῳδίᾳ, Σωκράτη τινὰ ἐκεῖ περιφερόμενον, φάσκοντά τε ἀεροβατεῖν καὶ ἄλλην πολλὴν φλυαρίαν φλυαροῦντα, ὧν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν πέρι ἐπαΐω. καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀτιμάζων λέγω τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην, εἴ τις περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοφός ἐστι. μή πως ἐγὼ ὑπὸ Μελήτου τοσαύτας δίκας φύγοιμι! ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδὲν μέτεστι. μάρτυρας δ' αὐτοὺς ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι, καὶ ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν, ὅσοι ἐμοῦ πώποτε ἀκηκόατε διαλεγομένου· πολλοὶ δὲ ὑμῶν οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσι. φράζετε οὖν ἀλλήλοις, εἰ πώποτε ἢ σμικρὸν ἢ μέγα ἤκουσέ τις ὑμῶν ἐμοῦ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαλεγομένου· καὶ ἐκ τούτων γνώσεσθε, ὅτι τοιαῦτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τἆλλα περὶ ἐμοῦ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν.

Cap. IV. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε τούτων οὐδέν ἐστιν,

οὐδέ γ' εἴ τινος ἀκηκόατε, ὡς ἐγὼ παιδεύειν ἐπιχειρῶ
Ε ἀνθρώπους καὶ χρήματα πράττομαι, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀλη-
θές. ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτό γέ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἴ τις
οἷός τ' εἴη παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους, ὥσπερ Γοργίας τε ὁ
Λεοντῖνος, καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος, καὶ Ἱππίας ὁ Ἠλεῖος.
τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστος, ὦ ἄνδρες, οἷός τ' ἐστὶν ἰὼν εἰς
ἑκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους, οἷς ἔξεστι τῶν ἑαυ-
τῶν πολιτῶν προῖκα ξυνεῖναι ᾧ ἂν βούλωνται, τού-
τους πείθουσι τὰς ἐκείνων ξυνουσίας ἀπολιπόντας
20 σφίσι ξυνεῖναι χρήματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσειδέ-
ναι. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλος ἀνήρ ἐστι Πάριος ἐνθάδε σοφός,
ὃν ἐγὼ ᾐσθόμην ἐπιδημοῦντα· ἔτυχον γὰρ προσελθὼν
ἀνδρὶ, ὃς τετέλεκε χρήματα σοφισταῖς πλείω ἢ ξύμ-
παντες οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλίᾳ τῷ Ἱππονίκου. τοῦτον οὖν
ἀνηρόμην — ἐστὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ δύο υἱέε — Ὦ Καλλία,
ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ μέν σου τὼ υἱέε πώλω ἢ μόσχω ἐγε-
νέσθην, εἴχομεν ἂν αὐτοῖν ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν καὶ
Β μισθώσασθαι, ὃς ἔμελλεν αὐτὼ καλώ τε κἀγαθὼ
ποιήσειν τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετήν· ἦν δ' ἂν οὗτος ἢ
τῶν ἱππικῶν τις ἢ τῶν γεωργικῶν· νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ
ἀνθρώπω ἐστόν, τίνα αὐτοῖν ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἐπιστάτην
λαβεῖν; τίς τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τε
καὶ πολιτικῆς, ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν; οἶμαι γάρ σε ἐσκέφ-
θαι διὰ τὴν τῶν υἱέων κτῆσιν. ἔστι τις, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἢ
οὔ; Πάνυ γε, ἢ δ' ὅς. Τίς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ποδαπός;
καὶ πόσου διδάσκει; Εὔηνος, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, Πά-
ριος, πέντε μνῶν. Καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Εὔηνον ἐμακάρισα, εἰ
ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔχει ταύτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ οὕτως ἐμμε-
Ο λῶς διδάσκει. ἐγὼ γοῦν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκαλλυνόμην τε καὶ

ἠβρυνόμην ἄν, εἰ ἠπιστάμην ταῦτα· ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.

Cap. V. Τπολάβοι οὖν ἄν τις ὑμῶν ἴσως, Ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ σὸν τί ἐστι πρᾶγμα; πόθεν αἱ διαβολαί σοι αὗται γεγόνασιν; οὐ γὰρ δήπου, σοῦ γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου, ἔπειτα τοσαύτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν, εἰ μή τι ἔπραττες ἀλλοῖον ἢ οἱ πολλοί. λέγε οὖν ἡμῖν, τί ἐστιν, ἵνα μὴ ἡμεῖς περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχεδιάζωμεν. Ταυτί μοι δοκεῖ δίκαια λέγειν ὁ λέγων, κἀγὼ ὑμῖν πειράσομαι ἀποδεῖξαι, τί ποτ' ἔστι τοῦτο, ὃ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκε τό τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν. ἀκούετε δή. καὶ ἴσως μὲν δόξω τισὶν ὑμῶν παίζειν, εὖ μέντοι ἴστε, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐρῶ. Ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δι' οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἔσχηκα. ποίαν δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην; ἥπερ ἐστὶν ἴσως ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία. τῷ ὄντι γὰρ κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἶναι σοφός· οὗτοι δὲ τάχ' ἄν, οὓς ἄρτι ἔλεγον, μείζω τινὰ ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶεν, ἢ οὐκ ἔχω, τί λέγω· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτὴν ἐπίσταμαι, ἀλλ' ὅστις φησὶ ψεύδεταί τε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει. καί μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ θορυβήσητε, μηδὲ ἂν δόξω τι ὑμῖν μέγα λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν λόγον, ὃν ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀξιόχρεων ὑμῖν τὸν λέγοντα ἀνοίσω. τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δή τίς ἐστι σοφία καὶ οἵα, μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέξομαι τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς. Χαιρε- 21
φῶντα γὰρ ἴστε που. οὗτος ἐμός τε ἑταῖρος ἦν ἐκ νέου, καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἑταῖρός τε καὶ ξυνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ μεθ' ὑμῶν κατῆλθε. καὶ ἴστε δή,

οἷος ἦν Χαιρεφῶν, ὡς σφοδρὸς ἐφ' ὅ τι ὁρμήσειε. καὶ
δή ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐλθὼν ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο μαν-
τεύσασθαι, — καί, ὅπερ λέγω, μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄν-
δρες. ἤρετο γὰρ δή, εἴ τις ἐμοῦ εἴη σοφώτερος. ἀνεῖλεν
οὖν ἡ Πυθία μηδένα σοφώτερον εἶναι. καὶ τούτων πέρι
ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῖν αὐτοῦ οὑτοσὶ μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖ-
νος τετελεύτηκε.

B ΣΩΚΡ. VI. Σκέψασθε δὲ ᾧν ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγω·
μέλλω γὰρ ὑμᾶς διδάξειν, ὅθεν μοι ἡ διαβολὴ γέγονε.
ταῦτα γὰρ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐνεθυμούμην οὑτωσί, Τί ποτε
λέγει ὁ θεός, καὶ τί ποτε αἰνίττεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὔτε
μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ξύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὤν· τί οὖν
ποτε λέγει φάσκων ἐμὲ σοφώτατον εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ δή-
που ψεύδεταί γε· οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ. καὶ πολὺν μὲν
χρόνον ἠπόρουν, τί ποτε λέγει, ἔπειτα μόγις πάνυ ἐπὶ
ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἐτραπόμην. ἦλθον ἐπί
C τινα τῶν δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι, ὡς ἐνταῦθα, εἴπερ
που, ἐλέγξων τὸ μαντεῖον καὶ ἀποφανῶν τῷ χρησμῷ,
ὅτι Οὑτοσὶ ἐμοῦ σοφώτερός ἐστι, σὺ δ' ἐμὲ ἔφησθα.
διασκοπῶν οὖν τοῦτον — ὀνόματι γὰρ οὐδὲν δέομαι
λέγειν, ἦν δέ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν, πρὸς ὃν ἐγὼ σκοπῶν
τοιοῦτόν τι ἔπαθον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι — καὶ διαλε-
γόμενος αὐτῷ, ἔδοξέ μοι οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι
σοφὸς ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα
ἑαυτῷ, εἶναι δ' οὔ. κἄπειτα ἐπειρώμην αὐτῷ δεικνύναι,
D ὅτι οἴοιτο μὲν εἶναι σοφός, εἴη δ' οὔ. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τού-
τῳ τε ἀπηχθόμην καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν παρόντων. πρὸς
ἐμαυτὸν δ' οὖν ἀπιὼν ἐλογιζόμην, ὅτι Τούτου μὲν τοῦ
ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφώτερός εἰμι· κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ

ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν οἴεταί τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δέ, ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἴομαι. ἔοικα γοῦν τούτου γε σμικρῷ τινι αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφώτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἃ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἴομαι εἰδέναι. ἐντεῦθεν ἐπ' ἄλλον ἦα τῶν ἐκείνου δοκούντων σοφωτέρων εἶναι, καί μοι ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἔδοξε. καὶ ἐνταῦθα κἀκείνῳ καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς ἀπη- E
χθόμην.

Cap. VII. Μετὰ ταῦτ' οὖν ἤδη ἐφεξῆς ἦα, αἰσθανόμενος μὲν καὶ λυπούμενος καὶ δεδιώς, ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμην, ὅμως δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐδόκει εἶναι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖσθαι. ἰτέον οὖν, σκοποῦντι τὸν χρησμὸν τί λέγει, ἐπὶ ἅπαντας τούς τι δοκοῦντας εἰδέναι. καὶ νὴ τὸν κύνα, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, — δεῖ 22
γὰρ πρὸς ὑμᾶς τἀληθῆ λέγειν — ἦ μὴν ἐγὼ ἔπαθόν τι τοιοῦτον· οἱ μὲν μάλιστα εὐδοκιμοῦντες ἔδοξάν μοι ὀλίγου δεῖν τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι ζητοῦντι κατὰ τὸν θεόν, ἄλλοι δὲ δοκοῦντες φαυλότεροι ἐπιεικέστεροι εἶναι ἄνδρες πρὸς τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν. δεῖ δὴ ὑμῖν τὴν ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδεῖξαι, ὥσπερ πόνους τινὰς πονοῦντος, ἵνα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἡ μαντεία γένοιτο. Μετὰ γὰρ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ἦα ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητάς τούς τε τῶν τραγῳδιῶν καὶ τοὺς τῶν διθυράμβων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὡς B
ἐνταῦθα ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ καταληψόμενος ἐμαυτὸν ἀμαθέστερον ἐκείνων ὄντα. ἀναλαμβάνων οὖν αὐτῶν τὰ ποιήματα, ἃ μοι ἐδόκει μάλιστα πεπραγματεῦσθαι αὐτοῖς, διηρώτων ἂν αὐτοὺς τί λέγοιεν, ἵν' ἅμα τι καὶ μανθάνοιμι παρ' αὐτῶν. αἰσχύνομαι οὖν ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες, τἀληθῆ· ὅμως δὲ ῥητέον. ὡς ἔπος γὰρ

εἰπεῖν, ὀλίγου αὐτῶν ἅπαντες οἱ παρόντες ἂν βέλτιον ἔλεγον περὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ ἐπεποιήκεσαν. ἔγνων οὖν καὶ
C περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὀλίγῳ τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφίᾳ ποιοῖεν, ἃ ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμῳδοί· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ἴσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσι. τοιοῦτόν τί μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεπονθότες. καὶ ἅμα ἠσθόμην αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν ποίησιν οἰομένων καὶ τἆλλα σοφωτάτων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων, ἃ οὐκ ἦσαν. ἀπῆα οὖν καὶ ἐντεῦθεν, τῷ αὐτῷ οἰόμενος περιγεγονέναι ὥπερ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.

Cap. VIII. Τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τοὺς χειροτέχνας
D ᾖα· ἐμαυτῷ γὰρ ξυνῄδειν οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένῳ, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τούτους δέ γ' ἤδειν ὅτι εὑρήσοιμι πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐπισταμένους. καὶ τούτου μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσθην, ἀλλ' ἠπίσταντο ἃ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην καί μου ταύτῃ σοφώτεροι ἦσαν. ἀλλ', ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταὐτόν μοι ἔδοξαν ἔχειν ἁμάρτημα, ὅπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταί, καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί· διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην καλῶς ἐξεργάζεσθαι ἕκαστος ἠξίου καὶ τἆλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφώτατος εἶναι, καὶ αὐτῶν αὕτη ἡ πλημμέλεια ἐκείνην τὴν σοφίαν ἀπέκρυπτεν· ὥστ' ἐμὲ ἐμαυτὸν ἀνερωτᾶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ, πότερα δεξαίμην ἂν οὕτως ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν, μήτε τι σοφὸς ὢν τὴν ἐκείνων σοφίαν, μήτε ἀμαθὴς τὴν ἀμαθίαν, ἢ ἀμφότερα ἃ ἐκεῖνοι ἔχουσιν ἔχειν. ἀπεκρινάμην οὖν ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τῷ χρησμῷ, ὅτι μοι λυσιτελοῖ ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν.

Cap. IX. Ἐκ ταυτησὶ δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως, ὦ ἄν-
23 δρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθειαί μοι γεγόνασι

καὶ οἶαι χαλεπώταται καὶ βαρύταται, ὥστε πολλὰς διαβολὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γεγονέναι, ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι. οἴονται γάρ με ἑκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφόν, ἃ ἂν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω· τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενός· καὶ φαίνεται τοῦτ' οὐ λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη, προσκεχρῆσθαι δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὀνόματι, ἐμὲ παράδειγμα ποιούμενος, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἴποι, ὅτι Οὗτος ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, σοφώτατός ἐστιν, ὅστις ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔγνωκεν, ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιιὼν ζητῶ καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ τῶν ξένων ἄν τινα οἴωμαι σοφὸν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπειδάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφός. καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσχολίας οὔτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πρᾶξαί μοι σχολὴ γέγονεν ἄξιον λόγου οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων, ἀλλ' ἐν πενίᾳ μυρίᾳ εἰμὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

Cap. X. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες, οἷς μάλιστα σχολή ἐστιν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων, αὐτόματοι χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται, εἶτα ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν· κἄπειτα, οἶμαι, εὑρίσκουσι πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν οἰομένων μὲν εἰδέναι τι ἀνθρώπων, εἰδότων δὲ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν οἱ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐξεταζόμενοι ἐμοὶ ὀργίζονται, ἀλλ' οὐχ αὑτοῖς, καὶ λέγουσιν, ὡς Σωκράτης τίς ἐστι μιαρώτατος καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους. καὶ ἐπειδάν τις αὐτοὺς

ἐρωτᾷ, ὅ τι ποίων καὶ ὅ τι διδάσκων, ἔχουσι μὲν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦσιν, ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀπορεῖν, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα· λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς, καὶ θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν, καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν. τὰ γὰρ ἀληθῆ, οἶμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοιεν λέγειν, ὅτι κατάδηλοι γίγνονται προσποιούμενοι μὲν εἰδέναι, εἰδότες δὲ οὐδέν. ἅτε οὖν, οἶμαι, φιλότιμοι ὄντες καὶ σφοδροὶ καὶ
E πολλοί, καὶ ξυντεταγμένως καὶ πιθανῶς λέγοντες περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐμπεπλήκασιν ὑμῶν τὰ ὦτα καὶ πάλαι καὶ σφοδρῶς διαβάλλοντες. ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μέλητός μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων, Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθόμενος, Ἄνυτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν
24 καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, Λύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων. ὥστε, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, θαυμάζοιμ' ἄν, εἰ οἷός τ' εἴην ἐγὼ ὑμῶν ταύτην τὴν διαβολὴν ἐξελέσθαι ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, οὕτω πολλὴν γεγονυῖαν. Ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τἀληθῆ, καὶ ὑμᾶς οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ἀποκρυψάμενος ἐγὼ λέγω οὐδ' ὑποστειλάμενος. καίτοι οἶδα σχεδὸν, ὅτι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀπεχθάνομαι. ὃ καὶ τεκμήριον, ὅτι τἀληθῆ λέγω καὶ ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ διαβολὴ ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ τὰ αἴτια ταῦτά.
B ἐστι. καὶ ἐάν τε νῦν ἐάν τε αὖθις ζητήσητε ταῦτα, οὕτως εὑρήσετε.

Cap. XI. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ὧν οἱ πρῶτοί μου κατήγοροι κατηγόρουν αὕτη ἔστω ἱκανὴ ἀπολογία πρὸς ὑμᾶς· πρὸς δὲ Μέλητον τὸν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ φιλόπολιν, ὥς φησι, καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους μετὰ ταῦτα πειράσομαι ἀπολογεῖσθαι. αὖθις γὰρ δή, ὥσπερ ἑτέρων τούτων

ὄντων κατηγόρων, λάβωμεν αὖ τὴν τούτων ἀντωμοσίαν. ἔχει δέ πως ὧδε· Σωκράτη φησὶν ἀδικεῖν τούς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ θεοὺς οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά. τὸ μὲν δὴ ἔγκλημα C τοιοῦτόν ἐστι· τούτου δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος ἓν ἕκαστον ἐξετάσωμεν. Φησὶ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς νέους ἀδικεῖν με διαφθείροντα. ἐγὼ δέ γε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀδικεῖν φημι Μέλητον, ὅτι σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεται, ῥᾳδίως εἰς ἀγῶνας καθιστὰς ἀνθρώπους, περὶ πραγμάτων προσποιούμενος σπουδάζειν καὶ κήδεσθαι, ὧν οὐδὲν τούτῳ πώποτε ἐμέλησεν. ὡς δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, πειράσομαι καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιδεῖξαι.

Cap. XII. Καί μοι δεῦρο, ὦ Μέλητε, εἰπέ, Ἄλλο τι περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι οἱ νεώτεροι D ἔσονται; Ἔγωγε. Ἴθι δὴ νῦν εἰπὲ τούτοις, τίς αὐτοὺς βελτίους ποιεῖ; δῆλον γὰρ, ὅτι οἶσθα, μέλον γέ σοι. τὸν μὲν γὰρ διαφθείροντα ἐξευρών, ὡς φῄς, ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις τουτοισὶ καὶ κατηγορεῖς· τὸν δὲ δὴ βελτίους ποιοῦντα ἴθι εἰπὲ καὶ μήνυσον αὐτοῖς, τίς ἐστιν. ὁρᾷς, ὦ Μέλητε, ὅτι σιγᾷς καὶ οὐκ ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; καίτοι οὐκ αἰσχρόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον οὗ δὴ ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτι σοι οὐδὲν μεμέληκεν; ἀλλ' εἰπέ, ὦ γαθέ, τίς αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους ποιεῖ; Οἱ νόμοι. Ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο E ἐρωτῶ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀλλὰ τίς ἄνθρωπος, ὅστις πρῶτον καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἶδε, τοὺς νόμους. Οὗτοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ δικασταί. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Μέλητε; οἵδε τοὺς νέους παιδεύειν οἷοί τέ εἰσι καὶ βελτίους ποιεῖν; Μάλιστα. Πότερον ἅπαντες, ἢ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν, οἱ δ' οὔ; Ἅπαντες. Εὖ γε νὴ τὴν Ἥραν λέγεις, καὶ πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν τῶν

ὠφελούντων. τί δαὶ δή, οἵδε οἱ ἀκροαταὶ βελτίους ποιοῦσιν, ἢ οὔ; Καὶ οὗτοι. Τί δαὶ οἱ βουλευταί; Καὶ οἱ βουλευταί. Ἀλλ' ἄρα, ὦ Μέλητε, μὴ οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, οἱ ἐκκλησιασταί, διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ κἀκεῖνοι βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἅπαντες; Κἀκεῖνοι. Πάντες ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ἀθηναῖοι καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς ποιοῦσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ μόνος διαφθείρω. οὕτω λέγεις; Πάνυ σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πολλήν γ' ἐμοῦ κατέγνωκας δυστυχίαν. καί μοι ἀπόκριναι· ἢ καὶ περὶ ἵππους οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν; οἱ μὲν βελτίους ποιοῦντες αὐτοὺς πάντες ἄνθρωποι εἶναι, εἷς δέ τις ὁ διαφθείρων; ἢ τοὐναντίον τούτου πᾶν εἷς μέν τις ὁ βελτίους οἷός τ' ὢν ποιεῖν ἢ πάνυ ὀλίγοι, οἱ ἱππικοί· οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἐάνπερ ξυνῶσι καὶ χρῶνται ἵπποις, διαφθείρουσιν; οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Μέλητε, καὶ περὶ ἵππων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ζώων; πάντως δή που, ἐάν τε σὺ καὶ Ἄνυτος οὐ φῆτε ἐάν τε φῆτε· πολλὴ γὰρ ἂν τις εὐδαιμονία εἴη περὶ τοὺς νέους, εἰ εἷς μὲν μόνος αὐτοὺς διαφθείρει, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ὠφελοῦσιν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Μέλητε, ἱκανῶς ἐπιδείκνυσαι, ὅτι οὐδεπώποτε ἐφρόντισας τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφῶς ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδέν σοι μεμέληκε περὶ ὧν ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις.

Cap. XIII. Ἔτι δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπέ, ὦ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε, πότερον ἔστιν οἰκεῖν ἄμεινον ἐν πολίταις χρηστοῖς, ἢ πονηροῖς; ὦ τᾶν, ἀπόκριναι· οὐδὲν γάρ τοι χαλεπὸν ἐρωτῶ. οὐχ οἱ μὲν πονηροὶ κακόν τι ἐργάζονται τοὺς ἀεὶ ἐγγυτάτω ἑαυτῶν ὄντας, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθόν τι; Πάνυ γε. Ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται ὑπὸ

τῶν ξυνόντων βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελεῖσθαι; ἀπόκριναι, ὦ 'γαθέ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἔσθ' ὅστις βούλεται βλάπτεσθαι; Οὐ δῆτα. Φέρε δή, πότερον ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις δεῦρο ὡς διαφθείροντα τοὺς νεωτέρους καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιοῦντα ἑκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα; Ἑκόντα ἔγωγε. Τί δῆτα, ὦ Μέλητε; τοσοῦτον σὺ ἐμοῦ σοφώτερος εἶ τηλικούτου ὄντος τηλικόσδε ὤν, ὥστε σὺ μὲν ἔγνωκας, ὅτι οἱ μὲν κακοὶ κακόν τι ἐργάζονται ἀεὶ τοὺς μάλιστα πλησίον ἑαυτῶν, οἱ δὲ Ε ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθόν· ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἥκω, ὥστε καὶ τοῦτ' ἀγνοῶ, ὅτι, ἐάν τινα μοχθηρὸν ποιήσω τῶν ξυνόντων, κινδυνεύσω κακόν τι λαβεῖν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ὥστε τοῦτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἑκὼν ποιῶ, ὡς φῂς σύ; ταῦτα ἐγώ σοι οὐ πείθομαι, ὦ Μέλητε, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα· ἀλλ' ἢ οὐ διαφθείρω, ἤ, εἰ 26 διαφθείρω, ἄκων, ὥστε σύ γε κατ' ἀμφότερα ψεύδει. εἰ δὲ ἄκων διαφθείρω, τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἀκουσίων ἁμαρτημάτων οὐ δεῦρο νόμος εἰσάγειν ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἰδίᾳ λαβόντα διδάσκειν καὶ νουθετεῖν· δῆλον γὰρ, ὅτι, ἐὰν μάθω, παύσομαι ὅ γε ἄκων ποιῶ. σὺ δὲ ξυγγενέσθαι μέν μοι καὶ διδάξαι ἔφυγες καὶ οὐκ ἠθέλησας, δεῦρο δὲ εἰσάγεις, οἷ νόμος ἐστὶν εἰσάγειν τοὺς κολάσεως δεομένους, ἀλλ' οὐ μαθήσεως.

Cap. XIV. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο μὲν δῆλον ἤδη ἐστίν, ὃ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι Μελήτῳ τού- Β των οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν πώποτε ἐμέλησεν. ὅμως δὲ δὴ λέγε ἡμῖν, πῶς με φῂς διαφθείρειν, ὦ Μέλητε, τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἦ δῆλον δή, ὅτι κατὰ τὴν γραφήν, ἣν ἐγράψω, θεοὺς διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζειν οὓς ἡ πόλις

νομίζει, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις ὅτι διδάσκων διαφθείρω; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πρὸς αὐτῶν τοίνυν, ὦ Μέλητε, τούτων τῶν θεῶν, ὧν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, εἰπὲ ἔτι σαφέστερον καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσι τουτοισί. ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι
C μαθεῖν, πότερον λέγεις διδάσκειν με νομίζειν εἶναί τινας θεούς, καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα νομίζω εἶναι θεοὺς καὶ οὐκ εἰμὶ τὸ παράπαν ἄθεος οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ἀδικῶ, οὐ μέντοι οὕσπερ γε ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ' ἑτέρους, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὅ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτι ἑτέρους· ἢ παντάπασί με φὴς οὔτε αὐτὸν νομίζειν θεοὺς τούς τε ἄλλους ταῦτα διδάσκειν. Ταῦτα λέγω, ὡς τὸ παράπαν οὐ νομίζεις θεούς. Ὦ θαυ-
D μάσιε Μέλητε, ἵνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις; οὐδὲ ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην ἆρα νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι; Μὰ Δί', ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον λίθον φησὶν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν. Ἀναξαγόρου οἴει κατηγορεῖν, ὦ φίλε Μέλητε· καὶ οὕτω καταφρονεῖς τῶνδε καὶ οἴει αὐτοὺς ἀπείρους γραμμάτων εἶναι, ὥστε οὐκ εἰδέναι, ὅτι τὰ Ἀναξαγόρου βιβλία, τοῦ Κλαζομενίου, γέμει τούτων τῶν λόγων. καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νέοι ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μανθάνουσιν, ἃ ἔξεστιν
E ἐνίοτε, εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ δραχμῆς ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας πριαμένοις Σωκράτους καταγελᾶν, ἐὰν προσποιῆται ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ οὕτως ἄτοπα ὄντα. ἀλλ' ὦ πρὸς Διός, οὑτωσί σοι δοκῶ οὐδένα νομίζειν θεὸν εἶναι; Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δί', οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν. Ἄπιστός γ' εἶ, ὦ Μέλητε, καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, σαυτῷ. ἐμοί γαρ δοκεῖ οὑτοσί, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πάνυ εἶναι ὑβριστὴς καὶ ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τὴν γραφὴν

ταύτην ὕβρει τινὶ καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ καὶ νεότητι γράψασθαι. ἔοικε γὰρ ὥσπερ αἴνιγμα ξυντιθέντι διαπειρω- 27
μένῳ, Ἆρα γνώσεται Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζομένου καὶ ἐναντι' ἐμαυτῷ λέγοντος, ἢ ἐξαπατήσω αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἀκούοντας; οὗτος γὰρ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἶπoι Ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἀλλὰ θεοὺς νομίζων. καίτοι τοῦτό ἐστι παίζοντος.

Cap. XV. Ξυνεπισκέψασθε δή, ὦ ἄνδρες, ᾗ μοι φαίνεται ταῦτα λέγειν· σὺ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀπόκριναι, ὦ Μέλητε. ὑμεῖς δέ, ὅπερ κατ' ἀρχὰς ὑμᾶς παρῃτησά- B
μην, μέμνησθέ μοι μὴ θορυβεῖν, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ εἰωθότι τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους ποιῶμαι.

Ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων, ὦ Μέλητε, ἀνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, ἀνθρώπους δὲ οὐ νομίζει; ἀποκρινέσθω, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυβείτω. ἔσθ' ὅστις ἵππους μὲν οὐ νομίζει εἶναι, ἱππικὰ δὲ πράγματα; ἢ αὐλητὰς μὲν οὐ νομίζει, αὐλητικὰ δὲ πράγματα; οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν· εἰ μὴ σὺ βούλει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἐγὼ σοὶ λέγω καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τουτοισί. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γε ἀπόκριναι. ἔσθ' ὅστις δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, δαίμονας C
δὲ οὐ νομίζει; Οὐκ ἔστιν. Ὡς ὤνησας, ὅτι μόγις ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τουτωνὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος. οὐκοῦν δαιμόνια μὲν φῄς με καὶ νομίζειν καὶ διδάσκειν, εἴτ' οὖν καινὰ εἴτε παλαιά· ἀλλ' οὖν δαιμόνιά γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ διωμόσω ἐν τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ. εἰ δὲ δαιμόνια νομίζω, καὶ δαίμονας δήπου πολλὴ

ἀνάγκη νομίζειν μέ ἐστιν. οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; ἔχει δή· τίθημι γάρ σε ὁμολογοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀποκρίνει. D τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἤτοι θεούς γε ἡγούμεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας; φῂς ἢ οὔ; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι, ὡς σὺ φῄς, εἰ μὲν θεοί τινές εἰσιν οἱ δαίμονες, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ὃ ἐγώ φημί σε αἰνίττεσθαι καὶ χαριεντίζεσθαι, θεοὺς οὐχ ἡγούμενον φάναι ἐμὲ θεοὺς αὖ ἡγεῖσθαι πάλιν, ἐπειδήπερ γε δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι· εἰ δ' αὖ οἱ δαίμονες θεῶν παῖδές εἰσι νόθοι τινὲς ἢ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἔκ τινων ἄλλων, ὧν δὴ καὶ λέγονται, τίς ἂν ἀνθρώπων θεῶν μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ μή; ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν ἄτοπον εἴη, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἵππων E μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο ἢ καὶ ὄνων τοὺς ἡμιόνους, ἵππους δὲ καὶ ὄνους μὴ ἡγοῖτο εἶναι. ἀλλ', ὦ Μέλητε, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως σὺ ταῦτα οὐχὶ ἀποπειρώμενος ἡμῶν ἐγράψω τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην, ἢ ἀπορῶν ὅ τι ἐγκαλοῖς ἐμοὶ ἀληθὲς ἀδίκημα· ὅπως δὲ σύ τινα πείθοις ἂν καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα ἀνθρώπων, ὡς [οὐ] τοῦ αὐτοῦ [ἀνδρός] ἐστι καὶ δαιμόνια καὶ θεῖα ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ αὖ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μήτε δαίμονας μήτε θεοὺς μήτε ἥρωας, οὐδεμία μηχανή 28 ἐστιν.

Cap. XVI. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀδικῶ κατὰ τὴν Μελήτου γραφήν, οὐ πολλῆς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπολογίας, ἀλλ' ἱκανὰ καὶ ταῦτα· ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλή μοι ἀπέχθεια γέγονε καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστι. καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ ἐμὲ αἱρήσει, ἐάντερ αἱρῇ, οὐ Μέλητος, οὐδὲ Ἄνυτος, ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος, ἃ δὴ πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους καὶ

ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἤρηκεν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ αἱρήσειν· οὐδὲν δὲ δεινόν, μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῇ. B

Ἴσως δ' ἂν οὖν εἴποι τις, Εἶτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτηδεύσας, ἐξ οὗ κινδυνεύεις νυνὶ ἀποθανεῖν; Ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἂν δίκαιον λόγον ἀντείποιμι, ὅτι Οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, εἰ οἴει δεῖν κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι ἄνδρα, ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖν, ὅταν πράττῃ τι, πότερον δίκαια ἢ ἄδικα πράττει, καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ κακοῦ. φαῦλοι γὰρ ἂν τῷ γε σῷ λόγῳ εἶεν τῶν ἡμιθέων ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτήκασιν, οἵ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτι- C
δος υἱός, ὃς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κινδύνου κατεφρόνησε παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρόν τι ὑπομεῖναι, ὥστε ἐπειδὴ εἶπεν ἡ μήτηρ αὐτῷ προθυμουμένῳ Ἕκτορα ἀποκτεῖναι, θεὸς οὖσα, οὑτωσί πως, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, Ὦ παῖ, εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἑταίρῳ τὸν φόνον καὶ Ἕκτορα ἀποκτενεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανεῖ· αὐτίκα γάρ τοι, φησί, μετ' Ἕκτορα πότμος ἑτοῖμος· ὁ δὲ ταῦτ' ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν θανάτου καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ὠλιγώρησε, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον δείσας D
τὸ ζῆν κακὸς ὢν καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μὴ τιμωρεῖν, Αὐτίκα, φησί, τεθναίην δίκην ἐπιθεὶς τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, ἵνα μὴ ἐνθάδε μένω καταγέλαστος παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν, ἄχθος ἀρούρης. μὴ αὐτὸν οἴει φροντίσαι θανάτου καὶ κινδύνου; οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ· οὗ ἄν τις ἑαυτὸν τάξῃ ἢ ἡγησάμενος βέλτιον εἶναι ἢ ὑπ' ἄρχοντος ταχθῇ, ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοντα κινδυνεύειν, μηδὲν ὑπολογιζόμενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ.

Cap. XVII. Ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἂν εἴην εἰργασμένος,
E ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ, ὅτε μέν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταττον,
οὓς ὑμεῖς εἵλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ καὶ ἐν
Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, τότε μὲν οὗ ἐκεῖνοι ἔταττον
ἔμενον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις, καὶ ἐκινδύνευον ἀποθα-
νεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος, ὡς ἐγὼ φήθην τε καὶ
ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ζῆν καὶ ἐξετάζοντα
29 ἐμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεὶς ἢ
θάνατον ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν.
δεινὸν μέντ' ἂν εἴη, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τότ' ἄν με δικαίως
εἰσάγοι τις εἰς δικαστήριον, ὅτι οὐ νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι,
ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδιὼς θάνατον καὶ οἰόμενος
σοφὸς εἶναι, οὐκ ὤν. τὸ γάρ τοι θάνατον δεδιέναι, ὦ
ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι, μὴ
ὄντα· δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναι ἐστὶν ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν. οἶδε μὲν
γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνατον οὐδ' εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ
πάντων μέγιστον ὂν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδίασι δ' ὡς εὖ
εἰδότες, ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστι. καὶ τοῦτο πῶς
B οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν αὕτη ἡ ἐπονείδιστος, ἡ τοῦ οἴεσθαι
εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν; ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ ἄνδρες, τούτῳ καὶ ἐν-
ταῦθα ἴσως διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ εἰ δή
τῳ σοφώτερός του φαίην εἶναι, τούτῳ ἄν, ὅτι οὐκ
εἰδὼς ἱκανῶς περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου οὕτω καὶ οἶομαι οὐκ
εἰδέναι. τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀπειθεῖν τῷ βελτίονι, καὶ
θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν ἐστιν οἶδα.
πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν, ὧν οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ἃ μὴ οἶδα
εἰ ἀγαθὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει, οὐδέποτε φοβηθήσομαι οὐδὲ
C φεύξομαι. ὥστε οὐδ' εἴ με νῦν ὑμεῖς ἀφίετε, Ἀνύτῳ
ἀπιστήσαντες, ὃς ἔφη ἢ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ δεῦρο

εἰσελθεῖν, ἦ, ἐπειδὴ εἰσῆλθον, οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναί με, λέγων πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ὡς, εἰ διαφευξοίμην, ἤδη ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ υἱεῖς ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἃ Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντάπασι διαφθαρήσονται, — εἴ μοι πρὸς ταῦτα εἴποιτε, Ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν μὲν Ἀνύτῳ οὐ πεισόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀφίεμέν σε, ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέντοι, ἐφ' ὥτε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ζητήσει διατρίβειν μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν· ἐὰν δὲ ἁλῷς ἔτι τοῦτο πράττων, ἀποθανεῖ· εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἶπον, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀφίοιτε, εἴποιμ' ἂν ὑμῖν, ὅτι Ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν, καὶ ἕως περ ἂν ἐμπνέω καὶ οἷός τε ὦ, οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν παρακελευόμενός τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτῳ ἂν ἀεὶ ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν, λέγων οἷάπερ εἰώθα, ὅτι, Ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναῖος ὤν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν, χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνει ἐπιμελούμενος, ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλεῖστα, καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται, οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ οὐδὲ φροντίζεις; καὶ ἐάν τις ὑμῶν ἀμφισβητήσῃ καὶ φῇ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀφήσω αὐτὸν οὐδ' ἄπειμι, ἀλλ' ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω, καὶ ἐάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ κεκτῆσθαι ἀρετήν, φάναι δέ, ὀνειδιῶ, ὅτι τὰ πλείστου ἄξια περὶ ἐλαχίστου ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φαυλότερα περὶ πλείονος. ταῦτα καὶ νεωτέρῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ, ὅτῳ ἂν ἐντυγχάνω, ποιήσω, καὶ ξένῳ καὶ ἀστῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστοῖς, ὅσῳ μου ἐγγυτέρω ἐστὲ γένει. ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός, εὖ ἴστε. καὶ ἐγὼ οἶομαι οὐδέν πω ὑμῖν μεῖζον

ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἢ πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους μήτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μήτε χρημάτων πρότερον μηδὲ
B οὕτω σπόδρα, ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς ἀρίστη ἔσται, λέγων, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τἆλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων διαφθείρω τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη βλαβερά· εἰ δέ τίς μέ φησιν ἄλλα λέγειν ἢ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν λέγει. πρὸς ταῦτα, φαίην ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἢ πείθεσθε Ἀνύτῳ, ἢ μή, καὶ ἢ ἀφίετε, ἢ μὴ ἀφίετε, ὡς ἐμοῦ
C οὐκ ἂν ποιήσοντος ἄλλα, οὐδ' εἰ μέλλω πολλάκις τεθνάναι.

ΚΑΡ. XVIII. Μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλ' ἐμμείνατέ μοι οἷς ἐδεήθην ὑμῶν, μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐφ' οἷς ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ' ἀκούειν· καὶ γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὀνήσεσθε ἀκούοντες. μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἄττα ὑμῖν ἐρεῖν καὶ ἄλλα, ἐφ' οἷς ἴσως βοήσεσθε· ἀλλὰ μηδαμῶς ποιεῖτε τοῦτο. Εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, ἐὰν ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε τοιοῦτον ὄντα, οἷον ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείζω βλάψετε ἢ ὑμᾶς αὐτούς. ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν βλάψειεν οὔτε Μέλητος οὔτε Ἄνυτος. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτο· οὐ γὰρ
D οἴομαι θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἀμείνονι ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χείρονος βλάπτεσθαι. ἀποκτείνειε μέντ' ἂν ἴσως, ἢ ἐξελάσειεν, ἢ ἀτιμάσειεν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὗτος μὲν ἴσως οἴεται καὶ ἄλλος τίς που μεγάλα κακά, ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ οἶομαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ποιεῖν ἃ οὗτος νυνὶ ποιεῖ, ἄνδρα ἀδίκως ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτιννύναι. νῦν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,

πολλοῦ δέω ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, ὥς τις
ἂν οἴοιτο, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, μή τι ἐξαμάρτητε περὶ τὴν
τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν ἐμοῦ καταψηφισάμενοι. ἐὰν γὰρ E
ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε, οὐ ῥᾳδίως ἄλλον τοιοῦτον εὑρήσετε,
ἀτεχνῶς, εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον εἰπεῖν, προσκείμενον τῇ
πόλει ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὥσπερ ἵππῳ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ
γενναίῳ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νωθεστέρῳ καὶ δεομένῳ
ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μύωπός τινος· οἷον δή μοι δοκεῖ ὁ
θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθεικέναι, τοιοῦτόν τινα, ὃς
ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὀνειδίζων ἕνα ἕκαστον
οὐδὲν παύομαι τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην πανταχοῦ προσκαθί- 31
ζων. τοιοῦτος οὖν ἄλλος οὐ ῥᾳδίως ὑμῖν γενήσεται, ὦ
ἄνδρες, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, φείσεσθέ μου. ὑμεῖς
δ' ἴσως τάχ' ἂν ἀχθόμενοι, ὥσπερ οἱ νυστάζοντες
ἐγειρόμενοι, κρούσαντες ἄν με, πειθόμενοι Ἀνύτῳ,
ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἀποκτείναιτε, εἶτα τὸν λοιπὸν βίον καθεύ-
δοντες διατελοῖτ' ἄν, εἰ μή τινα ἄλλον ὁ θεὸς ὑμῖν
ἐπιπέμψειε κηδόμενος ὑμῶν. ὅτι δ' ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ὢν
τοιοῦτος, οἷος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ πόλει δεδόσθαι, ἐν- B
θένδε ἂν κατανοήσαιτε· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνῳ ἔοικε τὸ
ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπάντων ἠμεληκέναι καὶ ἀνέ-
χεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελουμένων τοσαῦτα ἤδη ἔτη, τὸ
δὲ ὑμέτερον πράττειν ἀεί, ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ προσιόντα,
ὥσπερ πατέρα ἢ ἀδελφὸν πρεσβύτερον, πείθοντα ἐπι-
μελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς. καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπέ-
λαυον καὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνων ταῦτα παρεκελευόμην,
εἶχον ἄν τινα λόγον· νῦν δὲ ὁρᾶτε δὴ καὶ αὐτοί, ὅτι οἱ
κατήγοροι, τἆλλα πάντα ἀναισχύντως οὕτω κατηγο-
ροῦντες τοῦτό γε οὐχ οἷοί τε ἐγένοντο ἀπαναισχυντῆ-

C σαι, παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα, ὡς ἐγώ ποτέ τινα ἢ ἐπραξάμην μισθὸν ἢ ᾔτησα. ἱκανὸν γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα, ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω, τὴν πενίαν.

ΚΑΡ. XIX. Ἴσως ἂν οὖν δόξειεν ἄτοπον εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ ἐγὼ ἰδίᾳ μὲν ταῦτα ξυμβουλεύω περιιὼν καὶ πολυπραγμονῶ, δημοσίᾳ δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον ξυμβουλεύειν τῇ πόλει. Τούτου δὲ αἴτιόν ἐστιν ὃ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον
D γίγνεται [φωνή], ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμῳδῶν Μέλητος ἐγράψατο. ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνή τις γιγνομένη, ἥ ὅταν γένηται, ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τούτου, ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὔποτε. τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὅ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν. καὶ παγκάλως γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐναντιοῦσθαι· εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ἐγὼ πάλαι ἐπεχείρησα πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ πράγματα,
E πάλαι ἂν ἀπολώλη καὶ οὔτ' ἂν ὑμᾶς ὠφελήκη οὐδὲν οὔτ' ἂν ἐμαυτόν. καί μοι μὴ ἄχθεσθε λέγοντι τἀληθῆ· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται οὔτε ὑμῖν οὔτε ἄλλῳ πλήθει οὐδενὶ γνησίως ἐναντιούμενος καὶ διακωλύων πολλὰ ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει
32 γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τὸν τῷ ὄντι μαχούμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὀλίγον χρόνον σωθήσεσθαι, ἰδιωτεύειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

ΚΑΡ. XX. Μεγάλα δ' ἔγωγε ὑμῖν τεκμήρια παρέξομαι τούτων, οὐ λόγους, ἀλλ' ὃ ὑμεῖς τιμᾶτε, ἔργα. ἀκούσατε δή μου τὰ ἐμοὶ ξυμβεβηκότα, ἵν' εἰδῆτε, ὅτι οὐδ' ἂν ἑνὶ ὑπεικάθοιμι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δείσας θάνα-

τον, μὴ ὑπείκων δὲ ἅμα καὶ ἅμ' ἂν ἀπολοίμην. ἐρῶ δὲ ὑμῖν φορτικὰ μὲν καὶ δικανικά, ἀληθῆ δέ. Ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄλλην μὲν ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν πώποτε B ἦρξα ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐβούλευσα δέ· καὶ ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ Ἀντιοχὶς πρυτανεύουσα, ὅτε ὑμεῖς τοὺς δέκα στρατηγοὺς τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐβούλεσθε ἀθρόους κρίνειν, παρανόμως, ὡς ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἔδοξε. τότ' ἐγὼ μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων ἠναντιώθην ὑμῖν μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους, καὶ ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην· καὶ ἑτοίμων ὄντων ἐνδεικνύναι με καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ῥητόρων, καὶ ὑμῶν κελευόντων καὶ βοώντων, μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου ᾤμην μᾶλλόν με δεῖν διακινδυνεύειν ἢ μεθ' ὑμῶν C γενέσθαι μὴ δίκαια βουλευομένων, φοβηθέντα δεσμὸν ἢ θάνατον. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἦν ἔτι δημοκρατουμένης τῆς πόλεως. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία ἐγένετο, οἱ τριάκοντα αὖ μεταπεμψάμενοί με πέμπτον αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν Θόλον προσέταξαν ἀγαγεῖν ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος Λέοντα τὸν Σαλαμίνιον, ἵν' ἀποθάνοι· οἷα δὴ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐκεῖνοι πολλοῖς πολλὰ προσέταττον, βουλόμενοι ὡς πλείστους ἀναπλῆσαι αἰτιῶν. τότε μέντοι ἐγὼ οὐ λόγῳ, ἀλλ' ἔργῳ αὖ ἐνεδειξάμην, ὅτι ἐμοὶ θανάτου μὲν μέλει, εἰ D μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἦν εἰπεῖν, οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν, τοῦ δὲ μηδὲν ἄδικον μηδ' ἀνόσιον ἐργάζεσθαι, τούτου δὲ τὸ πᾶν μέλει. ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐκείνη ἡ ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἐξέπληξεν οὕτως ἰσχυρὰ οὖσα, ὥστε ἄδικόν τι ἐργάσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς Θόλου ἐξήλθομεν, οἱ μὲν τέτταρες ᾤχοντο εἰς Σαλαμῖνα καὶ ἤγαγον Λέοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ ᾠχόμην ἀπιὼν οἴκαδε. καὶ ἴσως ἄν διὰ ταῦτ' ἀπέθανον, εἰ μὴ ἡ ἀρχὴ

Ε διὰ ταχέων κατελύθη. καὶ τούτων ὑμῖν ἔσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες.

ΣΑΡ. XXI. Ἆρ' οὖν ἄν με οἴεσθε τοσάδε ἔτη διαγενέσθαι, εἰ ἔπραττον τὰ δημόσια, καὶ πράττων ἀξίως ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις καί, ὥσπερ χρή, τοῦτο περὶ πλείστου ἐποιούμην; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων οὐ-
33 δείς. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου δημοσίᾳ τε εἴ πού τι ἔπραξα, τοιοῦτος φανοῦμαι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε ξυγχωρήσας οὐδὲν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὔτε τούτων οὐδενί, οὓς οἱ διαβάλλοντές μέ φασιν ἐμοὺς μαθητὰς εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτ' ἐγενόμην· εἴ δέ τίς μου λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράττοντος ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκούειν, εἴτε νεώτερος εἴτε πρεσβύτερος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε ἐφθόνησα. οὐδὲ
Β χρήματα μὲν λαμβάνων διαλέγομαι, μὴ λαμβάνων δ' οὔ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως καὶ πλουσίῳ καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, καὶ ἐάν τις βούληται ἀποκρινόμενος ἀκούειν ὧν ἂν λέγω. καὶ τούτων ἐγώ, εἴτε τις χρηστὸς γίγνεται εἴτε μή, οὐκ ἂν δικαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχοιμι, ὧν μήτε ὑπεσχόμην μηδενὶ μηδὲν πώποτε μάθημα μήτε ἐδίδαξα. εἰ δέ τίς φησι παρ' ἐμοῦ πώποτέ τι μαθεῖν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι ἰδίᾳ ὅ τι μὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, εὖ ἴστε, ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει.

ΣΑΡ. XXII. Ἀλλὰ διὰ τί δή ποτε μετ' ἐμοῦ
C χαίρουσί τινες πολὺν χρόνον διατρίβοντες; Ἀκηκόατε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι· πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐγὼ εἶπον, ὅτι ἀκούοντες χαίρουσιν ἐξεταζομένοις τοῖς οἰομένοις μὲν εἶναι σοφοῖς, οὐσι δ' οὔ· ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ

ἀηδές. ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγώ φημι, προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντειῶν καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ᾧπερ τίς ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὁτιοῦν προσέταξε πράττειν. Ταῦτα, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐστι καὶ εὐέλεγκτα. εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε τῶν νέων τοὺς μὲν διαφθείρω, τοὺς δὲ D διέφθαρκα, χρῆν δήπου, εἴτε τινὲς αὐτῶν πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι ἔγνωσαν, ὅτι νέοις οὖσιν αὐτοῖς ἐγὼ κακὸν πώποτέ τι ξυνεβούλευσα, νυνὶ αὐτοὺς ἀναβαίνοντας ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἤθελον, τῶν οἰκείων τινὰς τῶν ἐκείνων, πατέρας καὶ ἀδελφοὺς καὶ ἄλλους τοὺς προσήκοντας, εἴπερ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τι κακὸν ἐπεπόνθεσαν αὐτῶν οἱ οἰκεῖοι, νῦν μεμνῆσθαι. πάντως δὲ πάρεισιν αὐτῶν πολλοὶ ἐνταυθοῖ, οὓς ἐγὼ ὁρῶ, πρῶτον μὲν Κρίτων οὑτοσί, ἐμὸς ἡλικιώτης καὶ δημότης, Κριτοβούλου τοῦδε πατήρ· ἔπειτα Λυσανίας ὁ Σφήττιος, Αἰσχίνου τοῦδε πατήρ· E ἔτι Ἀντιφῶν ὁ Κηφισιεὺς οὑτοσί, Ἐπιγένους πατήρ. ἄλλοι τοίνυν οὗτοι, ὧν οἱ ἀδελφοὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ διατριβῇ γεγόνασι, Νικόστρατος, ὁ Θεοδοτίδου, ἀδελφὸς Θεοδότου — καὶ ὁ μὲν Θεόδοτος τετελεύτηκεν, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἐκεῖνός γε αὐτοῦ καταδεηθείη —, καὶ Πάραλος ὅδε, ὁ Δημοδόκου, οὗ ἦν Θεάγης ἀδελφός· ὅδε τε 34 Ἀδείμαντος, ὁ Ἀρίστωνος, οὗ ἀδελφὸς οὑτοσὶ Πλάτων, καὶ Αἰαντόδωρος, οὗ Ἀπολλόδωρος ὅδε ἀδελφός. καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἐγὼ ἔχω ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὧν τινα ἐχρῆν μάλιστα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μέλητον μάρτυρα· εἰ δὲ τότε ἐπελάθετο, νῦν παρασχέσθω, ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ, καὶ λεγέτω, εἴ τι ἔχει τοιοῦ-

τον. ἀλλὰ τούτου πᾶν τοὐναντίον εὑρήσετε, ὦ ἄνδρες, πάντας ἐμοὶ βοηθεῖν ἑτοίμους τῷ διαφθείροντι, τῷ κακὰ ἐργάζομένῳ τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτῶν, ὥς φασι Μέ-
B λητος καὶ Ἄνυτος. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ διεφθαρμένοι τάχ' ἂν λόγον ἔχοιεν βοηθοῦντες· οἱ δὲ ἀδιάφθαρτοι, πρεσβύτεροι ἤδη ἄνδρες, οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες, τίνα ἄλλον ἔχουσι λόγον βοηθοῦντες ἐμοὶ ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν ὀρθόν τε καὶ δίκαιον, ὅτι ξυνίσασι Μελήτῳ μὲν ψευδομένῳ, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀληθεύοντι;

Cap. XXIII. Εἶεν δή, ὦ ἄνδρες· ἃ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔχοιμ' ἂν ἀπολογεῖσθαι, σχεδόν ἐστι ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα ἴσως τοιαῦτα. Τάχα δ' ἄν τις ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσειεν ἀναμνη-
C σθεὶς ἑαυτοῦ, εἰ ὁ μὲν καὶ ἐλάττω τουτουὶ τοῦ ἀγῶνος ἀγῶνα ἀγωνιζόμενος ἐδεήθη τε καὶ ἱκέτευσε τοὺς δικαστὰς μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων, παιδία τε αὐτοῦ ἀναβιβασάμενος, ἵνα ὅ τι μάλιστα ἐλεηθείη, καὶ ἄλλους τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φίλων πολλούς, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω, καὶ ταῦτα κινδυνεύων, ὡς ἂν δόξαιμι, τὸν ἔσχατον κίνδυνον. τάχ' ἂν οὖν τις ταῦτα ἐννοήσας αὐθαδέστερον ἂν πρός με σχοίη, καὶ ὀργισθεὶς αὐτοῖς τούτοις θεῖτο ἂν μετ' ὀργῆς τὴν ψῆφον. εἰ δή τις ὑμῶν
D οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἀξιῶ μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε, εἰ δ' οὖν, ἐπιεικῆ ἄν μοι δοκῶ πρὸς τοῦτον λέγειν λέγων, ὅτι Ἐμοί, ὦ ἄριστε, εἰσὶ μέν πού τινες καὶ οἰκεῖοι. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ἀπὸ δρυὸς οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης πέφυκα, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ὥστε καὶ οἰκεῖοί μοί εἰσι καὶ υἱεῖς γε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τρεῖς, εἷς μὲν μειράκιον ἤδη, δύο δὲ παιδία. ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐδέν' αὐτῶν δεῦρο ἀναβιβασάμενος δεήσομαι ὑμῶν ἀποψη-

φίσασθαι. Τί δὴ οὖν οὐδὲν τούτων ποιήσω; Οὐκ αὐθαδιζόμενος, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδ' ὑμᾶς ἀτιμάζων· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν θαῤῥαλέως ἐγὼ ἔχω πρὸς θάνατον ἢ Ε μή, ἄλλος λόγος· πρὸς δ' οὖν δόξαν καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει οὔ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι ἐμὲ τούτων οὐδὲν ποιεῖν καὶ τηλικόνδε ὄντα καὶ τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἔχοντα, εἴτ' οὖν ἀληθὲς εἴτ' οὖν ψεῦδος· ἀλλ' οὖν δεδογμένον γέ ἐστι τὸν Σωκράτη διαφέρειν τινὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων. εἰ οὖν ὑμῶν οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφέρειν 35 εἴτε σοφίᾳ εἴτε ἀνδρείᾳ εἴτε ἄλλῃ ἠτινιοῦν ἀρετῇ τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται, αἰσχρὸν ἂν εἴη, οἵουσπερ ἐγὼ πολλάκις ἑώρακά τινας, ὅταν κρίνωνται, δοκοῦντας μέν τι εἶναι, θαυμάσια δὲ ἐργαζομένους, ὡς δεινόν τι οἰομένους πείσεσθαι, εἰ ἀποθανοῦνται, ὥςπερ ἀθανάτων ἐσομένων, ἐὰν ὑμεῖς αὐτοὺς μὴ ἀποκτείνητε· οἳ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν αἰσχύνην τῇ πόλει περιάπτειν, ὥστ' ἄν τινα καὶ τῶν ξένων ὑπολαβεῖν, ὅτι οἱ διαφέροντες Ἀθηναίων εἰς ἀρετήν, οὓς αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν ἔν τε ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ Β ταῖς ἄλλαις τιμαῖς προκρίνουσιν, οὗτοι γυναικῶν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσι. ταῦτα γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὔτε ἡμᾶς χρὴ ποιεῖν τοὺς δοκοῦντας καὶ ὁτιοῦν εἶναι, οὔτ', ἂν ἡμεῖς ποιῶμεν, ὑμᾶς ἐπιτρέπειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὅτι πολὺ μᾶλλον καταψηφιεῖσθε τοῦ τὰ ἐλεεινὰ ταῦτα δράματα εἰσάγοντος καὶ καταγέλαστον τὴν πόλιν ποιοῦντος ἢ τοῦ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντος.

Cap. XXIV. Χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι δεῖσθαι τοῦ δικαστοῦ οὐδὲ C δέομενον ἀποφεύγειν, ἀλλὰ διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ κάθηται ὁ δικαστής, ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρί-

ζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ κρίνειν ταῦτα· καὶ ὀμώμοκεν οὐ χαριεῖσθαι οἷς ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ δικάσειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. οὔκουν χρὴ οὔτε ἡμᾶς ἐθίζειν ὑμᾶς ἐπιορκεῖν, οὔθ' ὑμᾶς ἐθίζεσθαι· οὐδέτεροι γὰρ ἂν ἡμῶν εὐσεβοῖεν. μὴ οὖν ἀξιοῦτέ με, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιαῦτα δεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πράττειν, ἃ μήτε ἡγοῦμαι καλὰ εἶναι μήτε δίκαια μήτε ὅσια, ἄλλως τε πάν-
D τως νὴ Δία, μάλιστα μέντοι καὶ ἀσεβείας φεύγοντα ὑπὸ Μελήτου τουτουί. σαφῶς γὰρ ἄν, εἰ πείθοιμι ὑμᾶς καὶ τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζοίμην ὀμωμοκότας, θεοὺς ἂν διδάσκοιμι μὴ ἡγεῖσθαι ὑμᾶς εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ἀπολογούμενος κατηγοροίην ἂν ἐμαυτοῦ, ὡς θεοὺς οὐ νομίζω. ἀλλὰ πολλοῦ δεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν· νομίζω τε γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρῖναι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅπῃ μέλλει ἐμοί τε ἄριστα εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν.

E Cap. XXV. Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες
36 Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μου κατεψηφίσασθε, ἄλλα τέ μοι πολλὰ ξυμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστόν μοι γέγονε τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον θαυμάζω ἑκατέρων τῶν ψήφων τὸν γεγονότα ἀριθμόν. οὐ γὰρ ᾤμην ἔγωγε οὕτω παρ' ὀλίγον ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολύ. νῦν δέ, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἰ τρεῖς μόναι μετέπεσον τῶν ψήφων, ἀποπεφεύγη ἄν. Μέλητον μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀποπέφευγα. καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀποπέφευγα, ἀλλὰ παντὶ δῆλον τοῦτό γε, ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων κατηγορήσοντες
B ἐμοῦ, κἂν ὤφλε χιλίας δραχμάς, οὐ μεταλαβὼν τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων.

He will see me at death.

Cap. XXVI. Τιμᾶται δ' οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου. Εἶεν. ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τίνος ὑμῖν ἀντιτιμήσομαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι; ἢ δῆλον, ὅτι τῆς ἀξίας; τί οὖν; τί ἄξιός εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτῖσαι, ὅ τι μαθὼν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἦγον ἀλλ' ἀμελήσας ὧνπερ οἱ πολλοί, χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ ξυνωμοσιῶν καὶ στάσεων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει γιγνομένων, ἡγησάμενος ἐμαυτὸν τῷ ὄντι ἐπιεικέστερον εἶναι ἢ ὥστε εἰς ταῦτ' ἰόντα σώζεσθαι, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ἦα, οἷ ἐλθὼν μήτε ὑμῖν C μήτε ἐμαυτῷ ἔμελλον μηδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον ἰὼν εὐεργετεῖν τὴν μεγίστην εὐεργεσίαν, ὡς ἐγώ φημι, ἐνταῦθα ἦα, ἐπιχειρῶν ἕκαστον ὑμῶν πείθειν μὴ πρότερον μήτε τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πρὶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμεληθείη, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος καὶ φρονιμώτατος ἔσοιτο, μήτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως· τῶν τε ἄλλων οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. τί οὖν εἰμι ἄξιος πα- D θεῖν τοιοῦτος ὤν; ἀγαθόν τι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ δεῖ γε κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ ταῦτά γε ἀγαθὸν τοιοῦτον, ὅ τι ἂν πρέποι ἐμοί. τί οὖν πρέπει ἀνδρὶ πένητι εὐεργέτῃ, δεομένῳ ἄγειν σχολὴν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ παρακελεύσει; οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅ- τι μᾶλλον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρέπει οὕτως, ὡς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι, πολύ γε μᾶλλον ἢ εἴ τις ὑμῶν ἵππῳ ἢ ξυνωρίδι ἢ ζεύγει νενίκηκεν Ὀλυμπιάσιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑμᾶς ποιεῖ εὐδαί- μονας δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἐγὼ δὲ εἶναι· καὶ ὁ μὲν τροφῆς E οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ δὲ δέομαι. εἰ οὖν δεῖ με κατὰ τὸ

δίκαιον τῆς ἀξίας τιμᾶσθαι, τούτου τιμῶμαι, ἐν
37 πρυτανείῳ σιτήσεως.

ΚΑΡ. XXVII. Ἴσως οὖν ὑμῖν καὶ ταυτὶ λέγων παραπλησίως δοκῶ λέγειν ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ οἴκτου καὶ τῆς ἀντιβολήσεως, ἀπαυθαδιζόμενος· τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε μᾶλλον. πέπεισμαι ἐγὼ ἑκὼν εἶναι μηδένα ἀδικεῖν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ ὑμᾶς τοῦτο οὐ πείθω· ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἀλλήλοις διειλέγμεθα· ἐπεί, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, εἰ ἦν ὑμῖν νόμος, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, περὶ θανάτου μὴ μίαν
B ἡμέραν μόνον κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ πολλάς, ἐπείσθητε ἄν· νῦν δ' οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἐν χρόνῳ ὀλίγῳ μεγάλας διαβολὰς ἀπολύεσθαι πεπεισμένος δὴ ἐγὼ μηδένα ἀδικεῖν πολλοῦ δέω ἐμαυτόν γε ἀδικήσειν καὶ κατ' ἐμαυτοῦ ἐρεῖν αὐτός, ὡς ἄξιός εἰμί του κακοῦ, καὶ τιμήσεσθαι τοιούτου τινὸς ἐμαυτῷ. τί δείσας; μὴ πάθω τοῦτο, οὗ Μέλητός μοι τιμᾶται, ὃ φημι οὐκ εἰδέναι οὔτ' εἰ ἀγαθὸν οὔτ' εἰ κακόν ἐστιν; ἀντὶ τούτου δὴ ἕλωμαι
C ὧν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων, τούτου τιμησάμενος; πότερον δεσμοῦ; καὶ τί με δεῖ ζῆν ἐν δεσμωτηρίῳ, δουλεύοντα τῇ ἀεὶ καθισταμένῃ ἀρχῇ, τοῖς ἕνδεκα; ἀλλὰ χρημάτων, καὶ δεδέσθαι ἕως ἂν ἐκτίσω; ἀλλὰ ταὐτόν μοί ἐστιν, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μοι χρήματα, ὁπόθεν ἐκτίσω. Ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμήσομαι; ἴσως γὰρ ἄν μοι τούτου τιμήσαιτε. πολλὴ μέντ' ἄν με φιλοψυχία ἔχοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ οὕτως ἀλόγιστός εἰμι, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι λογίζεσθαι, ὅτι ὑμεῖς μὲν ὄντες πολῖταί μου οὐχ οἷοί τε ἐγένεσθε ἐν-
D εγκεῖν τὰς ἐμὰς διατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλ' ὑμῖν

βαρύτεραι γεγόνασι καὶ ἐπιφθονώτεραι, ὥστε ζητεῖτε αὐτῶν νυνὶ ἀπαλλαγῆναι, ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα αὐτὰς οἴσουσι ῥᾳδίως. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. καλὸς οὖν ἄν μοι ὁ βίος εἴη ἐξελθόντι τηλικῷδε ἀνθρώπῳ ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης πόλιν πόλεως ἀμειβομένῳ καὶ ἐξελαυνομένῳ ζῆν. εὖ γὰρ οἶδ' ὅτι, ὅποι ἂν ἔλθω, λέγοντος ἐμοῦ ἀκροάσονται οἱ νέοι ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε. κἂν μὲν τούτους ἀπελαύνω, οὗτοι ἐμὲ αὐτοὶ ἐξελῶσι, πείθοντες τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἀπελαύνω, οἱ τούτων πατέρες τε καὶ οἰκεῖοι δι' αὐτοὺς τούτους. E

Cap. XXVIII. Ἴσως οὖν ἄν τις εἴποι, Σιγῶν δὲ καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγων, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσει ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ζῆν; Τουτὶ δή ἐστι πάντων χαλεπώτατον πεῖσαί τινας ὑμῶν. ἐάν τε γὰρ λέγω, ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ· ἐάν τ' αὖ λέγω, ὅτι 38 καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὂν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦτο, ἑκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, περὶ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε διαλεγομένου καὶ ἐμαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος, ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ, ταῦτα δ' ἔτι ἧττον πείσεσθέ μοι λέγοντι. τὰ δὲ ἔχει μὲν οὕτως, ὡς ἐγώ φημι, ὦ ἄνδρες, πεῖσαι δὲ οὐ ῥᾴδιον. Καὶ ἐγὼ ἄμ οὐκ εἴθισμαι ἐμαυτὸν ἀξιοῦν κακοῦ οὐδενός. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμησάμην ἂν χρημάτων ὅσα ἔμελ- B λον ἐκτίσειν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐβλάβην· νῦν δέ — οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ὅσον ἂν ἐγὼ δυναίμην ἐκτῖσαι τοσούτου βούλεσθέ μοι τιμῆσαι. ἴσως δ' ἂν δυναίμην ἐκτῖσαι ὑμῖν μνᾶν ἀργυρίου· τοσούτου οὖν τιμῶμαι.

Πλάτων δὲ ὅδε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος κελεύουσί με τριάκοντα μνῶν τιμήσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυᾶσθαι· τιμῶμαι οὖν τοσούτου· ἐγγυηταὶ δ' ὑμῖν ἔσονται τοῦ ἀργυρίου οὗτοι ἀξιόχρεῳ.

C ΚΑΡ. XXIX. Οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἕνεκα χρόνου, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὄνομα ἕξετε καὶ αἰτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τὴν πόλιν λοιδορεῖν, ὡς Σωκράτη ἀπεκτόνατε, ἄνδρα σοφόν· φήσουσι γὰρ δή με σοφὸν εἶναι, εἰ καὶ μὴ εἰμί, οἱ βουλόμενοι ὑμῖν ὀνειδίζειν. εἰ οὖν περιεμείνατε ὀλίγον χρόνον, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἂν ὑμῖν τοῦτο ἐγένετο· ὁρᾶτε γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἡλικίαν, ὅτι πόρρω ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου, θανάτου δὲ ἐγγύς. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο οὐ πρὸς πάντας ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοῦ
D καταψηφισαμένους θάνατον. λέγω δὲ καὶ τόδε πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους. Ἴσως με οἴεσθε, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἀπορίᾳ λόγων ἐαλωκέναι τοιούτων, οἷς ἂν ὑμᾶς ἔπεισα, εἰ ᾠόμην δεῖν ἅπαντα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν, ὥστε ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν δίκην. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἀλλ' ἀπορίᾳ μὲν ἑάλωκα, οὐ μέντοι λόγων, ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀναισχυντίας καὶ τοῦ ἐθέλειν λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαῦτα, οἵ' ἂν ὑμῖν μὲν ἥδιστ' ἦν ἀκούειν, θρηνοῦντός τέ μου καὶ ὀδυρομένου
E καὶ ἄλλα ποιοῦντος καὶ λέγοντος πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἐγώ φημι· οἷα δὴ καὶ εἴθισθε ὑμεῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν. ἀλλ' οὔτε τότε ᾠήθην δεῖν ἕνεκα τοῦ κινδύνου πρᾶξαι οὐδὲν ἀνελεύθερον, οὔτε νῦν μοι μεταμέλει οὕτως ἀπολογησαμένῳ, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αἱροῦμαι ὧδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι ἢ ἐκείνως ζῆν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν δίκῃ οὔτ' ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτ' ἐμὲ οὔτ' ἄλλον

οὐδένα δεῖ τοῦτο μηχανᾶσθαι, ὅπως ἀποφεύξεται πᾶν 39
ποιῶν θάνατον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πολλάκις δῆ-
λον γίγνεται, ὅτι τό γε ἀποθανεῖν ἄν τις ἐκφύγοι καὶ
ὅπλα ἀφεὶς καὶ ἐφ' ἱκετείαν τραπόμενος τῶν διωκόν-
των· καὶ ἄλλαι μηχαναὶ πολλαί εἰσιν ἐν ἑκάστοις τοῖς
κινδύνοις, ὥστε διαφεύγειν θάνατον, ἐάν τις τολμᾷ
πᾶν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐ τοῦτ' ἦ χαλεπόν,
ὦ ἄνδρες, θάνατον ἐκφυγεῖν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ χαλεπώτερον
πονηρίαν· θάττον γὰρ θανάτου θεῖ. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν
ἅτε βραδὺς ὢν καὶ πρεσβύτης ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου B
ἑάλων, οἱ δ' ἐμοὶ κατήγοροι ἅτε δεινοὶ καὶ ὀξεῖς ὄντες
ὑπὸ τοῦ θάττονος, τῆς κακίας. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἄπειμι
ὑφ' ὑμῶν θανάτου δίκην ὄφλων, οὗτοι δ' ὑπὸ τῆς
ἀληθείας ὠφληκότες μοχθηρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν. καὶ ἔγωγε
τῷ τιμήματι ἐμμένω, καὶ οὗτοι. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν που
ἴσως οὕτω καὶ ἔδει σχεῖν, καὶ οἶμαι αὐτὰ μετρίως
ἔχειν.

Cap. XXX. Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπιθυμῶ ὑμῖν
χρησμῳδῆσαι, ὦ καταψηφισάμενοί μου· καὶ γάρ εἰμι C
ἤδη ἐνταῦθα, ἐν ᾧ μάλιστ' ἄνθρωποι χρησμῳδοῦσιν,
ὅταν μέλλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι. φημὶ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες, οἳ
ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε, τιμωρίαν ὑμῖν ἥξειν εὐθὺς μετὰ τὸν
ἐμὸν θάνατον πολὺ χαλεπωτέραν νὴ Δί' ἢ οἵαν ἐμὲ
ἀπεκτόνατε. νῦν γὰρ τοῦτο εἴργασθε οἰόμενοι ἀπαλλά-
ξεσθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου. τὸ δὲ ὑμῖν πολὺ
ἐναντίον ἀποβήσεται, ὡς ἐγώ φημι. πλείους ἔσονται
ὑμᾶς οἱ ἐλέγχοντες, οὓς νῦν ἐγὼ κατεῖχον, ὑμεῖς δὲ
οὐκ ᾐσθάνεσθε· καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἔσονται ὅσῳ νεώτε- D
ροί εἰσι, καὶ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτήσετε. εἰ γὰρ οἴε-

σθε ἀποκτείνοντες ἀνθρώπους ἐπισχήσειν τοῦ ὀνειδίζειν τινὰ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζῆτε, οὐκ ὀρθῶς διανοεῖσθε· οὐ γάρ ἐσθ' αὕτη ἡ ἀπαλλαγὴ οὔτε πάνυ δυνατὴ οὔτε καλή, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη καὶ καλλίστη καὶ ῥᾴστη, μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολούειν, ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν παρασκευάζειν, ὅπως ἔσται ὡς βέλτιστος. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μαντευσάμενος ἀπαλλάττομαι.

E Cap. XXXI. Τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισαμένοις ἡδέως ἂν διαλεχθείην ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος τουτουὶ πράγματος, ἐν ᾧ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀρχολίαν ἄγουσι καὶ οὔπω ἔρχομαι οἷ ἐλθόντα με δεῖ τεθνάναι. ἀλλά μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες, παραμείνατε τοσοῦτον χρόνον· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει διαμυ-
40 θολογῆσαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἕως ἔξεστιν. ὑμῖν γὰρ ὡς φίλοις οὖσιν ἐπιδεῖξαι ἐθέλω τὸ νυνί μοι ξυμβεβηκὸς τί ποτε νοεῖ. Ἐμοὶ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί—ὑμᾶς γὰρ δικαστὰς καλῶν ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοίην—θαυμάσιόν τι γέγονεν. ἡ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνὴ ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιουμένη, εἴ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν· νυνὶ δὲ ξυμβέβηκέ μοι, ἅπερ ὁρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοί, ταυτί, ἃ γε δὴ οἰηθείη ἄν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἔσχατα κακῶν εἶναι. ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔτε ἐξιόντι ἕωθεν οἴκο-
B θεν ἠναντιώθη τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὔτε ἡνίκα ἀνέβαινον ἐνταυθοῖ ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὔτ' ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντί τι ἐρεῖν· καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δή με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξύ. νυνὶ δὲ οὐδαμοῦ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν πρᾶξιν οὔτ' ἐν ἔργῳ οὐδενὶ οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἠναντίωταί μοι. τί οὖν αἴτιον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω; ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐρῶ· κινδυνεύει γάρ μοι τὸ ξυμβεβη-

κὸς τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ἡμεῖς ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὅσοι οἰόμεθα κακὸν εἶναι τὸ C τεθνάναι. μέγα μοι τεκμήριον τούτου γέγονεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπως οὐκ ἠναντιώθη ἄν μοι τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον, εἰ μή τι ἔμελλον ἐγὼ ἀγαθὸν πράξειν.

Κεφ. XXXII. Ἐννοήσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῇδε, ὡς πολλὴ ἐλπίς ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι. Δυοῖν γὰρ θάτερόν ἐστι τὸ τεθνάναι· ἢ γὰρ οἷον μηδὲν εἶναι μηδ' αἴσθησιν μηδεμίαν μηδενὸς ἔχειν τὸν τεθνεῶτα, ἢ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα μεταβολή τις τυγχάνει οὖσα καὶ μετοίκησις τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον. καὶ εἴτε δὴ μηδεμία αἴσθησίς ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οἷον ὕπνος, ἐπει- D δάν τις καθεύδων μηδ' ὄναρ μηδὲν ὁρᾷ, θαυμάσιον κέρδος ἂν εἴη ὁ θάνατος. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι, εἴ τινα ἐκλεξάμενον δέοι ταύτην τὴν νύκτα, ἐν ᾗ οὕτω κατέδαρθεν, ὥστε μηδ' ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀντιπαραθέντα ταύτῃ τῇ νυκτὶ δέοι σκεψάμενον εἰπεῖν, πόσας ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς βεβίωκεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ, οἶμαι ἂν μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινά, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐαριθμήτους ἂν εὑρεῖν αὐτὸν ταύτας πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας. εἰ E οὖν τοιοῦτον ὁ θάνατός ἐστι, κέρδος ἔγωγε λέγω· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν πλείων ὁ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται οὕτω δὴ εἶναι ἢ μία νύξ. εἰ δ' αὖ οἷον ἀποδημῆσαί ἐστιν ὁ θάνατος ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐστι τὰ λεγόμενα, ὡς ἄρα ἐκεῖ εἰσὶν ἅπαντες οἱ τεθνεῶτες, τι μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν τούτου εἴη ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί; εἰ γάρ τις ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ἅιδου, ἀπαλλαγεὶς τούτων 41

τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι, εὑρήσει τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς, οἵπερ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικάζειν, Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυς καὶ Αἰακὸς καὶ Τριπτόλεμος, καὶ ἄλλοι, ὅσοι τῶν ἡμιθέων δίκαιοι ἐγένοντο ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῶν βίῳ, ἆρα φαύλη ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀποδημία; ἢ αὖ Ὀρφεῖ ξυγγενέσθαι καὶ Μουσαίῳ καὶ Ἡσιόδῳ καὶ Ὁμήρῳ ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἄν τις δέξαιτ' ἂν ὑμῶν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ πολλάκις ἐθέλω τεθνάναι, εἰ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ· ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ θαυμαστὴ ἂν εἴη ἡ διατριβὴ
B αὐτόθι, ὁπότε ἐντύχοιμι Παλαμήδει καὶ Αἴαντι τῷ Τελαμῶνος καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν ἄδικον τέθνηκεν· ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνων, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἀηδὲς εἴη. καὶ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον, τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἐξετάζοντα καὶ ἐρευνῶντα ὥσπερ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα διάγειν, τίς αὐτῶν σοφός ἐστι καὶ τίς οἴεται μέν, ἔστι δ' οὔ. ἐπὶ πόσῳ δ' ἄν τις, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, δέξαιτο ἐξετάσαι τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἀγαγόντα τὴν πολλὴν στρατιάν, ἢ Ὀδυσσέα, ἢ Σίσυφον,
C ἢ ἄλλους μυρίους ἄν τις εἴποι καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας; οἷς ἐκεῖ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ξυνεῖναι καὶ ἐξετάζειν ἀμήχανον ἂν εἴη εὐδαιμονίας πάντως. οὐ δήπου τούτου γε ἕνεκα οἱ ἐκεῖ ἀποκτείνουσι· τά τε γὰρ ἄλλα εὐδαιμονέστεροί εἰσιν οἱ ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἀθάνατοί εἰσιν, εἴπερ γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ ἐστιν.

Cap. XXXIII. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς χρή, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, εὐέλπιδας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἕν τι
D τοῦτο διανοεῖσθαι ἀληθές, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμε-

λεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τούτου πράγματα· οὐδὲ τὰ ἐμὰ νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου γέγονεν, ἀλλά μοι δῆλόν ἐστι τοῦτο, ὅτι ἤδη τεθνάναι καὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμάτων βέλτιον ἦν μοι. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐμὲ οὐδαμοῦ ἀπέτρεψε τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ἔγωγε τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μου καὶ τοῖς κατηγόροις οὐ πάνυ χαλεπαίνω. καίτοι οὐ ταύτῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ κατεψηφίζοντό μου καὶ κατηγόρουν, ἀλλ' οἰόμενοι βλάπτειν· τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ἄξιον μέμφεσθαι. Ε

Τοσόνδε μέντοι αὐτῶν δέομαι· τοὺς υἱεῖς μου, ἐπειδὰν ἡβήσωσι, τιμωρήσασθε, ὦ ἄνδρες, ταὐτὰ ταῦτα λυποῦντες, ἅπερ ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐλύπουν, ἐὰν ὑμῖν δοκῶσιν ἢ χρημάτων ἢ ἄλλου του πρότερον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἢ ἀρετῆς, καὶ ἐὰν δοκῶσί τι εἶναι μηδὲν ὄντες, ὀνειδίζετε αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ὧν δεῖ, καὶ οἴονταί τι εἶναι ὄντες οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι. καὶ ἐὰν ταῦτα ποιῆτε, δίκαια πεπονθὼς ἐγὼ ἔσομαι ὑφ' ὑμῶν αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ υἱεῖς. 42

Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ὥρα ἀπιέναι, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀποθανουμένῳ, ὑμῖν δὲ βιωσομένοις. ὁπότεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἔρχονται ἐπὶ ἄμεινον πρᾶγμα, ἄδηλον παντὶ πλὴν ἢ τῷ θεῷ.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

43 ΚΑΡ. Ι. Τί τηνικάδε ἀφῖξαι, ὦ Κρίτων; ἢ οὐ πρῳ ἔτι ἐστίν; ΚΡ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Πηνίκα μάλιστα; ΚΡ. Ὄρθρος βαθύς. ΣΩ. Θαυμάζω, ὅπως ἠθέλησέ σοι ὁ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου φύλαξ ὑπακοῦσαι. ΚΡ. Ξυνήθης ἤδη μοί ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, διὰ τὸ πολλάκις δεῦρο φοιτᾶν, καί τι καὶ εὐεργέτηται ὑπ' ἐμοῦ. ΣΩ. Ἄρτι δὲ ἥκεις ἢ πάλαι; ΚΡ. Ἐπιεικῶς Β πάλαι. ΣΩ. Εἶτα πῶς οὐκ εὐθὺς ἐπήγειράς με, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ παρακάθησαι; ΚΡ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἤθελον ἐν τοσαύτῃ τε ἀγρυπνίᾳ καὶ λύπῃ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ πάλαι θαυμάζω αἰσθανόμενος, ὡς ἡδέως καθεύδεις· καὶ ἐπίτηδές σε οὐκ ἤγειρον, ἵνα ὡς ἥδιστα διάγῃς. καὶ πολλάκις μὲν δή σε καὶ πρότερον ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ εὐδαιμόνισα τοῦ τρόπου, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ νυνὶ παρεστώσῃ ξυμφορᾷ, ὡς ῥᾳδίως αὐτὴν καὶ πράως φέρεις. ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Κρίτων, πλημμελὲς εἴη ἀγανακτεῖν τηλικοῦτον ὄντα, C εἰ δεῖ ἤδη τελευτᾶν. ΚΡ. Καὶ ἄλλοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τηλικοῦτοι ἐν τοιαύταις ξυμφοραῖς ἁλίσκονται, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐπιλύεται ἡ ἡλικία τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακτεῖν τῇ παρούσῃ τύχῃ. ΣΩ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. ἀλλὰ

τί δὴ οὕτω πρῲ ἀφῖξαι; ΚΡ. Ἀγγελίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φέρων χαλεπήν, οὐ σοί, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς σοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις πᾶσι καὶ χαλεπὴν καὶ βαρεῖαν, ἣν ἐγώ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατ' ἂν ἐνέγκαιμι. ΣΩ. Τίνα ταύτην; ἢ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφῖκται ἐκ Δήλου, οὗ δεῖ ἀφικομένου τεθνάναι με; ΚΡ. Οὔ τοι D δὴ ἀφῖκται, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μέν μοι ἥξειν τήμερον ἐξ ὧν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ἥκοντές τινες ἀπὸ Σουνίου καὶ καταλιπόντες ἐκεῖ αὐτό. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν ἀγγέλων, ὅτι ἥξει τήμερον, καὶ ἀνάγκη δὴ εἰς αὔριον ἔσται, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν βίον σε τελευτᾶν.

ΚΑΡ. II. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ', ὦ Κρίτων, τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ. εἰ ταύτῃ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον, ταύτῃ ἔστω. οὐ μέντοι οἶμαι ἥξειν αὐτὸ τήμερον. ΚΡ. Πόθεν τοῦτο τεκμαίρει; ΣΩ. Ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ. τῇ γάρ που ὑστεραίᾳ δεῖ με ἀπο- 44 θνήσκειν ἢ ᾗ ἂν ἔλθῃ τὸ πλοῖον. ΚΡ. Φασί γέ τοι δὴ οἱ τούτων κύριοι. ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας οἶμαι αὐτὸ ἥξειν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἑτέρας. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἔκ τινος ἐνυπνίου, ὃ ἑώρακα ὀλίγον πρότερον ταύτης τῆς νυκτός· καὶ κινδυνεύεις ἐν καιρῷ τινι οὐκ ἐγεῖραί με. ΚΡ. Ἦν δὲ δὴ τί τὸ ἐνύπνιον; ΣΩ. Ἐδόκει τίς μοι γυνὴ προσελθοῦσα καλὴ καὶ εὐειδής, λευκὰ ἱμάτια ἔχουσα, καλέσαι με καὶ εἰπεῖν, Ὦ Σώ- B κρατες, ἤματί κεν τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἵκοιο. ΚΡ. Ὡς ἄτοπον τὸ ἐνύπνιον, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἐναργὲς μέν οὖν, ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων.

ΚΑΡ. III. ΚΡ. Λίαν γε, ὡς ἔοικεν. ἀλλ', ὦ δαιμόνιε Σώκρατες, ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐμοὶ πείθου καὶ σώθητι· ὡς ἐμοί, ἐὰν σὺ ἀποθάνῃς, οὐ μία ξυμφορά ἐστιν,

ἀλλὰ χωρὶς μὲν τοῦ ἐστερῆσθαι τοιούτου ἐπιτηδείου, οἷον ἐγὼ οὐδένα μή ποτε εὑρήσω, ἔτι δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς
C δόξω, οἳ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ μὴ σαφῶς ἴσασιν, ὡς οἷός τ' ὢν σε σώζειν, εἰ ἤθελον ἀναλίσκειν χρήματα, ἀμελῆσαι. καίτοι τίς ἂν αἰσχίων εἴη ταύτης δόξα, ἢ δοκεῖν χρήματα περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι ἢ φίλους; οὐ γὰρ πείσονται οἱ πολλοί, ὡς σὺ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἠθέλησας ἀπιέναι ἐνθένδε, ἡμῶν προθυμουμένων. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τί ἡμῖν, ὦ μακάριε Κρίτων, οὕτω τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλει; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιεικέστατοι, ὧν μᾶλλον ἄξιον φροντίζειν, ἡγήσονται αὐτὰ οὕτω πεπρᾶχθαι, ὥσπερ ἂν πραχθῇ.
D ΚΡ. Ἀλλ' ὁρᾷς δή, ὅτι ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλειν. αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα νυνὶ ὅτι οἷοί τ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέγιστα σχεδόν, ἐάν τις ἐν αὐτοῖς διαβεβλημένος ᾖ. ΣΩ. Εἰ γὰρ ὤφελον, ὦ Κρίτων, οἷοί τε εἶναι οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἵνα οἷοί τε ἦσαν αὖ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὰ μέγιστα, καὶ καλῶς ἂν εἶχε. νῦν δὲ οὐδέτερα οἷοί τε· οὔτε γὰρ φρόνιμον οὔτε ἄφρονα δυνατοὶ ποιῆσαι, ποιοῦσι δὲ τοῦτο, ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσιν.
E Cap. IV. ΚΡ. Ταῦτα μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἐχέτω· τάδε δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπέ μοι. ἆρά γε μὴ ἐμοῦ προμηθεῖ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων, μή, ἐὰν σὺ ἐνθένδε ἐξέλθῃς, οἱ συκοφάνται ἡμῖν πράγματα παρέχωσιν ὡς σὲ ἐνθένδε ἐκκλέψασι, καὶ ἀναγκασθῶμεν ἢ καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν ἀποβαλεῖν ἢ συχνὰ χρήματα, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι
45 πρὸς τούτοις παθεῖν; εἰ γάρ τι τοιοῦτον φοβεῖ, ἔασον αὐτὸ χαίρειν· ἡμεῖς γάρ που δίκαιοί ἐσμεν σώσαντές

σε κινδυνεύειν τοῦτον τὸν κίνδυνον καί, ἐὰν δέῃ, ἔτι τούτου μείζω. ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ πείθου καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει. ΣΩ. Καὶ ταῦτα προμηθοῦμαι, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. ΚΡ. Μήτε τοίνυν ταῦτα φοβοῦ· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ πολὺ τἀργύριόν ἐστιν, ὃ θέλουσι λαβόντες τινὲς σῶσαί σε καὶ ἐξαγαγεῖν ἐνθένδε. ἔπειτα οὐχ ὁρᾷς τούτους τοὺς συκοφάντας ὡς εὐτελεῖς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἂν δέοι ἐπ' αὐτοὺς πολλοῦ ἀργυρίου; σοὶ δὲ ὑπάρχει μὲν τὰ B ἐμὰ χρήματα, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἱκανά· ἔπειτα καὶ εἴ τι ἐμοῦ κηδόμενος οὐκ οἴει δεῖν ἀναλίσκειν τἀμά, ξένοι οὗτοι ἐνθάδε ἕτοιμοι ἀναλίσκειν. εἷς δὲ κεκόμικεν ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀργύριον ἱκανόν, Σιμμίας ὁ Θηβαῖος· ἕτοιμος δὲ καὶ Κέβης καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πάνυ. ὥστε, ὅπερ λέγω, μήτε ταῦτα φοβούμενος ἀποκάμῃς σαυτὸν σῶσαι, μήτε ὃ ἔλεγες ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, δυσχερές σοι γενέσθω, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ἐξελθὼν ὅ τι χρῷο σαυτῷ. πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοσε ὅποι ἂν ἀφίκῃ ἀγαπήσουσί σε· ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ εἰς Θετταλίαν ἰέναι, εἰσὶν C ἐμοὶ ἐκεῖ ξένοι, οἵ σε περὶ πολλοῦ ποιήσονται καὶ ἀσφάλειάν σοι παρέξονται, ὥστε σε μηδένα λυπεῖν τῶν κατὰ Θετταλίαν.

CAP. V. Ἔτι δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν πρᾶγμα, σαυτὸν προδοῦναι, ἐξὸν σωθῆναι· καὶ τοιαῦτα σπεύδεις περὶ σεαυτὸν γενέσθαι, ἅπερ ἂν καὶ οἱ ἐχθροί σου σπεύσαιέν τε καὶ ἔσπευσαν σὲ διαφθεῖραι βουλόμενοι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τοὺς υἱεῖς τοὺς σαυτοῦ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς προδιδόναι, οὓς σοι ἐξὸν καὶ ἐκθρέψαι καὶ ἐκπαιδεῦσαι οἰχήσει D καταλιπών, καὶ τὸ σὸν μέρος, ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι, τοῦτο

πράξουσι· τεύξονται δέ, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, τοιούτων, οἷάπερ εἴωθε γίγνεσθαι ἐν ταῖς ὀρφανίαις περὶ τοὺς ὀρφανούς. ἢ γὰρ οὐ χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι παῖδας, ἢ ξυνδιαταλαιπωρεῖν καὶ τρέφοντα καὶ παιδεύοντα· σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς τὰ ῥᾳθυμότατα αἱρεῖσθαι. χρὴ δέ, ἅπερ ἂν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἀνδρεῖος ἕλοιτο, ταῦτα αἱρεῖσθαι, φάσκοντά γε δὴ ἀρετῆς διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου ἐπιμελεῖ-
E σθαι. ὡς ἔγωγε καὶ ὑπὲρ σοῦ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τῶν σῶν ἐπιτηδείων αἰσχύνομαι, μὴ δόξῃ ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ περὶ σὲ ἀνανδρίᾳ τινὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πεπρᾶχθαι, καὶ ἡ εἴσοδος τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ὡς εἰσῆλθες, ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσελθεῖν, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἀγὼν τῆς δίκης ὡς ἐγένετο, καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τουτί, ὥσπερ κατάγελως τῆς πράξεως, κακίᾳ τινὶ καὶ ἀνανδρίᾳ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ διαπε-
46 φευγέναι ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν, οἵτινές σε οὐχὶ ἐσώσαμεν, οὐδὲ σὺ σαυτόν, οἷόν τε ὂν καὶ δυνατόν, εἴ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ἡμῶν ὄφελος ἦν. ταῦτα οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅρα, μὴ ἅμα τῷ κακῷ καὶ αἰσχρὰ ᾖ σοί τε καὶ ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ βουλεύου, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ βουλεύεσθαι ἔτι ὥρα, ἀλλὰ βεβουλεῦσθαι. μία δὲ βουλή· τῆς γὰρ ἐπιούσης νυκτὸς ταῦτα πάντα δεῖ πεπρᾶχθαι. εἰ δέ τι περιμενοῦμεν, ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκέτι οἷόν τε. ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πείθου μοι καὶ μηδαμῶς ἄλλως ποίει.

B Cap. VI. ΣΩ. Ὦ φίλε Κρίτων, ἡ προθυμία σου πολλοῦ ἀξία, εἰ μετά τινος ὀρθότητος εἴη· εἰ δὲ μή, ὅσῳ μείζων, τοσούτῳ χαλεπωτέρα. σκοπεῖσθαι οὖν χρὴ ἡμᾶς εἴτε ταῦτα πρακτέον εἴτε μή· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐ μόνον νῦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀεὶ τοιοῦτος, οἷος τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ, ὃς ἄν μοι λογιζομέ-

νῳ βέλτιστος φαίνηται. τοὺς δὲ λόγους, οὓς ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, οὐ δύναμαι νῦν ἐκβαλεῖν, ἐπειδή μοι ἥδε ἡ τύχη γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ὅμοιοι φαίνονταί μοι, καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς πρεσβεύω καὶ τιμῶ, οὕς- C περ καὶ πρότερον· ὧν ἐὰν μὴ βελτίω ἔχωμεν λέγειν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, εὖ ἴσθι, ὅτι οὐ μή σοι ξυγχωρήσω, οὐδ' ἂν πλείω τῶν νῦν παρόντων ἡ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις ὥσπερ παῖδας ἡμᾶς μορμολύττηται, δεσμοὺς καὶ θανάτους ἐπιπέμπουσα καὶ χρημάτων ἀφαιρέσεις. Πῶς οὖν ἂν μετριώτατα σκοποίμεθα αὐτά; Εἰ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀναλάβοιμεν, ὃν σὺ λέγεις περὶ τῶν δοξῶν, πότερον καλῶς ἐλέγετο ἑκάστοτε ἢ οὔ, ὅτι ταῖς μὲν δεῖ τῶν δοξῶν προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ταῖς δὲ οὔ· ἢ πρὶν μὲν ἐμὲ δεῖν ἀποθνήσκειν καλῶς ἐλέγε- D το, νῦν δὲ κατάδηλος ἄρα ἐγένετο, ὅτι ἄλλως ἕνεκα λόγου ἐλέγετο, ἦν δὲ παιδιὰ καὶ φλυαρία ὡς ἀληθῶς; ἐπιθυμῶ δ' ἔγωγε ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὦ Κρίτων, κοινῇ μετὰ σοῦ, εἴ τί μοι ἀλλοιότερος φανεῖται, ἐπειδὴ ὧδε ἔχω, ἢ ὁ αὐτός, καὶ ἐάσομεν χαίρειν, ἢ πεισόμεθα αὐτῷ. ἐλέγετο δέ πως, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἑκάστοτε ὧδε ὑπὸ τῶν οἰομένων τι λέγειν, ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι τῶν δοξῶν, ἃς οἱ ἄνθρωποι δοξάζουσι, δέοι τὰς μὲν E περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι, τὰς δὲ μή. τοῦτο πρὸς θεῶν, ὦ Κρίτων, οὐ δοκεῖ καλῶς σοι λέγεσθαι; σὺ γὰρ, ὅσα γε τἀνθρώπεια ἐκτὸς εἶ τοῦ μέλλειν ἀποθνήσκειν αὔ- 47 ριον, καὶ οὐκ ἄν σε παρακρούοι ἡ παροῦσα ξυμφορά. σκόπει δή· οὐχ ἱκανῶς δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι, ὅτι οὐ πάσας χρὴ τὰς δόξας τῶν ἀνθρώπων τιμᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὰς μέν, τὰς δ' οὔ; οὐδὲ πάντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν μέν, τῶν δ'

οὔ; τί φῄς; ταῦτα οὐχὶ καλῶς λέγεται; ΚΡ. Καλῶς. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς τιμᾶν, τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς μή; ΚΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Χρησταὶ δὲ οὐχ αἱ τῶν φρονίμων, πονηραὶ δὲ αἱ τῶν ἀφρόνων; ΚΡ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΚΑΡ. VII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, πῶς αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐλέ-
Β γετο; γυμναζόμενος ἀνὴρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων πότερον παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐπαίνῳ καὶ ψόγῳ καὶ δόξῃ τὸν νοῦν προσέχει, ἢ ἑνὸς μόνου ἐκείνου, ὃς ἂν τυγχάνῃ ἰατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης ὤν; ΚΡ. Ἑνὸς μόνου. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν φοβεῖσθαι χρὴ τοὺς ψόγους καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους τοὺς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐκείνου, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν. ΚΡ. Δῆλα δή. ΣΩ. Ταύτῃ ἄρα αὐτῷ πρακτέον καὶ γυμναστέον καὶ ἐδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον, ᾗ ἂν τῷ ἐνὶ δοκῇ τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαΐοντι μᾶλλον ἢ ᾗ ξύμπασι τοῖς ἄλλοις. ΚΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. ΣΩ. Εἶεν.
C ἀπειθήσας δὲ τῷ ἑνὶ καὶ ἀτιμάσας αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους, τιμήσας δὲ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαΐόντων ἆρα οὐδὲν κακὸν πείσεται; ΚΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἔστι τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο; καὶ ποῖ τείνει, καὶ εἰς τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος; ΚΡ. Δῆλον, ὅτι εἰς τὸ σῶμα· τοῦτο γὰρ διόλλυσιν. ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν καὶ τἆλλα, ὦ Κρίτων, οὕτως, ἵνα μὴ πάντα διϊῶμεν. καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, περὶ ὧν νῦν ἡ βουλὴ ἡμῖν ἐστιν, πότερον τῇ τῶν
D πολλῶν δόξῃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἕπεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι ταύτην, ἢ τῇ τοῦ ἑνός, εἴ τίς ἐστιν ἐπαΐων, ὃν δεῖ καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ξύμπαντας τοὺς ἄλ-

λους; ᾧ εἰ μὴ ἀκολουθήσομεν, διαφθεροῦμεν ἐκεῖνο καὶ λωβησόμεθα, ὃ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο, τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο. ἢ οὐδέν ἐστι τοῦτο; ΚΡ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΚΑΡ. VIII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, ἐὰν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ μὲν βέλτιον γιγνόμενον, ὑπὸ τοῦ νοσώδους δὲ διαφθειρόμενον διολέσωμεν πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαϊ- Ε
— όντων δόξῃ, ἆρα βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστι, διεφθαρμένου αὐτοῦ; ἔστι δέ που τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα. ἢ οὐχί; ΚΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστι μετὰ μοχθηροῦ καὶ διεφθαρμένου σώματος; ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐκείνου ἆρα ἡμῖν βιωτὸν διεφθαρμένου, ᾧ τὸ ἄδικον μὲν λωβᾶται, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ὀνίνησιν; ἢ φαυλότερον ἡγούμεθα εἶναι τοῦ σώματος ἐκεῖνο, ὅ τι πότ' ἐστι τῶν ἡμετέρων, περὶ ὃ ἥ τε ἀδικία καὶ ἡ δι- 48
καιοσύνη ἐστίν; ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τιμιώτερον; ΚΡ. Πολύ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ βέλτιστε, πάνυ ἡμῖν οὕτω φροντιστέον, τί ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ὅ τι ὁ ἐπαΐων περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων,
— ὁ εἷς, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια. ὥστε πρῶτον μὲν ταύτῃ οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἰσηγεῖ, εἰσηγούμενος τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης δεῖν ἡμᾶς φροντίζειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. ἀλλὰ μὲν δή, φαίη γ' ἄν τις, οἷοί τ' εἰσὶν ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκτιννύναι. ΚΡ. Δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα· φαίη γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες. Β
ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ἀλλ', ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὗτός τε ὁ λόγος, ὃν διεληλύθαμεν, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἔτι ὅμοιος εἶναι τῷ καὶ πρότερον· καὶ τόνδε αὖ σκόπει, εἰ ἔτι μένει ἡμῖν ἢ οὔ, ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζῆν περὶ πλείστου ποιητέον, ἀλλὰ

τὸ εὖ ζῆν. ΚΡ. Ἀλλὰ μένει. ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὅτι ταὐτόν ἐστι, μένει, ἢ οὐ μένει; ΚΡ. Μένει.

ΚΑΡ. IX. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων τοῦτο σκεπτέον, πότερον δίκαιον ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε πειρᾶσθαι ἐξιέναι, μὴ ἀφιέντων Ἀθηναίων, ἢ οὐ δίκαιον· καὶ ἐὰν μὲν φαίνηται δίκαιον, πειρώμεθα, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐῶμεν, ἃς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις περί τε ἀναλώσεως χρημάτων καὶ δόξης καὶ παίδων τροφῆς, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων, σκέμματα ᾖ τῶν ῥᾳδίως ἀποκτιννύντων καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων γ' ἄν, εἰ οἷοί τε ἦσαν, οὐδενὶ ξὺν νῷ, τούτων τῶν πολλῶν. ἡμῖν δ', ἐπειδὴ ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἱρεῖ, μὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκεπτέον ἢ ἢ ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, πότερον δίκαια πράξομεν καὶ χρήματα τελοῦντες τούτοις τοῖς ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε ἐξάξουσι καὶ χάριτας, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐξάγοντές τε καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι, ἢ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἀδικήσομεν ταῦτα πάντα ποιοῦντες· κἂν φαινώμεθα ἄδικα αὐτὰ ἐργαζόμενοι, μὴ οὐ δεῖ ὑπολογίζεσθαι οὔτ' εἰ ἀποθνήσκειν δεῖ παραμένοντας καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας, οὔτε ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πάσχειν πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν. ΚΡ. Καλῶς μέν μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅρα δὲ τί δρῶμεν. ΣΩ. Σκοπῶμεν, ὦ γαθέ, κοινῇ, καὶ εἴ τῃ ἔχεις ἀντιλέγειν ἐμοῦ λέγοντος, ἀντίλεγε, καί σοι πείσομαι· εἰ δὲ μή, παῦσαι ἤδη, ὦ μακάριε, πολλάκις μοι λέγων τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὡς χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἀκόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐμὲ ἀπιέναι· ὡς ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦμαι πεῖσαί σε ταῦτα πράττειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος. ὅρα δὲ δὴ τῆς σκέψεως τὴν ἀρχήν, ἐάν σοι ἱκανῶς λέγηται, καὶ πειρῶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ ἐρω-

τωμενον, ἢ ἂν μάλιστα οἴῃ. ΚΡ. Ἀλλὰ πειρά- 49
σομαι.

ΚΑΡ. Χ. ΣΩ. Οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ φαμὲν ἑκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι, ἤ τινι μὲν ἀδικητέον τρόπῳ, τινὶ δὲ οὔ; ἢ οὐδαμῶς τό γε ἀδικεῖν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε καλόν, ὡς πολλάκις ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ὡμολογήθη; ὅπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο. ἢ πᾶσαι ἡμῖν ἐκεῖναι αἱ πρόσθεν ὁμολογίαι ἐν ταῖσδε ταῖς ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἐκκεχυμέναι εἰσί, καὶ πάλαι, ὦ Κρίτων, ἄρα τηλικοίδε γέροντες ἄνδρες πρὸς ἀλλήλους σπουδῇ διαλεγόμενοι ἐλάθομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παίδων οὐδὲν διαφέροντες; ἢ B παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτως ἔχει, ὥσπερ τότε ἐλέγετο ἡμῖν; εἴτε φασὶν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴτε μή, καὶ εἴτε δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἔτι τῶνδε χαλεπώτερα πάσχειν εἴτε καὶ πραότερα, ὅμως τό γε ἀδικεῖν τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τυγχάνει ὂν παντὶ τρόπῳ; φαμέν, ἢ οὔ; ΚΡ. Φαμέν. ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς ἄρα δεῖ ἀδικεῖν. ΚΡ. Οὐ δῆτα. ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ ἀδικούμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται, ἐπειδή γε οὐδαμῶς δεῖ ἀδικεῖν. ΚΡ. Οὐ φαίνε- C ται. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δή; κακουργεῖν δεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων, ἢ οὔ; ΚΡ. Οὐ δεῖ δή που, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἀντικακουργεῖν κακῶς πάσχοντα, ὡς οἱ πολλοί φασι, δίκαιον, ἢ οὐ δίκαιον; ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς. ΣΩ. Τὸ γάρ που κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲν διαφέρει. ΚΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ΣΩ. Οὔτε ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδ' ἂν ὁτιοῦν πάσχῃ ὑπ' αὐτῶν. καὶ ὅρα, ὦ Κρίτων, ταῦτα καθομολογῶν, ὅπως μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ὁμολογῇς. οἶδα D γάρ, ὅτι ὀλίγοις τισὶ ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει. οἷς

οὖν οὕτω δέδοκται καὶ οἷς μή, τούτοις οὐκ ἔστι κοινὴ βουλή, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη τούτους ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν, ὁρῶντας τὰ ἀλλήλων βουλεύματα. σκόπει δὴ οὖν καὶ σὺ εὖ μάλα, πότερον κοινωνεῖς καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ σοι· καὶ ἀρχώμεθα ἐντεῦθεν βουλευόμενοι, ὡς οὐδέποτε ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὔτε τοῦ ἀνταδικεῖν οὔτε κακῶς πάσχοντα ἀμύνεσθαι ἀντιδρῶντα κακῶς· ἢ ἀφίστασαι καὶ οὐ κοινωνεῖς τῆς ἀρχῆς; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ
E καὶ πάλαι οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ, σοὶ δ' εἴ πῃ ἄλλῃ δέδοκται, λέγε καὶ δίδασκε. εἰ δὲ ἐμμένεις τοῖς πρόσθεν, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἄκουε. ΚΡ. Ἀλλ' ἐμμένω τε καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ μοι· ἀλλὰ λέγε. ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ αὖ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, μᾶλλον δ' ἐρωτῶ· πότερον ἃ ἄν τις ὁμολογήσῃ τῷ δίκαια ὄντα ποιητέον ἢ ἐξαπατητέον; ΚΡ. Ποιητέον.

ΚΑΡ. XI. ΣΩ. Ἐκ τούτων δὴ ἄθρει. ἀπιόντες ἐν-
50 θένδε ἡμεῖς μὴ πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν πότερον κακῶς τινας ποιοῦμεν, καὶ ταῦτα οὓς ἥκιστα δεῖ, ἢ οὔ; καὶ ἐμμένομεν οἷς ὡμολογήσαμεν δικαίοις οὖσιν, ἢ οὔ; ΚΡ. Οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς ὃ ἐρωτᾷς· οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ὧδε σκόπει. εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνθένδε εἴτε ἀποδιδράσκειν, εἴθ' ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάσαι τοῦτο, ἐλθόντες οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως ἐπιστάντες ἔροιντο· Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τί ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ποιεῖν; ἄλλο τι ἢ τούτῳ τῷ ἔργῳ, ᾧ ἐπιχειρεῖς, διανοεῖ τούς τε νόμους ἡμᾶς ἀπολέσαι
B καὶ ξύμπασαν τὴν πόλιν τὸ σὸν μέρος; ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε ἔτι ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀνατετράφθαι, ἐν ᾗ ἂν αἱ γενόμεναι δίκαι μηδὲν ἰσχύωσιν,

ἀλλ' ὑπὸ ἰδιωτῶν ἄκυροί τε γίγνωνται καὶ διαφθείρωνται; τί ἐροῦμεν, ὦ Κρίτων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα; πολλὰ γὰρ ἄν τις ἔχοι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ῥήτωρ, εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ τούτου τοῦ νόμου ἀπολλυμένου, ὃς τὰς δίκας τὰς δικασθείσας προστάττει κυρίας εἶναι. ἢ ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτούς, ὅτι Ἠδίκει γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις C καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην ἔκρινε; Ταῦτα ἢ τί ἐροῦμεν; ΚΡ. Ταῦτα νὴ Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες.

Cap. XII. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν, ἂν εἴπωσιν οἱ νόμοι, Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἢ καὶ ταῦτα ὡμολόγητο ἡμῖν τε καὶ σοί, ἢ ἐμμένειν ταῖς δίκαις αἷς ἂν ἡ πόλις δικάζῃ; εἰ οὖν αὐτῶν θαυμάζοιμεν λεγόντων, ἴσως ἂν εἴποιεν, ὅτι Ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ θαύμαζε τὰ λεγόμενα, ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου, ἐπειδὴ καὶ εἴωθας χρῆσθαι τῷ ἐρωτᾶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. φέρε γάρ, τί ἐγκαλῶν ἡμῖν τε καὶ τῇ πόλει D ἐπιχειρεῖς ἡμᾶς ἀπολλύναι; οὐ πρῶτον μέν σε ἐγεννήσαμεν ἡμεῖς, καὶ δι' ἡμῶν ἐλάμβανε τὴν μητέρα σου ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ἐφύτευσέ σε; φράσον οὖν, τούτοις ἡμῶν τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς περὶ τοὺς γάμους, μέμφει τι ὡς οὐ καλῶς ἔχουσιν; Οὐ μέμφομαι, φαίην ἄν. Ἀλλὰ τοῖς περὶ τὴν τοῦ γενομένου τροφήν τε καὶ παιδείαν, ἐν ᾗ καὶ σὺ ἐπαιδεύθης; ἦ οὐ καλῶς προσέταττον ἡμῶν οἱ ἐπὶ τούτοις τεταγμένοι νόμοι, παραγγέλλοντες τῷ πατρὶ τῷ σῷ σε ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν; Καλῶς, φαίην ἄν. Εἶεν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐγένου τε καὶ E ἐξετράφης καὶ ἐπαιδεύθης, ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν πρῶτον μέν, ὡς οὐχὶ ἡμέτερος ἦσθα καὶ ἔκγονος καὶ δοῦλος, αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ σοὶ πρόγονοι; καὶ εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει,

ἆρ' ἐξ ἴσου οἴει εἶναι σοὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡμῖν, καὶ ἅττ
ἂν ἡμεῖς σε ἐπιχειρῶμεν ποιεῖν, καὶ σὺ ταῦτα ἀντι-
ποιεῖν οἴει δίκαιον εἶναι; ἢ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα σοι τὸν πα-
τέρα οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου ἦν τὸ δίκαιον καὶ πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην,
εἴ σοι ὢν ἐτύγχανεν, ὥστε, ἅπερ πάσχοις, ταῦτα καὶ
ἀντιποιεῖν, οὔτε κακῶς ἀκούοντα ἀντιλέγειν οὔτε τυ- a
51 πτόμενον ἀντιτύπτειν οὔτε ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά· πρὸς
δὲ τὴν πατρίδα ἄρα καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἐξέσται σοι, ὥστε,
ἐάν σε ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἡμεῖς ἀπολλύναι δίκαιον ἡγούμε-
νοι εἶναι, καὶ σὺ δὲ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν πατρίδα
καθ' ὅσον δύνασαι ἐπιχειρήσεις ἀνταπολλύναι, καὶ
φήσεις ταῦτα ποιῶν δίκαια πράττειν, ὁ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ
τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελόμενος; ἢ οὕτως εἶ σοφός, ὥστε
λέληθέ σε, ὅτι μητρός τε καὶ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
προγόνων ἁπάντων τιμιώτερόν ἐστι πατρὶς καὶ σεμνό-
B τερον καὶ ἁγιώτερον καὶ ἐν μείζονι μοίρᾳ καὶ παρὰ
θεοῖς καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώποις τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσι, καὶ σέβε-
σθαι δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ὑπείκειν καὶ θωπεύειν πατρίδα
χαλεπαίνουσαν ἢ πατέρα, καὶ ἢ πείθειν, ἢ ποιεῖν ἃ ἂν
κελεύῃ, καὶ πάσχειν, ἐάν τι προστάττῃ παθεῖν, ἡσυ-
χίαν ἄγοντα, ἐάν τε τύπτεσθαι ἐάν τε δεῖσθαι, ἐάν τε
εἰς πόλεμον ἄγῃ τρωθησόμενον ἢ ἀποθανούμενον,
ποιητέον ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ οὐχὶ
ὑπεικτέον, οὐδὲ ἀναχωρητέον, οὐδὲ λειπτέον τὴν τά-
ξιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ
πανταχοῦ ποιητέον ἃ ἂν κελεύῃ ἡ πόλις καὶ ἡ πα-
C τρίς, ἢ πείθειν αὐτὴν ᾗ τὸ δίκαιον πέφυκε· βιάζεσθαι
δ' οὐχ ὅσιον οὔτε μητέρα οὔτε πατέρα, πολὺ δὲ τού-

των ἔτι ἧττον τὴν πατρίδα. Τί φήσομεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων; ἀληθῆ λέγειν τοὺς νόμους, ἢ οὔ; ΚΡ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΑΡ. XIII. *ΣΩ. Σκόπει τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαῖεν ἂν ἴσως οἱ νόμοι, εἰ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, ὅτι οὐ δίκαια ἡμᾶς ἐπιχειρεῖς δρᾶν ἃ νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς. ἡμεῖς γάρ σε γεννήσαντες, ἐκθρέψαντες, παιδεύσαντες, μεταδόντες ἁπάντων ὧν οἷοί τ' ἦμεν καλῶν σοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι πολίταις, ὅμως προαγορεύομεν τῷ* D *ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίων τῷ βουλομένῳ, ἐπειδὰν δοκιμασθῇ καὶ ἴδῃ τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει πράγματα καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους, ᾧ ἂν μὴ ἀρέσκωμεν ἡμεῖς, ἐξεῖναι λαβόντα τὰ αὑτοῦ ἀπιέναι ὅποι ἂν βούληται. καὶ οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐμποδών ἐστιν οὐδ' ἀπαγορεύει, ἐάν τέ τις βούληται ὑμῶν εἰς ἀποικίαν ἰέναι, εἰ μὴ ἀρέσκοιμεν ἡμεῖς τε καὶ ἡ πόλις, ἐάν τε μετοικεῖν ἄλλοσέ ποι ἐλθών, ἰέναι ἐκεῖσε, ὅποι ἂν βούληται, ἔχοντα τὰ αὑτοῦ. ὃς δ' ἂν ὑμῶν παραμείνῃ, ὁρῶν ὃν* E *τρόπον ἡμεῖς τάς τε δίκας δικάζομεν καὶ τἆλλα τὴν πόλιν διοικοῦμεν, ἤδη φαμὲν τοῦτον ὁμολογηκέναι ἔργῳ ἡμῖν ἃ ἂν ἡμεῖς κελεύωμεν ποιήσειν ταῦτα, καὶ τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον τριχῇ φαμεν ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι τε γεννήταις οὖσιν ἡμῖν οὐ πείθεται, καὶ ὅτι τροφεῦσι, καὶ ὅτι ὁμολογήσας ἢ μὴν πείθεσθαι οὔτε πείθεται οὔτε πείθει ἡμᾶς, εἰ μὴ καλῶς τι ποιοῦμεν, προτιθέντων ἡμῶν,* 52 *καὶ οὐκ ἀγρίως ἐπιταττόντων ποιεῖν ἃ ἂν κελεύωμεν, ἀλλὰ ἐφιέντων δυεῖν θάτερα, ἢ πείθειν ἡμᾶς, ἢ ποιεῖν, τούτων οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ.*

ΣΑΡ. XIV. *Ταύταις δή φαμεν καὶ σέ, ὦ Σώκρα-*

τες, ταῖς αἰτίαις ἐνέξεσθαι, εἴπερ ποιήσεις ἃ ἐπινοεῖς, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα Ἀθηναίων σέ, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα. Εἰ οὖν ἐγὼ εἴποιμι, διὰ τί δή; ἴσως ἄν μου δικαίως καθάπτοιντο, λέγοντες, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα Ἀθηναίων ἐγὼ αὐτοῖς ὡμολογηκὼς τυγχάνω ταύτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν. φαῖεν γὰρ ἂν ὅτι Ὦ Σώκρατες, μεγάλα
B ἡμῖν τούτων τεκμήρια ἐστιν, ὅτι σοι καὶ ἡμεῖς ἠρέσκομεν καὶ ἡ πόλις· οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἁπάντων διαφερόντως ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεδήμεις, εἰ μή σοι διαφερόντως ἤρεσκε, καὶ οὔτ' ἐπὶ θεωρίαν πώποτε ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξῆλθες, ὅ τι μὴ ἅπαξ εἰς Ἰσθμόν, οὔτε ἄλλοσε οὐδαμόσε, εἰ μή ποι στρατευσόμενος, οὔτε ἄλλην ἀποδημίαν ἐποιήσω πώποτε, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλ
C λοι ἄνθρωποι, οὐδ' ἐπιθυμία σε ἄλλης πόλεως οὐδ' ἄλλων νόμων ἔλαβεν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς σοι ἱκανοὶ ἦμεν καὶ ἡ ἡμετέρα πόλις· οὕτω σφόδρα ἡμᾶς ἧροῦ, καὶ ὡμολόγεις καθ' ἡμᾶς πολιτεύεσθαι, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ παῖδας ἐν αὐτῇ ἐποιήσω, ὡς ἀρεσκούσης σοι τῆς πόλεως. ἔτι τοίνυν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δίκῃ ἐξῆν σοι φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι εἰ ἐβούλου, καὶ ὅπερ νῦν ἀκούσης τῆς πόλεως ἐπιχειρεῖς, τότε ἑκούσης ποιῆσαι, σὺ δὲ τότε μὲν ἐκαλλωπίζου ὡς οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν εἰ δέοι τεθνάναι σε, ἀλλ' ἧροῦ, ὡς ἔφησθα, πρὸ τῆς φυγῆς θάνατον· νῦν
D δὲ οὔτ' ἐκείνους τοὺς λόγους αἰσχύνει, οὔτε ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐντρέπει, ἐπιχειρῶν διαφθεῖραι, πράττεις τε ἅπερ ἂν δοῦλος φαυλότατος πράξειεν, ἀποδιδράσκειν ἐπιχειρῶν παρὰ τὰς ξυνθήκας τε καὶ τὰς ὁμολογίας, καθ' ἃς ἡμῖν ξυνέθου πολιτεύεσθαι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἀπόκριναι, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, φάσκον-

τές σε ὡμολογηκέναι πολιτεύεσθαι καθ' ἡμᾶς ἔργῳ, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγῳ, ἢ οὐκ ἀληθῆ. Τί φῶμεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων; ἄλλο τι ἢ ὁμολογῶμεν; ΚΡ. Ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν ἂν φαῖεν ἢ ξυνθήκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ ὁμολογίας παραβαίνεις, οὐχ Ε ὑπ' ἀνάγκης ὁμολογήσας, οὐδὲ ἀπατηθείς, οὐδὲ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ ἀναγκασθεὶς βουλεύσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἔτεσιν ἑβδομήκοντα, ἐν οἷς ἐξῆν σοι ἀπιέναι, εἰ μὴ ἠρέσκομεν ἡμεῖς μηδὲ δίκαιαι ἐφαίνοντό σοι αἱ ὁμολογίαι εἶναι. σὺ δὲ οὔτε Λακεδαίμονα προηροῦ οὔτε Κρήτην, ἃς δὴ ἑκάστοτε φῂς εὐνομεῖσθαι, οὔτε ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων οὐδὲ τῶν βαρβαρικῶν, ἀλλ' ἧττω ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀπεδήμησας ἢ οἱ χωλοί τε καὶ τυφλοὶ 53 καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνάπηροι· οὕτω σοι διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἤρεσκεν ἡ πόλις τε καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ νόμοι δῆλον ὅτι· τίνι γὰρ ἂν πόλις ἀρέσκοι ἄνευ νόμων; νῦν δὲ δὴ οὐκ ἐμμενεῖς τοῖς ὡμολογημένοις; ἐὰν ἡμῖν γε πείθῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ οὐ καταγέλαστός γε ἔσει ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξελθών.

Cap. XV. Σκόπει γὰρ δή, ταῦτα παραβὰς καὶ ἐξαμαρτών τι τούτων τί ἀγαθὸν ἐργάσει σαυτόν, ἢ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους τοὺς σαυτοῦ. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ κινδυνεύ- Β σουσί γέ σου οἱ ἐπιτήδειοι καὶ αὐτοὶ φεύγειν καὶ στερηθῆναι τῆς πόλεως, ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπολέσαι, σχεδόν τι δῆλον· αὐτὸς δὲ πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰς τῶν ἐγγύτατά τινα πόλεων ἔλθῃς, ἢ Θήβαζε ἢ Μέγαράδε, — εὐνομοῦνται γὰρ ἀμφότεραι — πολέμιος ἥξεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ τούτων πολιτείᾳ, καὶ ὅσοιπερ κήδονται τῶν αὐτῶν πόλεων, ὑποβλέψονταί σε διαφθορέα ἡγούμε-

νοι τῶν νόμων, καὶ βεβαιώσεις τοῖς δικασταῖς τὴν
C δόξαν, ὥστε δοκεῖν ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην δικάσαι· ὅστις
γὰρ νόμων διαφθορεύς ἐστι, σφόδρα που δόξειεν ἂν
νέων γε καὶ ἀνοήτων ἀνθρώπων διαφθορεὺς εἶναι.
πότερον οὖν φεύξει τάς τε εὐνομουμένας πόλεις καὶ
τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς κοσμιωτάτους; καὶ τοῦτο ποιοῦντι
ἆρα ἄξιόν σοι ζῆν ἔσται; ἢ πλησιάσεις τούτοις καὶ
ἀναισχυντήσεις διαλεγόμενος—τίνας λόγους, ὦ Σώ-
κρατες; ἢ οὕσπερ ἐνθάδε, ὡς ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύ-
νη πλείστου ἄξιον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ
οἱ νόμοι; καὶ οὐκ οἴει ἄσχημον ἂν φανεῖσθαι τὸ τοῦ
D Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα; οἴεσθαί γε χρή. Ἀλλ' ἐκ μὲν
τούτων τῶν τόπων ἀπαρεῖς, ἥξεις δὲ εἰς Θετταλίαν
παρὰ τοὺς ξένους τοὺς Κρίτωνος· ἐκεῖ γὰρ δὴ πλείστη
ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία, καὶ ἴσως ἂν ἡδέως σου ἀκούοιεν
ὡς γελοίως ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἀπεδίδρασκες, σκευήν
τέ τινα περιθέμενος, ἢ διφθέραν λαβὼν ἢ ἄλλα οἷα
δὴ εἰώθασιν ἐνσκευάζεσθαι οἱ ἀποδιδράσκοντες, καὶ
τὸ σχῆμα τὸ σαυτοῦ μεταλλάξας. ὅτι δὲ γέρων ἀνὴρ
E σμικροῦ χρόνου τῷ βίῳ λοιποῦ ὄντος, ὡς τὸ εἰκός,
ἐτόλμησας οὕτω γλίσχρως ἐπιθυμεῖν ζῆν, νόμους τοὺς
μεγίστους παραβάς, οὐδεὶς ὃς ἐρεῖ; ἴσως, ἂν μή τινα
λυπῇς· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀκούσει, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλὰ καὶ
ἀνάξια σαυτοῦ. ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσει πάντας ἀν-
θρώπους καὶ δουλεύων—τί ποιῶν ἢ εὐωχούμενος ἐν
Θετταλίᾳ, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ἀποδεδημηκὼς εἰς Θετ-
ταλίαν; λόγοι δὲ ἐκεῖνοι οἱ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ
54 τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς ποῦ ἡμῖν ἔσονται; Ἀλλὰ δὴ τῶν
παίδων ἕνεκα βούλει ζῆν, ἵνα αὐτοὺς ἐκθρέψῃς καὶ

παιδεύσῃς; τί δαί; εἰς Θετταλίαν αὐτοὺς ἀγαγων θρέψεις τε καὶ παιδεύσεις, ξένους ποιήσας, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτό σου ἀπολαύσωσιν; ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὔ, αὐτοῦ δὲ τρεφόμενοι σοῦ ζῶντος βέλτιον θρέψονται καὶ παιδεύσονται, μὴ ξυνόντος σοῦ αὐτοῖς; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιτήδειοι οἱ σοὶ ἐπιμελήσονται αὐτῶν. πότερον ἐὰν εἰς Θετταλίαν ἀποδημήσῃς, ἐπιμελήσονται· ἐὰν δὲ εἰς Ἅιδου ἀποδημήσῃς, οὐχὶ ἐπιμελήσονται; εἴπερ γέ τι ὄφελος αὐτῶν ἐστι τῶν σοι φασκόντων ἐπιτηδείων εἶναι, οἴεσθαί B γε χρή.

Cap. XVI. Ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, πειθόμενος ἡμῖν τοῖς σοῖς τροφεῦσι μήτε παῖδας περὶ πλείονος ποιοῦ μήτε τὸ ζῆν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου, ἵνα εἰς Ἅιδου ἐλθὼν ἔχῃς ταῦτα πάντα ἀπολογήσασθαι τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἄρχουσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐνθάδε σοι φαίνεται ταῦτα πράττοντι ἄμεινον εἶναι οὐδὲ δικαιότερον οὐδὲ ὁσιώτερον, οὐδὲ ἄλλῳ τῶν σῶν οὐδενί, οὔτε ἐκεῖσε ἀφικομένῳ ἄμεινον ἔσται. ἀλλὰ νῦν μὲν ἠδικημένος ἄπει, ἐὰν ἀπίῃς, οὐχ ὑφ' ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων· ἐὰν δὲ ἐξέλθῃς οὕτως αἰσχρῶς ἀνταδικήσας τε C καὶ ἀντικακουργήσας, τὰς σαυτοῦ ὁμολογίας τε καὶ ξυνθήκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς παραβὰς καὶ κακὰ ἐργασάμενος τούτους, οὓς ἥκιστα ἔδει, σαυτόν τε καὶ φίλους καὶ πατρίδα καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἡμεῖς τέ σοι χαλεπανοῦμεν ζῶντι, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἀδελφοὶ οἱ ἐν Ἅιδου νόμοι οὐκ εὐμενῶς σε ὑποδέξονται, εἰδότες, ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπεχείρησας ἀπολέσαι τὸ σὸν μέρος. ἀλλὰ μή σε πείσῃ Κρίτων ποιεῖν ἃ λέγει μᾶλλον ἢ ἡμεῖς. D

Cap. XVII. Ταῦτα, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε Κρίτων, εὖ

ἴσθι ὅτι ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἀκούειν, ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες τῶν αὐλῶν δοκοῦσιν ἀκούειν, καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ αὕτη ἡ ἠχὴ τούτων τῶν λόγων βομβεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ δύνασθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν. ἀλλὰ ἴσθι, ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοῖ δοκοῦντα, ἐάν τι λέγῃς παρὰ ταῦτα, μάτην ἐρεῖς. ὅμως μέντοι εἴ τι οἴει πλέον ποιήσειν, λέγε. ΚΡ. Ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν. ΣΩ. Ἔα τοίνυν, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ πράττωμεν ταύτῃ, ἐπειδὴ ταύτῃ ὁ θεὸς ὑφηγεῖται.

NOTES.

NOTES.

APOLOGIA SOCRATIS.

A. Ὅ τι ... κατηγόρων. *In what manner you have been* 17 *affected by my accusers*, i. e. by their harangues, which had immediately preceded the defence of Socrates. Since πεπόνθατε denotes the receiving of an action, it is followed by ὑπό, as if it were a passive verb. C. 556; K. 249, 3; Mt. 496, 3.* So ὑπ' αὐτῶν just below; and in like manner *ab* in Latin. The accusers or prosecutors of Socrates were three, Anytus, 18 B., Meletus, 19 B., and Lycon, 23 E.——ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. The trial of Socrates took place before the Heliæa, the most numerous and popular, and, at that time, by far the most important court at Athens, which consisting in all of 6,000 Athenian citizens (though they usually administered justice in sections of 500 each), and being also often thronged by spectators from the populace, its members might well be addressed by the same honorable title as the members of the popular assembly, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, instead of the more distinctive title ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί. The 6,000 Heliasts were a majority of the adult citizens of Athens. Cf. Wachsmuth's His. Ant. Sec. 47. On the constitution of this court see, besides Wachsmuth, Meier's Attic Process, Smith's Dict. of Antiqq., and

* C. stands for Crosby's Grammar; K. for Kühner's Middle Grammar; and Mt. for Matthiæ's, second edition.

Grote's Hist. of Greece, vol. iv. chap. 31. On the compliment implied in the title Ἀθηναῖος, cf. 29 D.——δ' οὖν. *But then*, however that may be.——ὀλίγου, sc. δεῖν, literally, to want little = *almost*. C. 622; Mt. 355, obs. 2. Cf. ὀλίγου δεῖν, 22, A.——ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμην, *forgot myself*, i. e. my true character.——ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν limits οὐδὲν εἰρήκασι, and is designed to qualify, or apologize for, that otherwise absolute negation of all truth in his accusers: *they have said, so to speak, nothing that is true at least*. Cf. Stallbaum in loc., and Gorg. 450 B, also Woolsey, ibid.——αὐτῶν ἓν ἐθαύμασα, etc. *One thing of theirs I most wondered at of the many falsehoods which they stated*, viz. *this*. αὐτῶν relates to persons and is the gen. of the possessor, while τῶν πολλῶν is the partitive gen. after the same word ἓν. Cf. Stallbaum ad loc.

B. χρῆν. Al. χρὴ. But the imperf. ind. implies the non-performance of the duty: *you ought to have been on your guard*, as you have not been. Mt. 505, obs.; K. 260, R. 3.——ἐξαπατηθῆτε. The subj. follows the past tense of the ind. (χρῆν) to denote that the danger of being deceived still continued: *you ought to have been on your guard*, and ought still to be, *lest you be deceived*. C. 602; K. 345, 5; Mt. 518, 1.——μὴ αἰσχυνθῆναι. μή rather than οὐ regularly accompanies the inf., because the inf., from its very nature, usually denotes a mere conception: *that they should not be ashamed*. C. 647; K. 318, 4; Mt. 608, 5.——ὅτι = *because*.——ἔργῳ, *by the fact*, the actual trial.——μηδ' ὁπωστιοῦν. Observe the emphasis: *not even in any way whatever*.——αὐτῶν, *of them*, or in them. εἰ μὴ ἄρα = *nisi forte, unless perchance*. Often used ironically: *unless forsooth*. K. 324, a.——λέγειν depends on δεινὸν = *powerful* (literally, *terrible*) *to speak*.——εἰ . . . λέγουσιν may be rendered, if they *mean* this.——οὐ κατὰ τούτους, *not after their example*. He would acknowledge, that he was an orator according to that definition, but not according to their exempli-

fication of it, since *they*, as he proceeds to say, *had spoken little or nothing that was true.*——*ἤ τι ἢ οὐδὲν* = *little or nothing, next to nothing.* Mt. 487, 8.——*πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.* Cf. Xen. Mem. 4, 8, 9: *τὴν δίκην ἀληθέστατα εἰπών.*——*οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δί, κ.τ.λ. Not, however, by any means, Athenians, speeches rhetorically decked out as theirs were in choice words and phrases, nor carefully arranged in ornate periods, but you shall hear facts, stated without premeditation in the words which chance to occur to me.*——*ὥσπερ οἱ τούτων*, sc. *λόγοι ἦσαν.* In such comparative clauses, the noun may take the case of the preceding noun, or may be put in the nominative. *λόγους* is the object of *ἀκούσεσθε*, which is expressed in the last instead of the first clause, in order to declare emphatically and affirmatively what they *shall* hear. According to Stallbaum, *ὀνόματα* = singula nomina, *ῥήματα* = nomina una cum predicato. In the technical language of Greek grammar, *ὀνόματα* = nouns, *ῥήματα* = verbs.

C. *πιστεύω γάρ, κ.τ.λ.* in this connection implies, that just sentiments do not need rhetorical ornaments.——*δήπου*, as usual, is somewhat playful = *methinks, to be sure.*——*τῇδε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ*, est: *mihi homini id ætatis*—verbum abstractum loco verbi concreti positum. Stallb. Socrates was 70 years old at the time of his trial. Cf. D.——*πλάττοντι* takes the gender of *μειρακίῳ*, and usually implies more or less of *fictitious* and false ornament.——*εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσίεναι*, to come *into* your presence, your dicastery, or your assembly.——*παρίεμαι.* Ruhnken, as cited and approved by Stallbaum, says: *παρίημι* = admitto, *παρίεμαι* = ad me admitti volo, i. e. *precor, deprecor.*——*Καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ, κ.τ.λ. Both in the agora at the counters, and elsewhere.* Cf. Mat. 21, 12: *τὰς τραπέζας τῶν κολλυβιστῶν.*

D. *ἔχει γὰρ οὑτωσί. For the fact is thus*, sc. as follows. Then follows the explanatory clause, which, as usual, is without any connective (asyndeton).——*ἀναβέβηκα*, sc. the *βήμα*, or stand of the accused. The accuser also had his *βήμα* or *elevat-*

ed stand in the court.——*τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως.* The language of judicial proceedings. For the gen. see Mt. 337; K. 274, 3; C. 395.——*ὥσπερ οὖν ἄν.* This *ἄν* belongs to the apodosis with *ξυνεγιγνώσκετε*, where it is repeated (*δήπου ἄν*). It stands with *ὥσπερ* to intimate at the outset (by way of anticipation), that the example is a mere supposition, and then, after the intervening protasis with *εἰ*, it is repeated with the verb or some other important word of the apodosis. K. 261, 3. Cf. Gorg. 447, D, and other examples cited by Stallb. in loc.——*τῷ ὄντι* = *in fact.* So very often, especially in Plato.——*ξένος*, not an Athenian but still a Greek, who might be understood in the Athenian courts, but would speak in the dialect, tone, and manner of his native country. Compare Schleiermacher's note ad loc.——*οἷσπερ.* C. 446; K. 242, *γ*; Mt. 441, 2, a.

18 A. *Καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν, and indeed now also.* The construction is irregular. We should expect *οὕτω καὶ νῦν, so also now*, answering to *ὥσπερ.*——*δίκαιον, being just*, i. e. a *reasonable* request. It is in apposition with *τοῦτο*, which is further explained by the infinitives *ἐᾶν* and *σκοπεῖν*, the demonstrative preparing the way for the infinitives and calling attention to them. Mt. 472, b; K. 304, 2.——*ὡς . . . δοκῶ, as it appears to me at least;* literally, as *I* appear. The Greeks are fond of changing the impersonal construction into the personal. K. 307, R. 6 and 7; C. 551; Mt. 264, 5.——*ἴσως μέν . . . εἴη.* It is difficult to see in this harmless parenthesis the un-Platonic self-praise which Ast finds in it.——*αὐτὸ τοῦτο, this very thing*, i. e. *this single point*, viz. whether I speak what is just or not. Here the demonstrative (enforced by the reflexive, of which combination Plato is particularly fond) prepares the way for a clause, as it does above for an infinitive. K. 304, 2; Mt. 472, c.——*ἀρετή* = *the virtue*, being in the predicate, omits the article in Greek, but requires it in English. K. 244, R. 1; C. 487, 4; Mt. 264, 5.——*δίκαιός εἰμι* instead of *δίκαιόν ἐστι* with the acc. and inf.;

another example of the personal for the impersonal construction. Cf. note on δοκῶ, above. It is treated as a species of attraction by Mt. 297, and C. 551.——*τὰ πρῶτά μου ψευδῆ κατηγορημένα, those things which have been first falsely charged upon me*, or *charged upon me being false*. Cf. δίκαιον, above.

B. πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη explains πάλαι, which is altogether indefinite: *for some time, many years now*.——τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον. Anytus and his associates, sc. Meletus and Lycon. Anytus is named, as being the most popular and at the same time the most hostile of the three prosecutors of Socrates. He was a man of large fortune but loose principles. He gained the favor of the people as a leader of the exiles at Phyle in the time of the Thirty Tyrants, and having taken offence at Socrates partly on personal and partly on professional grounds (cf. 23, E), induced Meletus and Lycon to join with him in a prosecution. According to Diogenes Laertius (2, 38, 39), the Athenians repented of their condemnation of Socrates and put Meletus to death, and sent Anytus and Lycon into banishment. Grote disbelieves and denies this. His. of Gr. Vol. 8, ch. 68. Cf. Stallb. and Smith's Dic. of Biog. and Mythol., *Anytus*.——οἳ . . . παραλαμβάνοντες, *who taking the mass of you from your boyhood*, sc. as it were, under their instruction.——ὡς ἔστι, κ.τ.λ., *saying, there is one Socrates*, etc. The introductory particle appropriate to an indirect quotation is here, and often in Greek, followed by a direct quotation, and must be omitted in English. C. 609; K. 329, R. 3.——σοφὸς ἀνήρ, *a philosopher*. Compare the Latin *sapiens*. σοφός, as well as σοφιστής and φιλόσοφος, was more or less a term of reproach with the ignorant multitude. Cf. Grote, His. Gr. Vol. viii. pp. 479–485, Eng. ed.——τὰ τε μετέωρα φροντιστής. φροντιστής governs the acc. as retaining the active force of φροντίζων. Mt. 422; C. 424.——τὸν ἥττω . . . ποιῶν, *making the weaker the stronger argument*, or, as it is often expressed, *making the worse appear*

the better reason. Cf. Cic. Brut. 8: docere quemadmodum caussa inferior dicendo fieri superior possit. Schleiermacher renders, *making wrong right*, and cites Aristotle as saying (Rhet. 2, 24) that it was done by bringing up against the truth, in some one view perhaps improbable, an opposite probability or *apparent* truth. The Sophists were open to this charge, as the physical philosophers were to that of inquiring into every thing in the heavens above and in the earth beneath; and the art of the enemies of Socrates consisted in arraying against *him* the prejudices which the public mind already cherished, with greater or less reason, against *them*—in short, in confounding him with them, though he was, in fact, diametrically opposed to them both in faith and in philosophy. Cf. below, 23, D: *τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν.*

C. Κατασκεδάσαντες denotes the manner or means of their power and formidableness; hence it is without the article.—— *οὐδὲ θεοὺς νομίζειν, do not even believe in the existence of the gods.* This, it is well known, was one point in the indictment against Socrates. Cf. Xen. Mem. 1, 1, 1; also below, 24 B. The physical philosophers of the age afforded a plausible, not to say just, occasion for this charge, since they, for the most part, dispensed with all efficient causes, and either failed to recognize the Deity, or else confounded him with his works. The systems, if not the men, were chargeable with atheism or pantheism. Cicero ascribes to Anaxagoras the first distinct recognition of the divine existence and agency, as an intelligent cause, in the universe.——*ἔπειτα . . . ἔτι δὲ καὶ = then . . . still further also;* or *in the second place . . . in the third place also.*——*ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ.* Explained by *παῖδες ὄντες, κ.τ.λ.*—— *ἂν . . . ἐπιστεύσατε.* Observe the peculiar force of the past tense of the ind. with *ἄν*: *you would have believed*, sc. had it been possible, as it was not. C. 603 and 604; K. 339, I. 6, cf. 340

1.——*ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες, accusing me in my absence.* The form of expression (*ἐρήμη*, sc. *δίκη*) is derived from a suit at law, in which one of the parties does not appear.——*ἀτεχνῶς* = *altogether.* Previous to Forster's, the editions connected *ἀτεχνῶς* with *μειράκια.* But as Schleiermacher well says, *ἀτεχνῶς* almost always connects itself with what follows, and it would not properly attach to *μειράκια*, since *μειράκια*, lads, are older than *παῖδες*, small boys.——*εἰ . . . τυγχάνει ὤν* implies no uncertainty: *εἰ* = *in case*, or *when.* The allusion is particularly to Aristophanes, who is *named* below, 19, C; though Cratinus, Amipsias, Eupolis, and other comic poets, ridiculed Socrates. Cf. Stallb. ad loc.

D. *φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ χρώμενοι* = *φθονοῦντες καὶ διαβάλλοντες, in the spirit of envy and calumny.*——*οἱ δὲ* introduces another class of persuaders, as if *οἱ μὲν* had preceded with *φθόνῳ . . . χρώμενοι*, the one being the envious and calumnious, the other those who were really persuaded in their own minds of the guilt of Socrates.——*ἀπορώτατοι, most inaccessible* (*ἀ* and *πόρος*), *most difficult to approach and convince.* Cf. Lysis, 223, B: *ἄποροι προσφέρεσθαι.*——*ἀναβιβάσασθαι . . . ἐντανθοῖ, to make him come up hither*, i. e. summon him to appear in court. Observe the force of the middle voice: *for my benefit*, cf. *ἐξελέσθαι*, 19, A.——*αὐτῶν* is partitive genitive = *any of them.*——*ὥσπερ . . . ἀποκρινομένου, to fight with shadows, as it were, in defending myself, and also to confute while no one replies.* The participle and the infinitive in each part form a complex idea, and then the two parts or ideas are connected together by *τε καὶ*. Thus is the apparent confusion of participles and infinitives explained by Fischer. See his note ad loc.

E. *Ἀξιώσατε* = existimate. So rendered by Bekker, Ast, Stallbaum, &c.——*ἐκείνους, those*, sc. *earlier* and more *remote* accusers. *ἐκεῖνος* refers to the *more remote idea*, though, as in this instance, it be to the *latter word* or *clause.*

19 A. Εἶεν. *Well, be it so.* Schleiermacher: *wohl.* It marks the establishment and completion of what goes before and the transition to another topic.——ἐξελέσθαι. Cf. note on ἀναβιβάσασθαι, 18, D.——τὴν διαβολήν . . . χρόνῳ. *The calumny* (misconception produced by calumny) *which you have entertained a long time, this* to eradicate *in so short a time.*——τοῦτο οὕτω γενέσθαι, sc. the eradication of false impressions from the minds of his judges. It is still further explained by καὶ πλέον . . . ἀπολογούμενον, *and to accomplish something by my defence.* On πλέον τι ποιεῖν = *proficere aliquid*, to get on or forward with a thing, to gain something by it, see Lexicon. ——εἴ τι ἄμεινον, κ.τ.λ. The sequel shows, that he not only doubted whether it was best for him to be acquitted, but that he did not desire to live by any such means as were likely to influence his judges to acquit him. He makes his defence rather as a matter of form in obedience to the laws, than with the expectation or desire of success.——Ἀναλάβωμεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς. *Let us take up anew, from the beginning.* He has adverted to the charge in general terms before (18, B); but here he would resume its examination from the first, as if he had not before mentioned it.——ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολή, *the false opinion of me.* Cf. εὐνοία τῇ σῇ, *good will to you*, Gorg. 486, A; C. 503; K. 302, R. 2; Mt. 466, 2.——με ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην. For the force of the middle voice, see C. 559, d; K. 250, R. 2; Mt. 492, c. For the double acc. (of the cognate signification γραφήν, and the direct object με), see C. 435; K. 280, 1. Render: *has preferred against me this indictment.* γραφή is a public indictment for a criminal offence; δίκη is applicable either to public or private causes, but when used in contradistinction to γραφή, it denotes a private suit.

B. ὥσπερ οὖν, κ.τ.λ. *Therefore just as* it is customary to read the *bill of indictment* presented by *formal accusers*, so *must we read theirs.* ἀντωμοσία is primarily the oath of a

party at law, and then the bill or form of indictment.——*περιεργάζεται, is over-busy, excessively curious.*

C. *τοιαύτη τίς, something like this.* He does not profess to give it exactly. Cf. Xen. Mem. 1, 1, 1.——*ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κωμῳδίᾳ.* The Clouds, perhaps the master-piece of Aristophanes, in which he introduces Socrates, as the principal character, sitting in a basket in the air (as the gods were represented in the machinery of the Attic drama), and uttering declamations as windy as his position. Very different explanations are given of the motives which induced the poet to treat the moral philosopher with such palpable injustice. Some have supposed that he was influenced by personal hostility, and further instigated and suborned by the enemies of Socrates. But this supposition does not accord either with the comparatively respectful tone in which Aristophanes elsewhere alludes to Socrates (cf. Birds, 1280, 1554; Frogs, 1487), or with the mild and even complimentary terms in which Plato speaks of Aristophanes here and elsewhere. Had Plato regarded Aristophanes as a bitter personal enemy of Socrates, or as having occasioned his master's death, he never would have introduced the poet and the philosopher conversing on such friendly terms as in the Symposium, still less furnished for the poet's tomb such an epitaph as the following: "Jupiter, wishing to find an asylum for all the graces, found the soul of Aristophanes." Others have thought that Aristophanes really mistook the true character of Socrates, confounded his teachings with those of the Sophists, whom he opposed, and so in sober earnest visited upon his head the storm of indignation which was merited by the class, and by him as its leader and ablest representative. But, to say nothing of the want of discernment which is thus imputed to Aristophanes, the matter was not viewed in so serious a light either by Plato (as the considerations just mentioned suffice to show), or by Soc-

rates, who was present when the piece was performed, and stood forth before the audience that he might be recognized as "a host who furnished a large company an *agreeable entertainment.*" There was enough of general resemblance between him and them in their talkative habits, the subjects on which they conversed, and the manner in which they reasoned (especially as he often met the Sophists on their own ground, and refuted them with their own weapons), to give plausibility to the representation of him as an arch-sophist. Doubtless also the ultra conservative poet viewed the speculating and revolutionizing spirit of the Socratic philosophy with not a little of the same fear and aversion with which he regarded the demoralizing instructions of the Sophists. Moreover, Socrates stood in the most friendly relations to Alcibiades and Euripides, both of whom, as arch-innovators though in different spheres, were subjects of unsparing ridicule and reproach in the comedies of Aristophanes. So much of objective reality we may suppose lay at the basis of the representation which is made of Socrates in the Clouds. The rest is comic exaggeration and extravagance got up purposely, but not maliciously, for the amusement of the πολυγέλοι Ἀθηναῖοι. And surely never was comedian furnished with a more fruitful theme for inextinguishable laughter than the grotesque person, outlandish dress, and singular gait of Socrates, with which friend and foe, Athenian and stranger, all had become familiar as he stood and stared or started and ran through the streets, or fascinated some and bored and vexed others, in the shops and the market-places. The intent of the piece and its author may have been misunderstood by some, and it may have had some effect in preparing the way for the prosecution, which it suggests. But it is referred to in the Apology as an illustration of popular prejudices of long standing, rather than as a cause of the present indictment. And the utter failure of the Clouds to

make any serious impression on the popular mind against Socrates is seen, not only in its want of success at the time (for it gained no favor and won no prize), but also in the fact that a period of twenty-four years intervened between its exhibition and the condemnation of the Moral Philosopher. Cf. Stallb. ad loc.; Smith's Dic. of Biog.——*περιφερόμενον*, sc. in a basket (*κρεμάθρα*), cf. the Clouds, 225 seqq.——*ἀεροβατεῖν*. When asked what he is doing, Socrates replies in the play: *ἀεροβατῶ καὶ περιφρονῶ τὸν ἥλιον*. Cf. the Clouds, ibid.——*ὧν . . . πέρι ἐπαΐω*. Observe the anastrophe and the position of *πέρι*, as in English: which I know nothing *about*.——*λέγω*, sc. the foregoing = *I say this*. *ἀτιμάζων* governs *ἐπιστήμην*. The Socratic irony is manifest in this clause, and in the following, which is parenthetical: *let me not, by any means, be prosecuted by Meletus on so weighty a charge!* sc. as undervaluing this kind of knowledge.——*ἀλλὰ γὰρ*, κ.τ.λ. *But* I must speak, *for*, &c.

D. *αὐτοὺς ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλούς*. *The greater part of yourselves*.——*ἐκ τούτων*, Al. *τούτου*. The Greeks very often employ the plural of the demonstrative in reference to a foregoing clause or single idea, where we should use the singular. Render: *from this*. Cf. K. 241, R. 3; Mt. 472, 5.——*περὶ ἐμοῦ* is placed before *ἅ* for emphasis = *which the many say about me*.——*τούτων*, the charges in the foregoing context—inquiring into things above, making the worse the better reason, &c.——*οὐδέ γ'εἰ*, κ.τ.λ. We should expect *οὔτε* answering to the *οὔτε* in the previous clause, but *οὐδέ γε* is more emphatic and therefore more appropriate to introduce a new topic of special importance. It is made still more emphatic by being repeated before *τοῦτο ἀληθές*.——*χρήματα πράττομαι*. This charge also confounded Socrates with the Sophists, who amassed large sums of money for tuition. It is denied also by Xenophon, Mem. 1, 2, 60.

E. *ἐπεί καὶ τοῦτο, κ.τ.λ.* The Attics use *ἐπεί* often like *γάρ* = *for*, and sometimes, like *quum* in Latin, it may be well rendered *although*. Socrates treats this charge, just as he did the other, ironically, representing it as a very beautiful and honorable thing, if one were only wise and capable of doing it; and yet he feels constrained to deny it simply because it is not true.——*Γοργίας τε ὁ Λεοντῖνος, κ.τ.λ.* He enumerates several of the most popular Sophists and rhetoricians who had enriched themselves by teaching the sons of the wealthy at Athens. They were all foreigners. For Gorgias of Leontini, a city of Sicily, cf. Diog. Laer. 9, 52; Cic. de Orat. 1, 22; Brut. 8; Plat. Gorg., Hip., and Protag. For Prodicus of Ceos, one of the Cyclades Islands, cf. Cic. Brut. 8; Xen. Mem. 2, 1, 21 seqq.; Plat., Protag. and Cratyl. For Hippias of Elis, a city of the Peloponnesus, cf. Cic. de Orat. 32, Brut. 8; Plat. Hip. and Minos. See also Smith's Dic. Biog. and Mythol., and Grote's His. Gr. vol. 8, chap. 67. Grote defends the Sophists as a class with great learning and eloquence. Doubtless they have been condemned too much in the gross—with too indiscriminate severity. But though there were doubtless wise and good men among them, it can hardly be doubted that, for the most part, their influence was hostile to morals and religion, and they deserved the censure which Plato everywhere attaches to them.——*τοὺς νέους* would regularly be the object of *πείθειν*, depending on *οἷός τ'ἐστὶν*, instead of which, however, by a singular anacoluthon, we have *πείθουσι*. It should be observed, that Plato abounds in such irregular constructions and unexpected changes, doubtless to keep up the appearance of a colloquial style appropriate to the dialogue, and which is no less appropriate to the plain talk which Socrates promises to hold with his judges in this Apology.——*πολιτῶν* is partitive genitive after *ᾧ*: *who have the opportunity to associate gratuitously with whomsoever they please of their fellow-citizens.*——

προσειδέναι: *and besides* (paying them money) *to feel under obligation to them.*

A. ἐπεὶ = γὰρ, *for*, cf. note, 19, E. Schleiermacher ren- 20
ders it by the German *ja.*——ὃν . . . ἐπιδημοῦντα, *of whose sojourning here I* lately *became aware.* The reference is to Evenus, the poet and Sophist, as appears below, B. He was a native of the island Paros. He is mentioned in the Phædo, 60, D, and Phædrus, 267, A. Callias, the son of Hipponicus, who informed Socrates of Evenus's stay in the city, was proverbially rich (ὁ πλούσιος, Plutarch), and his lavish expenditure upon the Sophists is often referred to. Protag. 314, B, C; Xen. Symp. 1, 5; Aristoph., Birds, 285. See also Boeck's Pub. Econ. Athens, vol. 2, p. 242.

B. ἀρετήν. Acc. of specification: *in the virtue* (or excellence) *becoming* them. So, in a similar illustration, Xenophon makes Socrates use the word δίκαιος of a horse and an ox, that is obedient to his proper law and trained for his appropriate work. Socrates used such illustrations, drawn from the lower animals and the common affairs of life, till they were threadbare and almost offensive, at least to those who could not but feel their force as directed against themselves. The "Great Teacher" abounded in this method of instruction.——ἦν δ' ἂν οὗτος. *And this* (overseer) *would have been*, etc. The past tense of the indicative with ἄν is appropriate to a conclusion preceded by a supposition *contrary to fact.* C. 603; K. 329, 6; Mt. 508, b.——τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ πολιτικῆς, *that which is appropriate to man and also to the state.*——πέντε μνῶν = some $83. This was a small sum in comparison with the tuition fees which Protagoras, Gorgias, and some others exacted, who received 100 minæ. With the Greek μνᾶ compare the Latin *mina* and our word *money.*——ἐμμελῶς, according to Stallbaum, has a double application to the *style* of teaching and to the *price* of tuition = *so properly* (literally, *in tune*),

so excellently in both respects. He says, there is great urbanity in the expression. If Socrates had said, οὕτως εὐτελῶς, he would have too clearly ridiculed Evenus and so Callias. He used therefore a word, by which, while he seemed to praise Evenus, he yet severely censured both his levity and the avarice of the other Sophists. Forster renders it by *concinne*, Ast, *commode*, Schleiermacher, *vortrefflich*, Cousin, *a bon marche*. It is used of a moderate or reasonable price in the Laws, 776, B, 760, A.

C. ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ, κ.τ.λ. The ellipsis is obvious: *but* I cannot thus pride myself, *for* etc. γὰρ in such connection may be rendered *really*, *certainly: but I really do not* know. Cf. K. 324, R. 1; C. 661, 2.——ὑπολάβοι. Compare our *take up*. ——τὸ σὸν τί ἐστι πρᾶγμα, *your* business, what is it? The emphasis is on *your:* you deny any acquaintance with the profession of the naturalist who inquires into the secrets of the universe, or of the Sophist who teaches, and is well paid for teaching, the art of persuasion; what then, Socrates, *is your* business, profession, or pursuit?——οὐδὲν περιττότερον, *nothing more or other*, *nihil aliud*. Cousin: *rien de plus ou autrement*. Schleiermacher: *nichts besonders*. Stallbaum renders: *nihil curiosius*.——ἔπειτα, *then*, *in that case*, *I suppose so much talk and discussion would not have arisen*, *as has arisen*. γέγονεν stands where ἂν ἐγένετο would regularly have been used, to denote that this bruit has actually arisen. The next clause, εἰ μή τε ἔπραττες, κ.τ.λ., is a repetition of the condition already expressed in the first clause, σοῦ γε οὐδὲν . . . πραγματευομένου, for the sake of greater clearness and emphasis. The style is manifestly colloquial.

D. τί ποτ', *quid tandem*. In questions, ποτέ, like *tandem*, indicates surprise, wonder, impatience, or some other lively emotion. It is here retained in the indirect question, just as it would have been used in the direct, as expressive of the won-

der of the inquirer.——*τό τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν, both the name*, sc. of a wise man, and *the calumny* connected with it. ——*εὖ μέντοι ἴστε, κ.τ.λ. Be assured, however, I will tell you the whole truth.* Observe the omission of *ὅτι*. So in Crit. 54, D, *ἀλλὰ ἴσθι, ὅσα γε, κ.τ.λ.*, and elsewhere after *εὖ ἴστε*.——*ἀλλ' ἤ*. It has been usual in the grammars to explain this combination of particles (which occurs after a preceding negative or after a question implying a negative), as equivalent to *ἄλλο ἤ*, with the accent *changed* (*ἀλλὸ ἤ*) and then *lost* (*ἀλλ' ἤ*). Cf. C. 671, 2; K. 322, R. 10. But no sufficient reason is given for the change of the accent. Besides it is often preceded by *ἄλλο*, cf. infra, 34, B: *τίνα ἄλλον ἔχουσι λόγον . . . ἀλλ' ἤ, κ.τ.λ.* Perhaps it is better to adopt the explanation of Stallbaum, Phæd. 81, B, viz., that it is a combination of two different constructions into one. It being allowable to say either *οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἀλλά*, or *οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἤ*, these two constructions are combined in this, *οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἀλλ' ἤ*.——*ποίαν δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην, pray what sort of wisdom this.* The clause takes the construction of *σοφίαν* in the preceding (acc. after *διὰ*). The omission of the preposition is especially frequent in the questions and answers of the dialogue, cf. C. 651, E; K. 300, C.——*ἥπερ ἐστὶν ἴσως, κ.τ.λ. Just that, perhaps, which is*, etc.——*τῷ ὄντι, in reality. ταύτην, in this*, acc. of specification. So *σοφίαν* in the next clause.

E. *ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον, than pertains to man, quam pro homine*, cf. Mt. 449.——*ἢ οὐκ ἔχω, τί λέγω, or else I know not what to call it*—certainly it is not human wisdom—it is not any such wisdom as I possess. The irony of the passage is evident. ——*ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἐμῇ, for the sake of calumniating me.* For this sense of *ἐπί*, cf. K. 296, II. c.; Mt. 585. For *τῇ ἐμῇ*, instead of the objective gen., *ἐμοῦ*, cf. note, 19, A.——*μὴ θορυβήσητε. Do not raise a tumult against me*, or as a speaker would say to a modern assembly, *do not hiss me* = *ne obstreputis.* The

reader will remember the popular constitution of the court, cf. note, 17, A. For the aor. subj. in prohibitions with *μή* and its compounds, cf. C. 598; K. 259, 5; Mt. 511, 3.——*μηδὲ ἄν, not even if.*——*ἀξιόχρεων, responsible*, primarily in regard to money, secondarily in regard to testimony. Cf. 38, B.——*μέγα λέγειν*, properly denotes *boasting*, as *μέγα φρονεῖν* does *pride*. In the later Greek, it meant to *say something marvellous*. But it was the seeming *pride* and *arrogance* of what he said, which, he feared, would give offence, and which did actually give offence to the judges. Cf. Xen. Apol. Soc. as cited below, 21, A; also Xen. Apol. Soc. 1, where he speaks of the *μεγαληγορία*, which all the Apologies ascribe to Socrates in his defence.——*τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δή τίς ἐστι σοφία καὶ οἵα, for of my wisdom, whether now I have any, and of what sort it is*, &c. By a somewhat peculiar *attraction*, *σοφία* is drawn from the principal into the subordinate clause.

21 A. *που = I suppose.*——*ἐμός ἑταῖρος*. Hence often attacked by Aristophanes in the Clouds and elsewhere.——*ξυνέφυγε . . . κατῆλθε, he went with you in your recent exile and with you returned.* The allusion is to the exile of the principal men of the Athenian democracy under the Thirty Tyrants, which having taken place only the previous year, is called *τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην*. This allusion was calculated to recommend Chærephon to popular favor. Words compounded with *κατά* (*κατίεναι, κατέρχεσθαι*, &c.) often denote a return home to one's country, town, harbor, as words compounded with *ἀνά* signify the departure from such a resting place. Away from home is *up*, return is *down*.——*ὡς σφοδρὸς*. Cf. Aristoph. Clouds, 104, 501, seq., Birds, 1570; Xen. Mem. 2, 3; Plat. Gorg., Charm., &c. pass.——*καί, ὅπερ λέγω, μὴ θορυβεῖτε, and, I repeat it, do not be raising a tumult.* It will be observed, that the aor. subj. is used in the first request (*μὴ θορυβήσητε* above), but in the repetition the pres. imp. The former is a general request

not to do it at all; the latter is more definite, and means: *don't be doing it*, as you *are* doing and will be very *liable* to do while *I proceed*, especially with this to you most surprising and perhaps offensive part of my narrative. C. 570, seq.; K. 257, 1; Mt. 501. The Apology, which bears the name of Xenophon, declares expressly, that this part of Socrates' Defence did call forth repeated expressions of displeasure from the judges. Xen. Apol. Soc. 15.——ἤρετο γὰρ δή. The Greeks use the particles, γάρ, δή, οὖν, in resuming a sentence after a parenthesis, where we use *I say*. Mt. 615, 616.——ἀνεῖλεν, *responded*, literally, *took up*, sc. her response. This famous response is worded differently in different authorities. Cf. Xen. Apol. Socr. 14; Diog. Laert. 2, 37; Schol. Aristoph. Clouds, 144.——ὁ ἀδελφὸς, sc. Chærecrates, Xen. Mem. II. 3. ——οὑτοσὶ . . . ἐκεῖνος. Cf. note, 18, E.

B. τί ποτε, *what in the world*. Cf. note, 20, D.——ξύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὤν. After ξύνοιδα, συγγινώσκω, &c., the participle expresses *that of which one is conscious*, and may either agree with the subject of the verb in the *nom.* or with the reflexive which follows the verb and refers to the same person, in the *dative*. Here we have the former construction; below, 22, D, we have the other: ἐμαυτῷ ξυνῄδειν οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένῳ. C. 614, 615; K. 310, R. 2; Mt. 548, 2. μέγα and σμίκρὸν are adverbial accusatives. C. 440, 441; K. 278, R. 1; Mt. 425, 1. ——τί ῥοῦν ποτε λέγει, *what in the world then, I say, does he mean?* οὖν is resumptive like γὰρ, above, 21, A; and λέγει is best rendered, as it often is, by the English *mean*. Below the same form of expression follows ἠπόρουν, instead of the oratio obliqua, ὅ τι . . . λέγοι. C. 610; 345, 5; Mt. 529, 5.——ἔπειτα . . . ἐτραπόμην, *but at length, with much labor, I betook myself to an examination of it* (sc. the oracle or the meaning of the god, τί ποτε λέγει) *somewhat as follows*. τοιοῦτος usually refers to the foregoing, τοιόσδε to the following (cf. note, 37, A),

but not always. C. 513, 516. Cf. *τοιαύτη τις*, 19, C, and note, ibid.——*ἦλθον* stands without a connective, because this clause is in *apposition* as it were with the preceding, being a fuller and more exact statement of the examination there mentioned. Cf. 17, D, and note, ibid. The reader will observe that all such clauses or sentences are asyndetic; while, with the exception of such, each clause and sentence of connected discourse in Greek begins with some connective particle, *δέ*, *καί*, *γάρ*, *οὖν*, &c.

C. *ὡς . . . ἐλέγξων*, *supposing, that there, if anywhere, I should confute*, etc. C. 640; K. 312, 6; Mt. 568.——*ὅτι Οὑτοσὶ*. Cf. note on *ὡς ἐστι*, 18, B.——*σὺ δ' ἐμὲ ἔφησθα*, *but you* (sc. the oracle) *said I* (sc. was wiser).——*πρὸς ὃν . . . ἔπαθον*, *in looking to whom I met with such an experience.*——*καὶ διαλεγόμενος*. *Καὶ* connects *διαλεγόμενος* to *διασκοπῶν* (the intervening clause being parenthetical), and the participle belonging to the principal subject of the discourse (Socrates) is in the nominative, though, to agree with what follows, it should be in the dative with *μοι*. It is a species of anacoluthon. C. 344; Mt. 311.

D. *ἐντεῦθεν* is both temporal and causal = *from that time and for that reason.*——*πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν . . . ἐλογιζόμην*, *I reasoned with myself.*——*τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*. The *μὲν* implies, that something else may be said or found to be true in reference to some other man. It has no *δὲ* or other particle correlative to it, but prepares the mind for the further examinations which follow. The *μὲν* after *κινδυνεύει* is correlative to *ἀλλ'*, after which follows again the more usual correlative *οὗτος μὲν . . . ἐγὼ δὲ*. After *ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα*, *οὕτως* is understood. ——*οὖν* denotes not an inference but a correspondence with what he has before said of the ignorance of himself and others: *while I, just as in fact, and as I have already said, I do not know, so I do not even suppose that I know.*——*σμικρῷ τινι* de-

notes the *degree*, and *αὐτῷ τούτῳ* the *respect* in which he is wiser. C. 418, 3, 419; K. 285, 3; Mt. 400, 6, 8. The tyro will observe the difference between *μή* and *οὐδέ*, the contingent and the absolute negative, well illustrated in the clause *ἃ μὴ οἶδα, κ.τ.λ.*: *what I chance not to know, I do not even suppose that I know.*

E. *ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμην.* These words connect with each of the preceding participles, but in the different relations of the *fact* and the *cause*—with *αἰσθανόμενος, ὅτι* would strictly require to be rendered *that;* with *λυπούμενος* and *δεδιώς, because.* ——*τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ.* C. 477; Mt. 284.——*ἰτέον οὖν, σκοποῦντι.* Socrates here passes suddenly from the indirect to the direct narration, and gives us the *very language* of his heart at the *time* when he made this examination: *I must go then* (thought I), *in investigating the oracle what it means, to all*, etc. *σκοποῦντι* agrees with *μοι* implied as the dative of the agent after *ἰτέον.* For *χρησμόν*, put as the object of *σκοποῦντι* instead of the subject of *λέγει*, see C. 425, 4.

A. *νὴ τὸν κύνα.* A very common oath in the mouth of 22
Socrates. Cf. Gorg. 460, B; 482, B, and Prof. Woolsey's notes, ibid. In the last cited passage, Socrates adds: *τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν*, which perhaps shows that the oath was of Egyptian origin. See Mitchell's note, D, App. to Aristoph. Wasps. Fischer, followed by Stallbaum, Cousin, &c., refers the origin of such oaths to Rhadamanthus, who is said, in order to avoid swearing always by the gods, to have invented several other formulæ as substitutes, such as by the dog, by the oak, by the goose, &c. In Xenophon, as well as Plato, Socrates is represented as swearing (somewhat singularly) by Juno, infra, 24, E; Gorg. 449, D; Hip. Maj. 291, 9; Xen. Mem. I. 5, 5. III. 10, 9. IV. 2, 9, et al.——*οἱ μὲν μάλιστα, κ.τ.λ.* An explanatory clause, hence without a connective. Cf. notes, 17, D; 21, B.——*ὀλίγου δεῖν.* Cf. note 17, A.——*τοῦ πλείστου* is governed by

ἐνδεεῖς. The reader will observe the juxtaposition of the two contrasted words, φαυλότεροι and ἐπιεικέστεροι.——πλάνην, *wandering*, sc. to visit and examine the reputed wise men.——πονοῦντος agrees with μου implied in ἐμὴν.——πόνους alludes to labors like those of Hercules.——ἵνα . . . γένοιτο: *that after all the oracle might in the end prove irrefutable*, i. e. in addition to all his labors, *also* (καὶ) to bring about a *result* the opposite of what he set out to accomplish, which was to show that the oracle must be false. Such seems to be the true interpretation of this much disputed passage. Cf. Fischer's Defence of Platonic Passages against the Amendments of Stephens; also the notes of Schleiermacher and Stallbaum ad loc.

B. ὡς . . . καταληψόμενος. Cf. note 21, C. ἐπ' ἀυτοφώρῳ καταληψόμενος contains an allusion to the *detection* of a criminal *in the very act*.——μάλιστα πεπραγματεῦσθαι: *to have been most carefully composed*.——διερώτων ἄν. The imperfect with ἄν denotes repetition according to the circumstances in each case: *I would ask them in each instance, what they meant to say*. C. 594; K. 260, B; Mt. 599, a. So below, ἂν βέλτιον ἔλεγον: *almost all who were present would speak better* (i. e. give a better account) *of the poems which they themselves had composed*, sc. than the authors. Wolf renders οἱ παρόντες, *qui hic adsunt*, sc. the judges of Socrates! and Smith, with a total misapprehension of Stallbaum, whom he professes to translate, renders ἂν βελτίον ἔλεγον, used to *think best* of those poems which they themselves had composed!

C. οὐ σοφίᾳ, κ.τ.λ. So in Ion 533, E, Socrates says, that poets and musicians, like prophets and soothsayers, compose their productions, not by *art*, but by an inspiration which displaces *reason*. The fundamental difference between real *science* or *art*, as based on established rules and understood reasons, and mere unintelligent knack, or unconscious instinct or inspira-

tion, is an idea, on which Socrates often and earnestly insists. Cf. Gorgias pass.; Grote's His. Gr. vol. viii. p. 579, Eng. ed.——*οἰομένων*. C. 633; K. 310; Mt. 549, 4.——*εἶναι ἀνθρώπων*. C. 627, a; K. 307, 5; Mt. 536.——*ἃ*, like its antecedent *τἄλλα*, is acc. of specification, and *σοφωτάτοι* is understood in the predicate after *ἦσαν*: *in which they were not*, sc. the wisest.——*τῷ αὐτῷ οἰόμενος περιγεγονέναι*: *supposing that I surpassed them in the same respect in which* I surpassed *also the politicians*. Cf. 21, D.

D. *τελευτῶν*, *lastly*. C. 632; 312, R. 3; Mt. 557.——*ἐμαυτῷ . . . ἐπισταμένῳ*. Cf. note, 21, B.——*ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν*. Cf. note, 17, A.——*τούτου*: *in respect to this*. C. 395; K. 273, R. 20; Mt. 336.——*δημιουργοί* is subject of *ἔδοξαν*. Besides its emphatic position, it is also made emphatic by *καὶ*, which is likewise repeated before the other subject of comparison *οἱ ποιηταί*, where it is superfluous in English, though very often so used in Greek. See above, C: *καὶ ἐντεῦθεν . . . ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν*.——*τἄλλα τὰ μέγιστα*, e. g. the administration of the government, to which, as understood by Forster, Stallbaum, and others, Socrates particularly refers.——*ἀνερωτᾶν*, to ask *again*, as in the case of the poets and the politicians.——*ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ*: *nomine oraculi*. Stallb.

E. *δεξαίμην*, in the sense of *prefer*, is very frequent in Plato. Cf. Gorg. 468, E; 471, C, et passim.——*ἀμφότερα* is neuter, though it refers to the feminine nouns *σοφίαν* and *ἀμαθίαν* = *both the things*. C. 450; K. 241, 2; Mt. 437.

A. *σοφὸς εἶναι* explains *ὄνομα τοῦτο* = *called this name*, sc. 23
to be wise. *To be* is superfluous in English, but *εἶναι* often follows verbs of calling. C. 434, N; K. 269, R. 1; 420, 1. *σοφὸς* is nom. instead of acc., because in the mind of the speaker, *himself* is the main subject of the sentence, as having become odious—as if he had said *ἀπέχθημαι γέγονα* instead of *ἀπέχθειαί μοι γεγόνασι*. On the popular prejudice against this name, see note 18, B, and Grote as there cited.——*ἃ ἂν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω*:

in which I may chance to confute another, or *in whatsoever I may confute another*. The ἄν makes the expression indefinite and general, and may be expressed either in connection with the relative (*whatever*), which it usually follows, and with which it often combines, or in connection with the verb (*may chance*). Cf. C. 606; K. 260, c; Mt. 527.——τὸ δὲ: *but as to the matter of fact*. It is strengthened by τῷ ὄντι = in *reality*. The article with δὲ indicates that which is so opposed to something else, that it ought to be regarded as true. So Ast ad Pol. 363, and approved by Stallbaum. The fuller formula, τὸ δὲ ἀληθές, is often used in the same way. See examples in Stallbaum.——ὀλίγου τινὸς . . . καὶ οὐδενός: *a little and indeed nothing*. So often μικρὰ καὶ οὐδέν = little or nothing. So *atque* in Latin sometimes adds a clause, which corrects, and at the same time increases the force of, the foregoing. For the force of τινὸς, cf. ἤ τι ἤ οὐδὲν, 17, B, and note ibid.——καὶ φαίνεται . . . Σωκράτη: *and he seems to say this* (sc. that he is wise) *not of Socrates*. Instead of τοῦτ' οὐ, most of the early editions have τούτου. For two acc. after a verb of *saying*, cf. C. 435; K. 280, 2; Mt. 415.——προσκεχρῆσθαι: made use of my name *besides*, i. e. *incidentally*, for another purpose.

B. ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἶπον: *as if he would say*. There is an ellipsis of ποιοῖτο or some such verb, constituting an implied apodosis, with which the ἄν belongs. Cf. note, 17, D: ὥσπερ οὖν ἄν.——κατὰ τὸν θεόν: according to the god, i. e. in accordance with his oracle, or out of regard to his authority. So in Rom. viii. 27, and elsewhere in the New Testament.——καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ τῶν ξένων, κ.τ.λ.: *both of the citizens and of the foreigners if I suppose any to be wise*. Partitive gen. after τινά.——τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως. Socrates apologizes elsewhere in Plato (e. g. below, 31, 32) and in Xenophon (e. g. Mem. I. 6, 15) for not participating in the affairs of the state. His was a higher mission, viz., to educate the individual citizens.——πε-

νίᾳ μυρίᾳ: *the greatest poverty*. *πενία* = paupertas, poverty; *πτωχεία* = egestas, destitution. The former is the usual condition of the poorer and laboring classes; the latter, of mendicants. As to the pecuniary circumstances of Socrates, cf. Xen. Œcon. 2, 3, where it appears he was commonly called *πένης*, and where it is said his house and all his property were worth five minæ.

C. *οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων*. This is no unimportant circumstance to show how the prejudices and passions of the *multitude* were awakened against him.——*εἶτα* instead of *καὶ εἶτα*, as we often use *then* for *and then* between two verbs.

D. *ἀλλ' οὐχ αὑτοῖς*, *but not with themselves*, as they might well be angry with themselves for their own ignorance, instead of being angry with him who exposed it. Al. *αὐτοῖς*, sc. the young men, but this would require *ἐκείνοις*.——*τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων*, κ.τ.λ. Cf. notes, 18, B.——*ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα*, κ.τ.λ., sc. *διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους διδάσκων*; *that* he corrupts the young by teaching *things in heaven and things under the earth, and not to believe in the gods*, &c.

E. Μέλητος *μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν*. Al. Μέλιτος. This man is ridiculed by Aristophanes as well as Plato for his person, his character, and his bad *tragic poetry*. We learn from the Euthyphron (2, B, C), that his share in the prosecution of Socrates was to bring the indictment before the Archon Basileus, at which time he is described as still young and obscure, but vain and conceited. Besides his professional resentment in common with his brother poets, he had a personal grudge against Socrates for having refused to participate in, and severely animadverted upon, the arrest and "rendition" of Leon of Salamis by Meletus and three others at the command of the Thirty Tyrants. Xen. Mem. IV. 4, 3; Andoc. De Myster.——Ἄνυτος *ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν*. He was a leather dresser, and, besides sharing with other "*mechanics*" in the resentment

provoked by Socrates's exposure of their ignorance as above described, he had, very likely, taken offence at his constant reference to shoemakers and other mechanics in the familiar illustration of his sentiments. He was also a popular demagogue, and had received the highest honors of the Athenian democracy. Hence in the text, *ὑπὲρ τῶν πολιτικῶν*. See note, 18, B. In Plato's Men. (91, A–C), we find him warning Socrates against a too free use of his tongue, lest he should get himself into trouble.——*Λύκων ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων*. Lycon was an orator and demagogue, probably the same who is held up as a drunken brawler by Aristophanes, Wasps, 1301. It was his part to prepare the accusation against Socrates. On all these accusers, see further in Stallbaum ad loc., and Smith's Dict. Ant.

24 A. *ἀρχόμενος*. C. 632; K. 312, R. 3; Mt. 557.——*ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὑμῖν . . . τἀληθῆ*. *This is the truth for you*, sc. which I promised to tell you, cf. 17, B.——*τοῖς ἀυτοῖς ἀπεχθάνομαι*. I incur hatred *by the same*, sc. *τἀληθῆ*. On the sentiments of this and the following clause, cf. John viii. 46, v. 43; Gal. iv. 16.

B. *τὸν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ φιλόπολιν*. These epithets are applied in accordance with polite usage, and yet not without irony. *φιλόπολις* differs from *φιλόπατρις*, according to Stallb., as *friend of Athens* from *friend of Greece*.——*αὖθις γὰρ δή . . . λάβωμεν αὖ*: *for now again let us take up on the other hand*. The language implies some formality and gravity in the examination of this, as also of the former accusation.——*ὥσπερ ἑτέρων τούτων ὄντων κατήγορων*: *inasmuch as these are different accusers*, i. e. another class, a *second*, in contradistinction to the *first*, whom he has just disposed of.——*ἀντωμοσίαν*. Cf. note, 19, B.——*πως ὧδε, nearly as follows*. Cf. *τοιαύτη τίς*, 19, C, and note ibid. The order of the points in the indictment is inverted, as it is given by Xenophon, Mem. i. 1, 1. Diogenes Laertius gives

it on the authority of Phavorinus, as still existing in due form in the second century, in these words: "Socrates is guilty in not recognizing the gods that the state recognizes, but introducing other new divinities; and he is guilty also of corrupting the youth. Penalty death."

C. *ἐγὼ δέ γε, but I for my part.* The γε is omitted in the earlier editions, but inserted by Bekker, Ast, Stallbaum, &c., on the authority of the best MSS.——*σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεται, serio ludit;* literally, *jokes in earnest.* It is an example of the figure called *oxymoron.* It is explained by the following participial clauses. Meletus seemed as if he must be merely *joking, playing a part,* when he *pretended to feel so much concern about matters* (such as the education of the youth and the worship of the gods) *on which he never had bestowed an anxious thought;* and yet he made a *serious business* of it when he *rashly* (*ῥᾳδίως*) *brought men to trial* (*εἰς ἀγῶνας καθιστὰς ἀνθρώπους*).

D. *δεῦρο, hither,* *ἄγε* being understood, or instead of *ἔρχου.* So in Iliad and Odyssey sometimes, and elsewhere in Plato. The law allowed the parties in a suit to *question* each other, and obliged the party questioned to answer. Cf. below, note, 25, D. Few probably ever turned the law to so good account, as Socrates knew how to use it by his method of question and answer.——*ἄλλο τι.* This formula, or the fuller, *ἄλλο τι ἤ,* is often used, especially in Plato's Dialogues, simply to ask a question, implying an affirmative answer, like *οὐκοῦν,* or nonne, only with perhaps still stronger affirmative implication. C. 541, N; K. 344, 5, g; Mt. 487, 9. Render: *do you not,* etc.——*ὅπως . . . ἔσονται. ὅπως,* with the fut. ind., denotes more *continuance* as well as more certainty than *ὅπως* with the aor. subj. Here the object is to express a permanent state of excellence among the youth. Cf. C. 601; K. 330, 6; Mt. 519, 7.——*μέλον γέ σοι, especially* (*γε*) *since it so concerns you.* The part. agrees

with the foregoing question understood, with which it forms an acc. absolute. C. 638; K. 312, 5; Matthiæ calls it nom. abs. 564 ——*τὸν . . . διαφθείροντα, him who is corruptiny them.*——*εἰσάγεις*, literally, *bring in*, sc. to court, cf. 29, A: *εἰσάγοι . . . εἰς δικαστήριον*. Here, however, it is followed by a *dative* of the *persons*, *before* whom he is brought, sc. the judges (*τουτοισὶ*). Either the magistrate or the prosecutor might be said *εἰσάγειν*. It may usually be rendered *impeach*, or *prosecute*.

E. *νὴ τὴν Ἥραν*. Cf. note, 22, A.——*τί δαὶ δή. δαί*, a lengthened form of *δή*, expresses surprise, astonishment, and is used only in questions with *τί* and *πῶς*. K. 316, 7; Mt. 603. ——*ἀκροαταὶ*. The spectators, at trials of any interest before the Heliaea, were very numerous, thus bringing that court still more under popular influence.

25 A. *οἱ βουλευταί*. The members of the *βουλή*, or senate, of which there were two, the Senate of the Areopagus and the Senate of Five Hundred. Both kinds of *senators* are perhaps here intended.——*Ἀλλ' ἆρα, κ.τ.λ. But then, Meletus, may not perchance those in the assembly, the assemblymen, corrupt the young?* The *μὴ* implies some fear or anxiety, lest it may be so.

B. *οἱ μὲν βελτίους ποιοῦντες αὐτούς*, sc. *δοκοῦσι*, supplied from the preceding clause, of which this is explanatory, and therefore without a connective.——*τοὐναντίον τούτου πᾶν*. Adverbial acc. = *all the reverse of this*.——*πάντως δή που, altogether so no doubt, whether you and Anytus deny it or not.* *οὐ*, instead of *μή*, follows the conditional particle (*ἐάν*), because it unites with *φῆτε* to convey one idea, *οὐ φῆτε* = *deny*. K. 318, 2, h; Mt. 608, 1.——*εἰ . . . διαφθείρει*. The use of the ind. pres. implies a kind of ironical assent to the truth of the supposition: *if* (really, as you affirm) *only one corrupts them*. C. 603, *ζ*; K. 339, 3, a; Mt. 524, 1.——*οἱ ἄλλοι, the rest, all others*.

C. ἀλλὰ γάρ, *but* it is not so, *for;* or *but really*, cf. note, 20, C.——ὦ Μέλητε . . . ἀμέλειαν . . . μεμέληκε. A play upon the name: O *Careful* One, you show your *want* of *care*, that you have *never cared*, &c.——εἰσάγεις, cf. note, 24, D.——ὦ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε. The πρὸς Διὸς seems to be placed between ὦ and Μέλητε to carry out the play on the name in the foregoing sentence: *O thou before Jupiter Careful One.*——τοὺς ἀεὶ . . . ὄντας. ἀεὶ, preceded by the art. and followed by a part. means, *in every case*, i. e. *in each instance*, in which the supposition holds.

D. ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι. The very words of the law are cited by Demosthenes in his Second Oration against Stephanus: Νόμος. Τοῖν ἀντιδίκοιν ἐπάναγκες εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι ἀλλήλοις τὸ ἐρωτώμενον, μαρτυρεῖν δὲ μή.——τηλικούτου, *at my time of life*, sc. so old, i. e. 70, cf. 17, D. τηλικόσδε, *at your time of life*, sc. so young, cf. note, 23, E. The words both mean the same, viz., either *so old* or *so young*, according to the connection.

E. ταῦτα, acc. of the respect.——οἶμαι . . . οὐδένα, sc. πείσεσθαί σοι. C. 661, 1. So in the next clause, there is an ellipsis of διαφθείρω with ἄκων, and still further on of ποιῶν with παύσομαι. Throughout this passage, Socrates manifestly takes the ground, that virtue is coextensive with knowledge. It is impossible for any man to injure others without injuring himself; and no man who really *knows* this, will wrong another any sooner than he would injure himself, which no one ever does intentionally. Such is his argument here. So in Xen. Mem. III. 9, 5, he reasons, that no man who *knows* temperance, justice, and moral excellence, would prefer any thing else to these virtues. These virtues, therefore, are all resolvable into knowledge or wisdom. Every man *does* what seems to him best, and if he *knows* what is best, he will *do* it, and therefore do right. See also Xen. Mem. IV. 2, 20; Arist. Ethic. Eudem.

1, 5; Protag. 345; Gorg. 460, and Prof. Woolsey's remarks upon it in his Introduction.

26 B. *ὅτι κατὰ τὴν γραφήν, ἣν ἐγράψω*, sc. *με φὴς διαφθείρειν τοὺς νεωτέρους*, repeated from above.——*οὐ ταῦτα, κ.τ.λ. ταῦτα* is the obj. of *διδάσκων* placed where it is for emphasis.——*ὧν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, of whom our discussion now is. ὧν* is objective genitive.

C. *Καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα, and I myself accordingly.*——*οὐ μέντοι, κ.τ.λ., not however the same as the city indeed recognizes*, but *others, and this is what you accuse me of, that* (I teach them to believe that there are) *others; or do you say that I both do not believe in any gods at all myself, and that I teach others this doctrine.* Observe the correlation of *οὔτε—τε*, in the last member of this somewhat complicated and irregular sentence. *θεούς* usually omits the article after *νομίζειν, ἡγεῖσθαι*, &c. = believe in gods.

D. *ἵνα τί.* C. 539, 2, a; K. 344, R. 6.——*οὐδὲ . . . οὐδέ*, not simply correlative, like *οὔτε . . . οὔτε = neither . . . nor*, but emphatic = *not even . . . nor yet.* Cf. note, 18, C. The language implies that it was quite incredible, that Socrates should not believe even in gods so universally recognized as the sun and the moon. For the omission of the article with *ἥλιον* and *σελήνην*, cf. C. 485, a; K. 244, R. 3, c; Mt. 264, 5. *Μὰ Δί*, sc. *οὐ νομίζεις*, which is understood from the foregoing question. *Μά* is not of itself negative; hence it may be used with either *ναί* or *οὐ*; but when preceded by neither of these particles, a negative clause precedes or follows, or it is clear from the context and from an accompanying adversative particle, that the sentence is to be understood as negative. Cf. K. 316, 4, and Stallbaum ad loc.——*Ἀναξαγόρου.* Anaxagoras of Clazomene taught (according to Diog. Laert. 2, 8) that the sun was a mass of hot *iron*, as some understand it, or *stone*, as Socrates takes it here and Xen. Mem. 4, 7, 7, and the moon an

earthy body, like our own planet. There was the more plausibility in imputing to Socrates the doctrines of Anaxagoras, since Socrates was a disciple of Archelaus Physicus, who was a disciple of Anaxagoras.——*οὐκ εἰδέναι.* For *οὐκ*, instead of *μὴ*, see note on *οὐ φῆτε*, 25, B.

E. *Καὶ δὴ καὶ, and moreover also.* The sentence which follows is ironical; *ἃ* is the object of *πριαμένοις.*——*εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, δραχμῆς, for a drachma at the very highest. πολλοῦ*, like *δραχμῆς*, is gen. of price. This was the highest price which the managers could lawfully demand for a seat in the theatre. The common price was two oboli (Dem. pro Cor. 28), which was paid out of the treasury. Cf. Boeckh's Pub. Econ. Ath. 2, 13; Beck. Char. Ex. Sc. 10; and Smith's Dic. Antiqq. The doctrines of the philosophers were brought upon the stage, partly to be commended, as by Euripides in his tragedies, partly to be ridiculed, as by Aristophanes in his comedies. Some have thought that the allusion is not to the performances on the stage, but to the sale of the books of Anaxagoras at the orchestra. Cf. Schleiermacher ad loc. But as Forster well remarks, we never read of book sales there.——*ἄλλως τε καὶ, κ.τ.λ., especially when they are so absurd;* literally, *for other reasons and also* (in particular) *they being so absurd.*——*οὑτωσί, thus* entirely and absolutely.——*Ἄπιστός γ' εἶ . . . δοκεῖς.* Cf. note on *δίκαιός εἰμι*, 18, A.

A. *ἔοικε . . . διαπειρωμένῳ, for he seems like one having* 27
composed (i. e. he seems to have composed) *as it were an enigma, testing the question,* [redacted] *will Socrates, the wise man forsooth, know*, etc. In the earlier editions *καὶ* is inserted between the two participles. But Plato often uses two or more participles without a connective, especially when, as here, the action expressed by one participle is preliminary to that expressed by the other—he seems to have composed as it were an enigma *in order* to test. Cf. Gorg.: *τέτραχα ἑαυτὴν διανείμασα,*

ὑποδῦσα, κ.τ.λ. = having divided herself into four parts *and thus* put on, or *in order to* put on, &c. For the use of the part. after ἔοικε, cf. C. 615; K. 310, R. 2; Mt. 555, obs. 2. Compare also the note on ξύνοιδα with the part. 21, B.——ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζομένου. γινώσκω, though usually followed by the acc., sometimes takes the gen. in common with other verbs denoting mental state. Mt. 349, 1.——ὥσπερ ἂν. Cf. note, 17, D.——ἢ . . . λέγειν, *in what manner he seems to me to speak these* contradictions.

B. ἐν τῷ εἰωθότι τρόπῳ, *in my usual method*, sc. of question and answer.——ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα, *one after another*, again and again.

C. δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι. δαιμόνια is here constructed as an adjective. So Cicero translates τὸ δαιμόνιον by *divinum quiddam*, de Div. 1, 54. Schleiermacher and Stallbaum (see their notes ad loc.) argue, that Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle understood it to be used in this sense in the indictment. Certainly if he could have taken it as a noun (meaning divinities, instead of an adjective meaning divine things), it would have been far easier for Socrates to show the glaring inconsistency of his accuser, and he might have spared all his argumentation and illustration drawn from ἱππικὰ πράγματα, ἀνθρώπεια πράγματα, &c. The expression in the indictment had reference to those divine voices or monitions which Socrates professed to hear and obey as the guide of his life (cf. 31, D, and notes ibid.), and which would more properly be called *divine things*, than *divinities*.——ὡς ὤνησας: *what a service you have rendered—how obliging you are*—que tu m'oblige. Cousin. Al. ὤκνησας.——μόγις = tandem aliquando, Stallb.——ἀλλ' οὖν δαιμόνιά γε νομίζω, *but then I believe in divine things at all events*, sc. whether they be old or new, i. e. though they be new ones as charged in the indictment.——ἀντιγραφῇ = ἀντωμοσίᾳ, cf. note, 19, B, and Fischer's note ad loc.

D. ἤτοι θεούς γε ἡγούμεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας. The word δαίμονες, in Homer and the early Greek poets, is synonymous with θεοί; in Plato and other writers of his day it denotes more especially the inferior deities constituting an intermediate and connecting link between the superior gods and men; and in Plutarch and some of the latest Greek classics, it sometimes signifies bad as well as good beings of a superhuman order, thus *approaching* to the New Testament sense of demons or evil spirits.——τοῦτ' . . . χαριεντίζεσθαι, *this would be wherein I say* (27, A), *that you speak riddles and joke, to say that I who do not believe in gods, on the other hand do again believe in gods, since at all events I believe in demons.* The last clause repeats the premise (already laid down at the beginning of the sentence) in closer connection with the main point in the conclusion—a practice not unfrequent with Plato, and one of many by which his style is made to resemble the language of conversation.——ὧν δὴ καὶ λέγονται, *from whom forsooth they are said to be.* The preposition (ἐκ) is often omitted before the relative after having been inserted before the antecedent. C. 651, e; K. 300, b; Mt. 595, 4.——ἢ καὶ ὄνων. Forsterus delendam censebat hanc particulam (ἢ); sine caussa idonea; nam ἡμίονοι dici possunt, et ἵππων παῖδες, et ὄνων παῖδες. Fischer. That is, mules may have horses *or also* asses for their *male* parents, for the case to be illustrated limits the comparison to *male* parents.

E. οὐχὶ limits ἐγράψω; ἀποπειρώμενος denotes the end in view = *for the purpose of testing me*, and ἀπορῶν the cause = *because you were at a loss.*——ὅπως δὲ σύ, κ.τ.λ. *But that you should persuade any man possessed of the least understanding, that it is the part of the same man to believe in things pertaining both to demons and to gods, and the same man not to believe either in demons or gods or heroes, is beyond the scope of human ingenuity.* I have enclosed οὐ in brackets, because, though

found in most of the MSS., and therefore inserted by Becker and Stallbaum, neither they nor any other editor has been able to explain or translate it, and it is omitted by Forster, Fischer, Ast, Schleiermacher, and Cousin.

28 Ἀλλὰ γάρ. Cf. note, 25, C. Socrates here brings the direct defence to a close, saying that it does not require much argument, since what he has to fear is not the indictment or the prosecutors, but the multitude—not the evidence or the argument, but popular prejudice and passion. What follows is intended, not so much to avert the sentence which he anticipates from the judges or even to deprecate the displeasure of the people, as to vindicate his character, assert his mission, and bear witness to the truth, that more impartial judges may appreciate his merits—that a better age may honor him, as a missionary and a martyr.——καὶ τοῦτ' . . . αἱρῇ, *and this it is which will convict me, if indeed it should lead to my conviction.*——ἀλλ' . . . φθόνος. This clause is an emphatic repetition and explanation of the τοῦτ' at the beginning. Such colloquial repetitions (cf. note, 27, D) are especially frequent in antithetic clauses.——οὐδὲν δὲ δεινόν, μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῇ, *and there is no reason to fear lest it should* (that it will) *stop with me*, i. e. that I shall be the last victim.

B. Εἶτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνει. Εἶτα in questions implies astonishment or indignation, as ποτέ does surprise and wonder, cf. note, 20, D.——τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι are taken together as a limiting gen. with κίνδυνον, literally, the danger of living or dying, i. e. *the prospect of life or death.*——ἄνδρα, a *man* emphatically, not merely a human being, ἄνθρωπον. It is the subject of ὑπολογίζεσθαι.——ὅτου . . . ὄφελός ἐστιν, *who is of any use, however little.* ὄφελος more frequently takes the person to whom it belongs, or of whom it is predicated, in the genitive. See examples in the Lexicon. With the sentiment of this passage, compare Crito, 48.

C. οἵ τε ἄλλοι καὶ = *especially*; literally, *both the others and* (in particular) *the son of Thetis.* For ἄλλως τε καί = especially, cf. note, 26, E. The allusion is to Achilles, Hom. Il. 18, 90–125.——παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρόν τι ὑπομεῖναι, *in comparison with* (properly, *alongside of*) *submitting to any thing dishonorable.*——τιμωρήσεις. This verb takes after it a *dative* of *the person avenged*, together with an *accusative* of the *person on whom*, or *the thing for which* vengeance is taken = *if you shall avenge Patroclus your friend for his murder;* or, as we say, avenge the murder of Patroclus your friend.——αὐτίκα γάρ τοι, κ.τ.λ.; the very words of Thetis to her son, Il. 18, 96. This quotation interrupts the sentence, and instead of a clause depending on ὥστε which should regularly have followed, it goes on with an independent clause connected by δέ.

D. Κακὸς ὢν denotes the *state in which* to live were to be dreaded more than death: *to live being a bad* man, that is, an unfaithful friend and a cowardly soldier.——Αὐτίκα τεθναίην . . . ἄχθος ἀρούρης. Parts of two Homeric verses (Il. 18, 98 and 104) brought together.——μὴ . . . οἴει, *you do not suppose, do you,* implies a wish, that you should not suppose.——οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει. Cf. note, 17, D.——οὗ ἄν, *wherever*, cf. note, 23, A.——ἢ ὑπ' ἄρχοντος ταχθῇ. Anacoluthon for ἢ ὑπ' ἄρχοντος κελευσθείς, which would correspond with ἢ ἡγησάμενος βέλτιον; instead of which we have ὑπ' ἄρχοντος ταχθῇ, corresponding to ἑαυτὸν τάξῃ, as if the first ἤ had preceded τάξῃ, instead of ἡγησάμενος.——πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ, *before*, i. e. *more than the dishonorable.*

E. εἶην εἰργασμένος. Heindorf makes ἐργάζεσθαι here, as he says it often is, equivalent to ποιεῖν. But Stallbaum, with good reason, renders εἶην εἰργασμένος, I should have *perpetrated* (not merely *done*).——εἰ, ὅτε μέν με . . . τότε μὲν οὗ . . . τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ . . . ἐνταῦθα δέ, *if, when on the one hand the commanders . . then on the one hand I . . . but when on the other hand*

the god . . . then on the other hand I, &c. On this peculiarly emphatic doubling of μέν and δέ, cf. K. 322, R. 1; Mt. 622, 5. ——ἕμενον (past tense of the ind.) denotes an historical fact; λίποιμι (contingent) implies a mere supposition. The bravery and physical endurance of Socrates, as a soldier, were a prodigy and a proverb in that already somewhat degenerate age. In the battle at Delium, the Athenian general Laches declared, that if all the Athenians had fought as bravely as he, the Bœotians would have erected no trophies. It will be observed, that the preposition ἐπί is used to denote the locality of this battle, while ἐν is used with Ποτιδαίᾳ and Ἀμφιπόλει. Wherever this battle is referred to, it is thus designated ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ (cf. Xen. Mem. 3, 5, 4, and Robbins's note ibid.), whereas in other battles ἐν is the usual preposition. The reason seems to be, that Delium was properly the name of the *temple* of Apollo, and, though the city received the same designation, the old association forbade its extension so as to embrace the surrounding country, where the battle was fought.

29 A. δεινὸν μέντ' ἂν εἴη, *a strange thing indeed it would be.* It is a repetition or resumption of δεινὰ ἂν εἴην εἰργασμένος at the beginning of the section.——ὡς ἀληθῶς. ὡς gives emphasis to some adverbs and adjectives besides superlatives. There is an ellipsis of a corresponding demonstrative (οὕτως), and also of an appropriate verb: εἰσάγοι οὕτως ὡς ἀληθῶς εἰσάγοι.—— εἰσάγοι εἰς δικαστήριον. Cf. note, 24, D.——τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, *to man*, i. e. mankind. C. 470, A, 1; K, 244, 2.

B. Καὶ τοῦτο, κ.τ.λ., *and this, how is not this ignorance which is to be censured, that of supposing that one knows what he does not know.*——τούτῳ καὶ ἐνταῦθα, *in this respect and here*, emphatic repetition in order to limit the superiority strictly to this single point.——τῳ, *in any thing*, dat. of the respect.——τοῦτῳ ἄν, sc. φαίην εἶναι, *I should say that it was* (i. e. that I was wiser) *in this.*——οὕτω καὶ οἶομαι corresponds

to οὐκ εἰδὼς, which is equivalent to ὥσπερ οὐκ οἶδα.——τῷ βελτίονι, καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, *the better, whether god or man.*——πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν ὧν, κ.τ.λ., *in preference therefore to the evils which I know to be evils, I will never fear nor flee those which I know not if perchance they are good*, that is, I will never shun the latter *more than* the former—the uncertain more than the certain. Cf. πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ, 28, D.

C. ἀπιστήσαντες = ἀπειθήσαντες, which Stephens substituted for it in his edition = disobeying, *disregarding.* τὴν ἀρχὴν with a negative means, not in the first instance, i. e. *not at all.*——εἰσελθεῖν for εἰσάγεσθαι, *to be brought in hither for trial.*——ἀποκτεῖναι, to put me to death, i. e. *condemn me to death.* So Xen. Mem. 4, 8, 5.——ἂν . . . ἐπιτηδεύοντες . . . διαφθαρήσονται. On the use of ἄν with the fut. ind. which is rare in the Attic Greek and entirely denied by some, see K. 260, 2, (1); Mt. 599, d; and Stallb. ad loc. Stallbaum is inclined here to connect ἂν with ἐπιτηδεύοντες only = ἂν . . . ἐπιτηδεύοιεν . . . καὶ . . . διαφθαρήσονται. But it is more natural to suppose, that ἂν gives a contingent sense to διαφθαρήσονται also.——ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέντοι, ἐφ' ᾧτε, *on this condition, however, that you no longer*, &c. ἐφ' ᾧτε is equivalent to ὥστε, and is accordingly followed by the inf. C. 530; K. 341, R. 5; Mt. 479, a.

D. εἰ οὖν . . . ἀφιοίτε. οὖν is here resumptive = *I say.* It will be observed, that the same protasis is resumed twice—that is, the sentence is commenced with essentially the same condition, varied only in form, three times (εἴ με νῦν ὑμεῖς ἀφίετε . . . εἴ μοι πρὸς ταῦτα εἴποιτε . . . εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἶπον, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀφοίτε), before the apodosis is subjoined. In the first instance, the ind. (ἀφίετε) is used, implying some probability of his release; in the other instances, the same condition is expressed as a mere contingency by the use of the opt. (εἴποιτε, ἀφοίτε), corresponding to which we have the opt. with ἄν (εἴποιμ' ἂν ὑμῖν) in the apodosis.——ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ. Ἀσπά-

ζεσθαι est aliquem salutare ita ut eum *amplectaris; φιλεῖν salutare aliquem ita, ut eum osculeris.* Hoc loco significant haec verba: *grato lætoque animo vestram humanitatem et clementiam amplector atque veneror.* Stallbaum.——*πείσομαι μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν.* Cf. Acts v. 29.——*οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι. οὐ μή*, with the subj. instead of the fut., is used in strong denial. Cr. 595, δ; K. 318, 7; Mt. 517.——*ἀεί, continually, from time to time.*——*ἰσχύν, strength of mind, intellectual and moral power*, particularly *fortitude* and the kindred masculine virtues, as appears from what follows.

E. *ἄπειμι.* The present of *εἶμι* and its compounds is generally used by the Attics in a future sense. So in English, I go or am going = I shall or will go.——*φάναι δέ, but to say that he does.* In Laches, 187–8, Nicias gives a very similar though more minute account of the manner in which Socrates would *hold* every one he conversed with to the work of self-examination: "You do not seem to know, that whoever is nearest to Socrates in reasoning, just as in relationship, and whoever approaches him in conversation, even though he should begin to converse at first on some other subject, he will, with infallible certainty, be brought round in the discussion, till he is obliged to give an account of himself, in what manner he is now living, and how he has lived his past life; and once caught in it, Socrates will not let him go, till he has well and beautifully put all these things to the test . . . and I almost knew, long ago, that our discussion now, being in the presence of Socrates, would not be about the young men, but about ourselves."

30 A. *Καὶ νεωτέρῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ.* Cf. *καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ*, 29, C, and note ibid. Verbs of *doing* and *saying* more commonly take the indirect as well as the direct object in the acc. K. 280, 2, R. 2; Mt. 415, obs. 1.——*ὅσῳ, by as much as.* The full construction would require a corresponding demonstrative

(τοσούτῳ) with μᾶλλον, denoting the *degree of difference*. C. 419; K. 285, (3), c; Mt. 400, 8.——ἐγγύτερω may be followed either by a gen. or a dat. denoting that *to which* there is a *nearness*. C. 394, cf. 399; K. 273, R. 9, cf. 284, 3, (2); Mt. 339, cf. 386, 6. That *in which*, or *in respect to which*, the nearness exists, may also be either gen. or dat. C. 395, cf. 418; K. 274, 8, cf. 285, 3, b; Mt. 337, cf. 400, 6. But it is not according to usage to put both in the gen. or both in the dat. See Stallbaum's note on the proper reading of this passage, and compare ad rem, as well as ad verba, the passage above cited from Laches: ὃς ἂν ἐγγυτάτω Σωκράτους ᾖ λόγῳ ὥσπερ γένει.——τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν, *my service to the god*. The dat. *to* or *for* can follow substantives. C. 409; Mt. 390.——μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα, *no, nor so zealously*, cf. note on μηδ' ὁπωστιοῦν, 17, B.

B. λέγων ὅτι, κ.τ.λ. Observe the sentiment, that the higher good includes the lower, as the greater does the less.——εἰ . . . διαφθείρω. Cf. note, 25, B.——ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη βλαβερά, *these* instructions and persuasions *must be injurious*. Compare the argument of Xen. Mem. 1, 2, 8: *how then could such a man corrupt the young, unless the cultivation of virtue is corrupting.*——οὐδὲν λέγει, *he says nothing*, that is, *he is utterly mistaken*. Cf. Laches, 195, B; N. 1: ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, Λάχης ἐπιθυμεῖν καμὲ φανῆναι μηδὲν λέγοντα, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρτι τοιοῦτός τις ἐφάνη. ΑΑ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Νικία· καὶ πειράσομαι γε ἀποφῆναι. οὐδεν γὰρ λέγεις. So τι λέγειν is to say something, i. e. to speak well and truly, cf. Crit. 46, D; Xen. Mem. 2, 1, 12.——πρὸς ταῦτα, *wherefore*, literally, in reference to these things, in *view* of them.——ἢ πείθεσθε . . . ἢ μή, that is, unconditionally—don't propose any conditional acquittal, like that suggested 29, C; *since I would not* on any condition (ἂν refers to an implied condition) *do differently, not even if I must die* (strictly and emphatically *be dead*) *many times over*.

C. Μὴ θορυβεῖτε. Cf. note, 21, A. Socrates here enters upon another topic, and discourses upon it with such freedom and boldness, such a consciousness of his own innocence not merely, but such an assurance of his divine mission, and such compassion not for himself but for them if they should reject his instructions and condemn him to death, that they must either recognize his superior wisdom or take offence at his arrogance. Some modern critics even, Ast for example, regard the self-complacency of this and some other parts of the Apology as quite insufferable, quite un-Socratic. But is there not the Socratic irony here? Is there not at the same time Socratic truthfulness, fearlessness, and earnestness. It should be remembered that he presents himself throughout as vindicating, not so much himself as truth and justice, philosophy and religion, and God.——ἐμμείνατέ μοι οἷς ἐδεήθην ὑμῶν, persevere for me in what I asked of you, i. e. *continue to extend to me the favor which I requested of you.*——μέλλω γὰρ οὖν, *for I am about now* (οὖν, accordingly, in accordance with that request) *to say also some other things* (besides those already said) *at which perhaps you will cry out.* This clause is connected by γὰρ οὖν (more closely than it would be by γὰρ alone), not to the clause which immediately precedes, but to the previous one, (ἐμμείνατε, κ.τ.λ.)——οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτο, *for he would not even be able*, sc. if he wished. ἄν referring to an implied condition. C. 604, N. a; K. 260, 4, a; Mt. 515, obs.

D. οὐ . . . θεμιτὸν = nefas, not in accordance with the law of nature and of God, and therefore not possible in the nature of things. Schleiermacher: *nicht in der Ordnung.* Cousin: *pas . . . au pouvoir.* Stallbaum: *neque legibus divinæ sapientiæ respondere.*——ἀμείνονι ἀνδρὶ, *for* a better man to be injured by *a worse*, instead of ἀμείνονα ἄνδρα, *that* a better man, &c., the design being to link it more closely with οὐ . . θεμιτὸν εἶναι. This famous saying of Socrates has been widely

quoted and commented on from the earliest times. Cf. Epic. Encheir. 52; Max. Tyr. Diss. 18, 8; Plut. de Tranq. 17; and not only by philosophers but by the Christian Fathers, as Origen, Theodoret, &c. The reason for the assertion, as explained by Plutarch, and illustrated by Crito, 45, D, is, that bad men, however numerous and powerful, cannot make the good man bad or the wise man a fool, and that is the only real evil which can befall a man.——ἀποκτείνειε. Cf. note, 29, C. Here the word not only refers to the condemnation rather than the execution of the sentence, but, like the two verbs which follow, it has a causative sense = *procure* my condemnation to death, to exile, or to disfranchisement.——ἀτιμάσειεν denotes not dishonor in general, as some have understood it, but *deprivation* of *civil rights*. Cf. Forster ad loc.——ἀλλὰ ταῦτα, κ.τ.λ., *but these this man* (viz., the prosecutor) *probably supposes, and many another man perchance, to be great evils.* τις here gives an indefinite extension and application to ἄλλος, like *many a* in English.——ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον, intell. οἶομαι μέγα κακόν. Stallb. ——πολλοῦ δέω ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, *I am very far from making a defence for my own sake.* Observe the emphatic insertion and juxtaposition of ἐγὼ with ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ = *I for myself.* C. 672, note; K. 348, 10.——ὑμῖν, dat. after δόσιν. Cf. note, 30, A. Socrates means that he was given or sent to the Athenians by Apollo to be their monitor and reprover.

E. ἀτεχνῶς . . . προσκείμενον, *really, though the comparison may be too ridiculous, attached to,* &c. προσκείμενον, besides the passive sense of *being attached to,* involves also the active signification of *pressing upon* or *following up,* as a *gadfly* does a *horse,* to suit which the word was chosen.——μύωπος may mean a *spur* or a *gadfly.* Ficinus, Schleiermacher, Ast, Cousin, and some others, take it here in the former sense. But the epithets προσκείμενον, προστεθεικέναι, and προσκαθίζων,

apply better to a gadfly. Moreover this makes the comparison more ridiculous (γελοιότερον), and is more in the spirit of the Socratic irony. Out of regard to these reasons and to the life and point of the whole passage, I incline to agree with Forster, Stallbaum, Carey, &c., in taking μυώπος in its original and proper sense of a gadfly.——οἷον, as afterwards modified by τοιοῦτόν τινα signifies *something of this sort.* τοιοῦτόν τινα is placed where it is, to introduce more easily the following clause.

31 A. ἴσως is often strengthened by τάχ' ἄν and is equivalent to *mayhap.*——ἀχθόμενοι . . . πειθόμενοι. The reader will observe the singular succession of participles. Some of them may be rendered into English by verbs; ἄν gives a potential sense to the participle (κρούσαντες), C. 615, 2; K. 260, 5; Mt. 598, 6: *but you mayhap being offended, just like sleepers when they are roused out of sleep, would* (or will) *strike at me, and hearkening to Anytus, rashly put me to death.*——κρούσαντες still keeps up the allusion to the gadfly. So does ἐπιπέμψειε, *send upon you.*——ὅτι δ' ἐγὼ τυγχάνω, κ.τ.λ., *but that I now am just* (τυγχάνω ὤν) *such a person, as to have been given by the god to the city, you might discern from this fact.* The thing to be proved is that his character is such, that he might well be supposed to have a divine mission; and the proof is his self-forgetfulness and disinterested devotedness to the highest good of others, which, he argues, is something more than human (οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνω ἔοικε). Compare Cousin's translation and Stallbaum's note ad loc.

B. ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελούμενων, *to suffer my private affairs to be neglected,* literally, to *hold myself up over* them *being* neglected. ἀνέχεσθαι denotes superiority, and hence takes a genitive usually with a participle. K. 275, 1; Mt. 358. It will be seen, that both ἀνέχεσθαι and πράττειν express *continued past* action, in other words, they are *imperfects.*——

εἶχον ἄν τινα λόγον, *I should have had some reason*, i. e. my conduct would have been explicable on ordinary grounds without supposing a divine mission.——τοῦτο . . . ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι, *to reach this* (such a) *pitch of shamelessness.*

C. ἢ ἐπραξάμην . . . ἢ ᾔτησα, *that I ever either exacted or asked pay of any one.* πράττεσθαι = exigere (ex-*agere*), aus*machen*, *make* money.——ἱκανον . . . πενίαν, *for sufficient*, I think, *is the witness* (observe the article τὸν μάρτυρα) *I bring forward, that I speak the truth*, viz., *my* (well-known) *poverty.* Cf. note, 23, B.

D. γίγνεται [φωνή]. The suggestion first made in Forster's edition and adopted by most editions since, is certainly probable, that φωνή, though found in all the copies, has crept in from the margin, since it is needless here, has no influence on the structure of the sentence (being followed by the neuter pronouns ὃ and τοῦτ'), and is not only repeated in the next clause, but is there accompanied by τις, as it hardly could be if it had already been used just before.——θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον, *something divine and demoniacal*, if we may be allowed to use the word demoniacal in its etymological sense of *superhuman*, or *proceeding from* δαίμονες. Cf. note, 27, D.——ἐπικωμῳδῶν, *calumniating* or *satirizing* after the manner of the ancient comedy. Cf. Fischer ad loc. The reference is to the ἕτερα δαιμόνια καινά of the indictment, 24, B.——ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει . . . προτρέπει δὲ οὔποτε. Ast makes this statement an argument against the Platonic authorship of the Apology, as being inconsistent with what Xenophon (Mem. 4, 8, 5) and others say of the positive as well as negative character of the divine influence. But the same declaration is made almost in the same words in the Theages, 128, D. So Cicero likewise understood it, de Div. 1, 54: nunquam impellenti, sæpe revocanti. And though Xenophon, and Plato himself in other passages (e. g. Phæd. 242, B, C; Theæt. 151, A), appear to ascribe to the

voice a persuasive as well as dissuasive influence, that is only a general statement of the *fact*, whereas here we have a more definite and precise explanation of the *manner;* for, after all, the discrepancy is more apparent than real, since a dissuasive from all that he should not do, involved instruction in all that he should do. Cf. 40, A, B, C; also Schleiermacher's note ad hunc loc., and Appendix to Robbins's Memorabilia. As to the nature of this voice, or sign or oracle, as he elsewhere calls it (*ἡ μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου . . . τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον*, 40, A), there has always been much discussion, and the question may still perhaps be said to be sub judice. Some have supposed that Socrates believed himself to be under the guidance of a particular *δαίμων*, guardian genius or tutelar divinity, whose special, if not sole office, was to lead and protect him. But no such idea would be gathered from this, nor indeed from any other passage in Plato or Xenophon, where this subject is mentioned. Others have gone to the opposite extreme and have come to the conclusion, that the *δαίμων* of Socrates was nothing more than the voice of reason, considered as the voice of God, in his own soul. But this falls as far below the demands of the passage before us—of the appropriate significance of the language of Socrates—as the other goes beyond and superadds to it. After a diligent comparison of the language of Plato and Xenophon, together with such light as Plutarch, Cicero and subsequent writers have shed on the subject, I find scarcely any room left for doubt, that Socrates meant by his *φωνή*, and *θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον*, very nearly that same divine teaching and guidance which good men in every age have believed to be communicated to themselves, and to all who seek it by prayer and in the use of proper means—partly within the soul, and yet not *from* within but from above—partly by outward signs, omens, oracles, dreams and visions. Cf. below 33, C; *ἐκ μαντειῶν καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων*, κ. τ. λ. Certainly the Apology gives us no intimation of a

tutelary divinity peculiar to himself, and in the Memorabilia, Socrates explicitly declares, that the same divine teaching is within the reach of all men. Cf. below, 40, A, B, C; Xen. Mem. 1, 1, 3, 4; 1, 4, 15, 18; IV. 3, 13; IV. 8, 1. See also an interesting discussion of this question in Plutarch, De Genio Socratis.

E. *ἀπολώλη . . . ὠφελήκη.* This form of the pluperfect is common in Plato, though not to the exclusion of the common form, cf. *ξυνήδειν . . . ᾔδειν*, 22, D. Observe the repetition of *ἄν* in each disjunctive clause (*πάλαι ἄν . . . οὔτ' ἄν ὑμᾶς . . . οὔτ' ἄν ἐμαυτόν*) and compare the examples in Stallb. here and at Gorg. 475, E.

E. *οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν . . . οὔτε ἄλλῳ πλήθει οὐδενὶ . . . ἐναντιούμενος.* Socrates shows himself no demagogue or even democrat. In this, he had the company and sympathy of most of the literary men and philosophers of Athens, who, as a class, cherished little respect or affection—and had little reason in their personal relations to it, to cherish respect or affection—for the Athenian democracy. But more than this, the unbending integrity and firmness of Socrates placed him often in the attitude of "*opposition*" to the *existing* government, whether democratic or aristocratic, insomuch that he was deemed quite an impracticable. Compare his resistance to the popular assembly as described below, 20, B, with his refusal to obey the thirty tyrants in the arrest and "rendition" of a fugitive from oppression, 20, C; Xen. Mem. IV. 4, 2, 3.

A. *Καὶ εἰ μέλλει. Καὶ εἰ, even if*, is to be distinguished 32
from *εἰ καί, although. καὶ εἰ* concedes what is not true, or what is true only to a limited degree (the limit here being marked by *ὀλίγον χρόνον*); *εἰ καὶ* concedes what is true, simply and without degrees. Cf. Hermann ad Viger. 832; Stallb. ad loc.; and K. 340, 7.——*μὴ δημοσιεύειν.* In Xen. Mem. 1, 6, 15, Socrates gives as a reason for not engaging in public affairs, that

he could do more to control and benefit the state by educating as many others as possible to be good citizens and able statesmen, than he could by undertaking the affairs of state in his own person.——οὐδ' ἂν ἑνὶ ὑπεικάζοιμι, *I would not yield in the least to any one whatever.* οὐδ' . . . ἑνὶ is more emphatic than οὐδενὶ; and ὑπεικάζοιμι is an intensive form instead of the common ὑπείκοιμι, verbs ending in αζειν, υζειν, &c., being intensives. This strengthened form is regarded by some as an aorist, cf. C. 299. But they are not accented as aorists (the inf. is εἰκάζειν, not εἰκαζεῖν), nor are they found to have the force of aorists. Cf. Hermann Progr. de Verbis Græcorum in αζειν, ιζειν, and υζειν exeuntibus; Stallb. ad loc.; Woolsey ad Gorg. 483, A; ad Antig. 1096; K. 162. In the next clause, we have ὑπείκων, because there no emphasis is required.——μὴ ὑπείκων δὲ, κ.τ.λ., *and as soon as I did not yield, just so soon I should perish.* The first ἅμα belongs with ὑπείκων, the second, strengthened by καί, with ἀπολοίμην. Cf. Fischer ad loc.——φορτικὰ μὲν καὶ δικανικά, *displeasing and wearisome indeed.* δικανικά has reference primarily to *pleadings in the courts of law*, which are apt to be tediously minute and circumstantial. Some take it here in the sense of *boastful.*

B. ἄλλην μὲν . . . ἐβούλευσα δέ, *I never held any other office, but I was a member of the* βουλή, or *council of five hundred.* See the same fact, and βουλεύειν used in the same sense, Xen. Mem. 1, 1, 18.——ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ Ἀντιοχὶς, *the tribe* to which *Socrates* belonged, viz., *Antiochis.*——πρυτανεύουσα, *presiding*, i. e. *furnishing* the *prytanes*, who acted as presidents both of the council and of the popular assembly. Each of the ten tribes chose by lot fifty representatives in the council, and these representatives, or the tribe through them, presided during about one tenth of the lunar year, or thirty-five days. Moreover, these fifty representatives of the tribe were subdivided into five bodies, of ten men each, each of which presid-

ed during a fifth part of the presidency of the tribe, i. e. during one week. Out of these ten proedri (as they were called) for the week, an *ἐπιστάτης* or chief president was chosen by lot, who presided as chairman in the council and also in the assembly for one day. Socrates was *ἐπιστάτης* on that day when the fate of the ten generals was to be decided, and refused to put the illegal proposition to vote in the assembly. Cf. Xen. Mem. IV. 4, 2: *ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις ἐπιστάτης γενόμενος.*——*τοὺς δέκα στρατηγοὺς.* The Athenians chose ten generals, one for each tribe, at the commencement of a war. Sometimes they were all in the field together. More frequently, however, only three were sent out to carry on the war, while the others took charge of the war department at home. In the battle at Arginusæ, only eight were actually present. For the details, see Xen. Hellen. B. I. C. 7.——*τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους, who did not bring away for burial* the bodies of the slain. They were victorious in the battle (over the Lacedemonians at Arginusæ), and in order to pursue the enemy, they left the care of the dead to some of the inferior officers, instead of attending to it in person. For this they were accused before the assembly, and, in spite of the intervention of Socrates, condemned, and six of them actually put to death. The fact illustrates in a striking manner the sacred interest and importance which the Greeks attached to the rite of burial. Though they had gained the victory, the generals had not done their duty or *finished* their work, till the dead were buried. So the Iliad was not deemed complete till the burial rites of the heroes, Achilles and Hector, were narrated in the 23d and 24th Books; and the Ajax and Antigone of Sophocles are prolonged to considerable extent beyond the catastrophe for the same purpose—to put the minds of Grecian hearers and readers at rest from that pious horror, which they entertained of remaining unburied. Had certain critics of the Homeric poems considered this matter duly, they

would not have found in the last two books an argument against the unity of the Iliad.——*τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας.* Cf. C. 659, a; K. 300, 4; Mt. 596, a.——*ἀθρόους, together*, by one vote, cf. *μιᾷ ψήφῳ*, Xen. Mem. 1, 1, 18.——*παρανόμως.* The law required that the vote should be taken separately, cf. Xen. Hel. 1, 7, 37: *κρίνεσθαι δίχα ἕκαστον.*——*ὡς . . . ἔδοξε.* Xenophon says (Hel. 1, 7, 39), they soon repented of it and punished the authors of the measure as deceivers of the people.——*ἔγω μόνος, κ.τ.λ.* The prytanes all opposed at first, but when threatened with the vengeance of the people, they all gave in except Socrates the son of Sophroniscus. Xen. Hel. 1, 7, 15. ——*μηδὲν ποιεῖν.* C. 665; K. 318, 8.——*ἐνδεικνύναι καὶ ἀπάγειν*, to *indict* me and *lead me away* to punishment.——*βοώντων.* See in Xen. Hel. 1, 7, 13, 14, the tumult and uproar of the meeting.

C. *Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία . . . οἱ τριάκοντα.* There was always an oligarchic faction at Athens, who were aided and sustained by Lacedemonian influence; and when at the close of the Peloponnesian war, the Lacedemonians triumphed, they placed thirty of this faction in the supreme power, who were after known as *the thirty*, or the thirty tyrants.——*με πέμπτον αὐτὸν*, myself *and four others.* C. 511, 5; K. 303, R. 4, e; Mt. 469, 9.——*Λέοντα τὸν Σαλαμίνιον.* A native of Salamis, but a citizen of Athens, who had withdrawn to Salamis to escape the power of the tyrants.——*ἀναπλῆσαι αἰτιῶν, to complicate with* their own *crimes.*

D. *εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον, if it were not too rude* (rustic) *an expression*, is an apology for the use of *οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν* in such a connection as would probably offend the polite ears of the Athenians.——*τούτου δὲ τὸ πᾶν μέλει, for this, I say, I care every thing. τὸ πᾶν* is an adverbial or synecdochial acc. the exact opposite of *οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν.*——*ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐκείνη ἡ ἀρχή, κ.τ.λ.*, for, *me* (emphatic both in form and position) *that government* (of the

thirty), *strong as it then was, did not so terrify.*——ἦγαγον Λέοντα. He was put to death. Xen. Hel. II. 3, 39.——ᾠχόμην ἀπιὼν οἴκαδε, *went immediately home.*——διὰ ταχέων = ταχεως. The government of the Thirty Tyrants lasted only four years.

E. τοσάδε ἔτη, *so many years* as I *have* lived.——ἔπραττον. The imperf. denotes *continued* action.——τοῖς δικαίοις, the things that are just = justice.——ὥσπερ χρή, *as one ought* always to do—this is implied in the present.——οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων οὐδείς, sc. διεγένετο, would have lived so many years.

A. τοιοῦτος φανοῦμαι, shall be found (on examination) *such* 33
a man, sc. one who has never fallen in with any one in any thing contrary to justice, as explained by the following clause. ——ἐμοὺς μαθητὰς εἶναι. Socrates was charged by his enemies with the crimes of Critias and Alcibiades, the one the prince of demagogues and the other the leader of the Thirty Tyrants. They had indeed listened to his conversations; but neither they nor indeed any other man (he proceeds to say) were his *disciples*, for he had no disciples, and never professed to be a teacher. Hence he never called his hearers μαθηταί, but οἱ συνόντες. See this whole topic discussed at length, Xen. Mem. 1, 2.——τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ, my proper business, my appointed mission, already described as assigned him by Apollo.

B. μὴ λαμβάνων δ' οὔ, sc. διαλέγομαι, *but in case I not receive pay, not converse.*——παρέχω . . . ἐρωτᾶν, *I give liberty to question me to rich and poor alike, and to every one who may wish*, ἐάν τις = παντί ὅστις ἄν. Stallb.——τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχοιμι, *bear the responsibility.*——ἀποκρινόμενος, *answering*, has reference to the Socratic method of question and answer, and is equivalent to *entering into conversation.*——τούτων . . . ὧν . . . μηδενὶ. *Of* (in respect to) *these* (alleged disciples) *I should not justly bear the responsibility, to no one of whom I ever promised*, etc.

C. ὅτι ἀκούοντες χαίρουσιν, κ.τ.λ. This clause may depend

directly on *εἶπον*, or may constitute the answer to the question *διὰ τί*, κ.τ.λ. = they do it, *because they are pleased*. Most editions prefer the former, Stallbaum the latter reading. I have adopted the former because of its greater ease and naturalness. The same *words* are used above, 23, C. There, however, the participle *ἀκούοντες* stands last, and is followed by its proper case, the genitive, *ἐξεταζομένων*, κ.τ.λ., while here the verb *χαίρουσιν* follows the participle and is followed by its appropriate case, the dative, viz., *ἐξεταζομένοις*, κ.τ.λ.——*τοῦτο*, sc. to examine those who suppose that they are wise but are not.——*παντὶ τρόπῳ*. Among these ways, Xenophon (Mem. 1, 1, 3) specifies *οἰωνοῖς, θυσίαις, φήμαις, συμβόλοις*.——*εὐέλεγκτα*, strictly, *easy to be confuted*; but here, *easy to be tested and proved*.

D. *εἰ γὰρ δή*, *for if really*.——*χρῆν δήπου*, *they ought surely*. The imperf. implies that they had *not* done it.——*εἴτε τινὲς αὐτῶν πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι . . . νέοις οὖσιν αὐτοῖς*, κ.τ.λ., *both if any of them, after having become older, became conscious that when they were young*, etc. Instead of *εἴτε* the correlative member of the sentence begins with the more emphatic *εἰ δὲ*. So below, 40, D, E, *εἴτε δὴ μηδεμία αἴσθησις . . . εἰ δ' αὖ οἷον ἀποδημῆσαι*. So *δέ* is sometimes antithetic to *τέ*, and *οὐδέ* to *οὔτε*.——*αὐτοὶ*, *themselves*, in contradistinction from their relatives. So *αὐτοὺς* in the previous clause.——*μεμνῆσθαι* depends on *χρῆν* in the antithetic member of the sentence, the force of which still continues.——*ἐνταῦθοῖ*. Cf. Cr. 659, *γ*; K. 300, 4, R. 8.——*Κρίτων οὑτοσί*, *this Crito here*. His name has become identified with that of Socrates, as his friend and patron, and is perpetuated in the Platonic dialogue, or rather monologue, called Crito. He was a wealthy Athenian, of the same *deme* (*δημότης*) or ward as Socrates, viz., Alopece, and now, it seems, like him, far advanced in life. The son Critobulus seems to have done little credit either to his father or his teacher. Cf. Xen. Mem. 1, 3, 8 seqq.; Athen. 220, A,

E. Λυσανίας. Cf. Diog. Laert. 2, 60.——ὁ Σφήττιος, of the deme Sphettus. It was customary at Athens to add by way of distinction to the name of the individual the ward to which he belonged, and often also the name of his father. The same object was accomplished at Rome, as it also is in modern times, by several names.——Αἰσχίνου, usually called the Socratic, to distinguish him from the orator of the same name. He established no school of philosophy, but taught the doctrines of his master for money, and wrote Socratic dialogues. The extant dialogues, however, which bear his name, and which have been edited by Fischer, are not genuine.——ὁ Κηφισιεύς, *of the deme Cephisia.* This Antiphon is to be distinguished from the orator and from several others of the same name. The son, Epigenes, is mentioned by Xenophon (Mem. III. 12), as well as by Plato in his Phædo, 59.——τοίννυν, *moreover*, is not inferential but transitional, as it often is in the orators as well as the philosophers. Cf. Stallb. ad loc., also Schaefer ad Demosth. Several of the names which follow are found only here, e. g. Nicostratus, Theodotus, Paralus, and Æantodorus. Touching Demodocus, see Theag. 127, E; Adimantus, de Repub. 357–368, 548; Apollodorus, Phæd. 59, A, 117, D; Xen. Mem. III. 11, 17. Apollodorus was a most devoted follower of Socrates. Theages and Plato also were favorite disciples.——καταδεηθείη = Latin, deprecari, sensus est: non potest Theodotus Nicostratum fratrem rogare, ne me accuset et contra me testetur. Stallb.

A. μάλιστα μὲν is correlative to εἰ δὲ τότε. The *best* time 34
for Meletus to call some of these witnesses—the time when he *ought especially* to have called them—was in the course of his *argument* before the court; *but if he forgot it then*, &c.——παραχωρῶ, *give way, yield him the floor* as we say, or in the technical language of the Greek bar, let him speak or testify during my water (the measure of *time* by the clepsydra),

B. *ἂν λόγον ἔχοιεν βοηθοῦντες, might have a reason for helping me*, i. e. for defending me, right or wrong.——*ἀλλ' ἤ*. Cf. note, 20, D.——*ξυνίσασι Μελητῳ, κ.τ.λ.* Comp. note, 21, B. ——*Εἶεν*. Cf. note, 19, A. Socrates here concludes his direct defence, *ἃ μὲν . . . ἀπολογεῖσθαι . . . τοιαῦτα*, and proceeds to justify himself in not resorting to the ordinary means of moving the compassion of his judges and so saving his life.——*Τάχα δ' ἄν, κ.τ.λ.* Such means of acquittal were expressly prohibited by law. Cf. Demos. adv. Timocr.; Xen. Mem. IV. 4, 4. But the law was disregarded, and it was the prevailing practice to bring in the wives and children of the accused, and to resort to all possible ways of exciting the compassion of the judges, as is manifest from many passages of the orators and of Aristophanes, e. g. Vesp. 568 sqq.; Demost. in Mid. 99; Isoc. de Perm. 31. Ast thinks the Apology here a manifest imitation of Isocrates in the passage last cited, and therefore not genuine; but with how little reason, see Schleiermacher ad loc.——*ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα, κ.τ.λ., while I*, as ought to have been expected (*ἄρα*), *will do none of these things.*——*καὶ ταῦτα, and that, too, when incurring*, &c.

D. *οὐκ ἀξιῶ μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε, εἰ δ' οὖν*, for I for my part do not expect it, but if, I say, any one of you is in such a state of mind. For *ἀξιῶ*, cf. 19, D; for *οὖν*, 21, A.——*καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου, and* well I may have, *for in the very language of Homer.* Acc. in apposition with a sentence, C. 324, 8; K. 266, R. 2; Mt. 410. So quotations, especially proverbs, are often introduced. The quotation is from Od. 19, 163, where Ulysses, in the guise of a beggar, is thus addressed by Penelope. The expression is proverbial, and denotes that the person to whom it is applied is a man among men, sprung from men and related to them.——*υἱεῖς γε . . . τρεῖς, and sons even, men of Athens, three* of them, cf. Crit. 47, B, note.——*μειράκιον, a young man*, sc. Lamprocles, who is called *μέγας* in Phæd. 65,

and is introduced in Xen. Mem. II. 2, holding a conversation with his father touching his filial duty to his termagant mother.——*παιδία, small children*, sc. Sophroniscus and Menexenus, cf. Phæd. 3, where they are called *σμικροὶ*. Seneca (Epis. 104) says that the sons of Socrates resembled their mother rather than their father.

E. *ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν, κ.τ.λ., but whether I can meet death with confidence or not is another question.* He barely *hints* at this as one reason for his course, but dismisses it as not exactly pertinent on the present occasion.——*πρὸς δ'οὖν δόξαν, however that may be, in regard to reputation both mine and yours*, &c. Cf. note, 17, A. So just below, *ἀλλ' οὖν δεδογμένον, but whatever may be the fact, it is at least supposed.*——*τηλικόνδε*, sc. seventy, cf. 17, D.——*τοῦτο τοὔνομα*, sc. *σοφός*, cf. 23, A. ——*ψεῦδος*, the subs. is often associated with the adj. *ἀληθὲς*, as shown by Heindorf, Ast, and Stallbaum.

A. *τι εἶναι.* C. 518, *β*; Mt. 487, 5.——*ὥσπερ . . . ἐσομέ-* 35
νων. C. 640; K. 312, R. 13; Mt. 568, 2.——*καὶ ὁτιοῦν εἶναι, to be even any thing whatever*, i. e. to have any weight of character, however inconsiderable.

C. *χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης*, but irrespective of *the* reputation, sc. which attaches to me and of which we have been speaking. Observe the force of the article. The emphatic negative *οὐδὲ* should also be noticed; it appears to me that it is *not even* right. The second *οὐδὲ* is not merely correlative to the first, but emphatic = *no nor*, or *nor even.*——*καταχαρίζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια* is *to pervert justice for the sake of pleasing.*——*ταῦτα*, sc. *τὰ δίκαια* = *justice.*——*ὀμώμοκεν.* The oath of office taken by the *δικασταί*, and the security it afforded, are very often adverted to, particularly by the Attic orators, e. g. Demos. de Cor. 2 and 6. The substance of the oath was that they would administer justice according to the laws so far as there were laws, and where no laws existed, according to their own best

judgment of what was right. Cf. Poll. Onom. 8, 122; Demos. adv. Lept. 118.

D. ἄλλως τε πάντως . . . μάλιστα μέντοι καὶ, *both every other way, to be sure, especially, however, when accused of impiety*, &c., cf. note on ἄλλως τε καὶ, 26, E.——σαφῶς γὰρ ἄν, cf. note, ὥσπερ οὖν ἄν, 17, D.——θεοὺς . . . εἶναι. Observe the emphatic position of these words, the one at the beginning, the other at the end of the clause: *I should teach you not to believe in the existence of the gods.*——νομίζω τε γάρ, sc. θεοὺς, *for I both believe in them.*——ὡς οὐδεὶς = *more than any.*——καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρῖναι, *and I commit it to you and the god to decide.* This clause is to be closely connected with its correlative clause (νομίζω τε . . . καὶ . . . ἐπιτρέπω), and in that connection it implies, that he *shows* his belief in the gods practically by his calm reliance on the providence of God in this trial for his life. It will be observed, that Socrates here uses the singular τῷ θεῷ, though he has been using the plural just before. He may refer to the god at Delphi, of whom he has often before spoken particularly, and in the singular number (cf. τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς, 20, E, sqq.), and who, having indirectly, by means of the oracle, involved him in difficulty, would now provide for the best result; or he may refer to the supreme God, whom he often, as represented in the writings both of Plato and Xenophon, singles out and distinguishes from the inferior deities (cf. Xen. Mem. 4, 3, 13).

With the above words of pious resignation and confidence, Socrates concludes the first and principal part of his defence and submits the question of guilty or not guilty to his judges. They pronounce him guilty by a small majority of votes. The question still remained, what punishment should be inflicted. In all those cases, where the laws do not prescribe the penalty (ἀγῶνες ἀτιμητοί),—and charges of impiety were of this sort, cf. Dem. in Timoc. 702, 5—it was customary for the accuser to

propose what he deemed a suitable penalty (τιμᾶσθαι), and the accused, if he chose, to propose some other punishment (ἀντιμᾶσθαι or ὑποτιμᾶσθαι), and then the judges decided between these two, no third proposition being admissible. Cf. Grote, vol. VIII. chap. 68; also Boeckh, Meier and Schömann, and Smith's Dic. Antiqq.: Ἀγῶνες ἀτιμητοὶ καὶ τιμητοί. The accusers of Socrates pronounced him worthy of death. Had Socrates chosen to propose banishment, for instance, instead of death, he might doubtless have escaped the extreme penalty, cf. 37, C; Crit. 52, C. But when he disdained to acknowledge guilt by proposing any counter-assessment, and even claimed reward instead of punishment as his due, the judges took offence and sentenced him to death. His remarks on what he thought the proper sentence constitute the second part of the Apology, capp. 25–29.

A. τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν depends on ξυμβάλλεται. The arti- 36
cle simply marks the infinitive a little more distinctly as the object of the main action; otherwise we should expect the infinitive alone. Mt. 543; C. 622. The μέν is correlative to δέ at the commencement of the next chapter: Τιμῶται δ'οὖν.—— ἄλλα τε . . . καὶ, *both many other things conspire to cause, and* especially, *it has happened to me not unexpected*, cf. note on ἄλλοι τε καὶ, 28, C. The full and regular construction would have been καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο ὅτι οὐκ ἀνέλπιστον, κ.τ.λ. ἐλπίς and its derivatives are used with reference to objects of fear as well as hope. So spes and sperare in Latin, cf. Virg. At *sperate* Deos memores fandi atque nefandi.——παρ' ὀλίγον . . . παρὰ πολύ. παρὰ implies *comparison*, *for I, for my part, did not suppose it would be thus by little*, but *by much*, sc. that the votes against me would exceed those in my favor. Cf. K. 297, III. (2); Mt. 588, c.——εἰ τρεῖς μόναι, κ.τ.λ. We have here taken the liberty to depart from the reading of Stallbaum, since he has departed (as we think without sufficient

reason) from the reading of most of the MSS. and all the standard editions. His reading is *τριάκοντα*. If that were the true reading, the *majority* against Socrates must have been twice that number, viz., sixty; and a majority of sixty could hardly have seemed to Socrates surprisingly small, nor would he have added *μόναι* to so large a number as thirty. The difficulty is created by a passage of Diog. Laert. 2, 41, in which he says, that Socrates was condemned by a majority of 281 votes, i. e., as the passage is usually interpreted, there were 281 votes *against* him. If a change of 3 votes would have secured his acquittal, there must have been 275 in his favor, and the whole number of votes must have been 556. But for such a number of dikasts, it is argued by Stallbaum, there is no authority, since the Heliasts usually sat in sections of 500, 1000, 1500, or some such multiple of a single section. See note, 17, A, and authorities there cited touching the constitution of the Heliæa. But examples are not wanting of such fractional sections, as 200, 400, 700, &c. Neither can we be sure, that all the jurors that were impannelled were present or voted in every trial. There does not, therefore, seem to be a sufficient reason for departing from the commonly received and most obvious reading and explanation of the passage.——*μετέπεσον*, fallen over, sc. into the other urn, which received the votes for acquittal.——*ἀποπεφεύγη*. For this form of the plup. see note, 31, E.——*ἀνέβη*, &c. Upon the *βῆμα* to aid Meletus in the advocacy of his cause, cf. note, 18, B.——*χιλίας δραχμάς*. The prosecutor, unless he received a fifth part of the votes, was liable to a fine of a thousand drachmas and also a forfeiture (*ἀτιμία*) of the right to appear as prosecutor in future—a very useful and very necessary check on the virulence of public prosecutions in the Athenian courts. Cf. Dem. de Cor. 103; in Mid. 23; Boeckh, Pub. Econ. Ath. chap. 9, 11. Socrates argues, that Meletus (not being the most popular or influential

of the three accusers), if he had been the sole prosecutor, would not have carried more than a third as many votes as were actually gained by the joint influence of the three, and consequently would not have received a fifth part of all the votes. Cf. Schleier. ad loc.——*τὸ πέμπτον μέρος*. Observe the force of the article, *the* required fifth according to the well-known law. Demosthenes (de Cor. 103) uses simply *τὸ μέρος* in the same way, *the* required *portion*.

B. *ὁ ἀνὴρ*, sc. the accuser, of whom he had just been speaking in the foregoing chapter.——*τιμᾶται* is middle voice. The usage in regard to assessment and counter-assessment (*τιμᾶσθαι* and *ἀντιμᾶσθαι*) has been explained above.——*ἢ δῆλον*, *or* is it needless to ask—*is it evident*, etc.——*παθεῖν* refers to corporal punishment, *ἀποτῖσαι* to a pecuniary penalty. The question is asked in the words of a judicial formula, cf. Dem. in Timoc. 105.——*ὅ τι μαθὼν* differs from *τί μαθὼν* only in being relative and indirect. It may be rendered *because*, but further indicates surprise or censure. This implication can be expressed in English only by a parenthesis: *because I did not keep quiet* (*and what had I taken into my head*, literally, learned, *that I did not*). Cf. Mt. 567; C. 631; K. 344, R. 5. See also Schleierm. and Stallb. ad loc.——*ὥνπερ οἱ πολλοί*, sc. *ἐπιμελοῦνται*, *not caring for those things which the mass* care for. Cf. Mt. 634, 3.——*τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν*, not the *other* magistracies, for the specifications which precede are not all magistracies, but *the rest*, sc. *the magistracies*. So Gorg. 473, C: *πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων* = the citizens and the rest, viz., the strangers. So *οἱ ἄλλοι* is often used.——*ξυνωμοσιῶν καὶ στάσεων*. Conspiracies and factions abounded at Athens in the age of Socrates. ——*ἐπιεικέστερον . . . σώζεσθαι*, *too upright a man to be safe if I went into these things*.

C. *ἐνταῦθα*, for *ἐνταυθοῖ*, as we often use *there* for *thither*. C. 659, δ; K. 300, R. 7. Below *ἐνταῦθα* is equivalent to *ἐπὶ*

τοῦτο, answering to ἐπὶ τὰ εὐεργετεῖν and ἰὼν is redundant: *but to go and confer on each individually the greatest benefit*, to this (literally, *there*) *I went*.——τῶν τε ἄλλων . . . ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, that is, on the principle that the man is more than his property, the state more than its possessions, and in general persons or things more than their adjuncts. The same great principle is often inculcated by our Lord in the gospels, cf. Mat. VI. 25, 33.

D. τιμᾶσθαι here also is mid. = to assess myself. Compare E, below: εἰ οὖν δεῖ με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἀξίας τιμᾶσθαι.——τοιοῦτον ὅ τι, instead of τοιοῦτον οἷον, to make it more indefinite; *such a good of whatever kind it may be, as*, etc. Below we have a still more singular mixing of correlatives: μᾶλλον πρέπει οὕτως ὡς, where we should expect μᾶλλον . . . ἢ or οὕτως ὡς, but find both forms brought together. A similar construction occurs at 30, A: πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα ὡς, except that there μηδὲ is interposed between πρότερον and οὕτω, and makes the construction somewhat less concise and abrupt.——πένητι. Cf. note, 23, B.——εὐεργέτῃ, *a public benefactor*, a term of honor, which the Athenians conferred by formal vote on those who had deserved well of the state, and which foreigners, and even foreign kings and princes, were ambitious to receive. So in Egypt, Ptolemy Euergetes.——ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ παρακελεύσει, *for your admonition*, i. e. to instruct you, the adj. taking the place of the *objective* gen.——ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι. The Prytaneum was a sort of city hall or state house, where the laws and public archives were kept, where the Prytanes and some other magistrates had their meals, and entertained, at the public expense, not only ambassadors from foreign states, but citizens who had deserved well of the state. To be thus entertained was the highest honor. Socrates claims it as a εὐεργέτης who has rendered the most useful services to the state, and also as affording him the requisite leisure, that he might devote himself

wholly to the instruction of the citizens.——*πολύ γε μᾶλλον.* Victors in the public games were honored with entertainment at the Prytaneum. Socrates claims the honor as due to himself *much more at least* than to such.——*ἵππῳ*, a *race horse* under a rider; *ξυνωρίδι*, *a two horse chariot;* *ζεύγει*, a general term for carriage, here denotes especially a chariot drawn by more than two horses, and may be rendered *four horse chariot.* ——*Ὀλυμπιάσιν, at the Olympic games.* The acc. (*Ὀλυμπίαδα* or *Ὀλύμπια*) more frequently follows *νικᾶν.* See Lex. under *νικάω.*——*δοκεῖν εἶναι . . . εἶναι.* Socrates was an uncompromising enemy of all *seeming*, and often exposes the *folly*, as well as the baseness of it, since the best way to *seem* to be good (in whatever excellence), is to *be* good. Cf. Xen. Mem. 1, 7, 1. ——*ὁ μὲν τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ δὲ δέομαι*, sc. because he is rich, as the victor in a chariot must be, while I am poor. He here has respect to the *πένητι* above, as in the preceding clause he refers to the *εὐεργέτῃ.* He is a *real benefactor*, and he is *really poor.* He both deserves and needs to be provided for in the Prytaneum.

A. *παραπλησίως . . . ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ οἴκτου καὶ τῆς ἀντιβολή-* 37
σεως. The reference is to chap. 23, where he scorns to resort to supplications or appeals to compassion, and yet denies that he does this *αὐθαδιζόμενος, from arrogance.* Here he employs the rare word *ἀντιβόλησις* instead of the usual *ἱκετεία.*——*τοιοῦτον ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε*, not *such as that*, but *such as this;* not *such as you suppose*, but *such as I proceed to explain* (cf. note, 21, B), i. e. it is not arrogance but truth and duty that impels me.——*ἑκὼν εἶναι* is stronger than *ἑκὼν* alone. It means, *so far as depends on my will.* C. 623, N.; K. 306, R. 8; Mt. 545.——*πείθω* sometimes takes two acc.——*διειλέγμεθα.* The perf. has respect to this apology, which he regards as virtually finished—it was finished so far as the question of guilt or innocence was concerned.——*ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις.* He probably has

particular reference to the Lacedemonians, whose laws Socrates, in common with most of the philosophers, highly reverenced. and who, as Thucydides and Plutarch inform us, never decided *capital* trials hastily, but extended them over several days.

B. *του κακοῦ, some evil*, i. e. *any punishment*. So *τοιούτου τινὸς, any thing of this sort*. It is gen. of *price* or *penalty*, and is accompanied with the dat. of the *person* (*ἐμαυτῷ*) on whom the penalty is assessed. The same construction is seen in *οὗ Μέλητός μοι τιμᾶται*, et passim. Ad rem, cf. note, 38, B. ——*ἦ μὴ πάθω*. *ἦ* is interrogative: shall I do it through fear that I may suffer death, when I am so ignorant of death that I do not know whether it is a good or an evil?——*ἕλωμαι*, subj. aor. in a deliberative question. It is to be rendered by the future. It is followed by a partitive genitive: *shall I choose* or *those things which I know to be evil*, sc. imprisonment, banishment, &c. We have in this sentence another example of that usage which occurs so often in Plato—two constructions condensed into one. The author might have said: *ἕλωμαί τι τούτων ἃ εὖ οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἐστιν*, or *ἕλωμαί τι τῶν, εὖ οἶδα, κακῶν ὄντων*. But instead of either we have parts of both. Cf. Stallb. ad loc.

C. *τῇ ἀεὶ καθισταμένῃ ἀρχῇ, the ever shifting government*. The Eleven who had charge of the prisons, executions, &c., were chosen *annually* (one from each of the ten tribes, with a secretary). Socrates implies that it were hardly worth while to live subject to the caprice of such a succession of petty tyrants as might chance to be *established from time to time* (such is the exact force of *ἀεὶ καθισταμένῃ*) over the public prisons. Cf. note on *ἀεὶ*, 25, C.——*ἀλλὰ ταὐτόν . . . ἔλεγον*, sc. perpetual imprisonment, because he had no money and therefore would never be released.——*τιμήσομαι . . . τιμήσαιτε*. Observe the change of voice. The middle voice is used of the *accuser* and *the accused*, and the active of the *judges*.

D. *βαρύτεραι, too burdensome.*——*ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα, κ.τ.λ., while others, however* (or *forsooth*), will bear them easily. Cf. note, 34, C.——*κἂν μὲν τούτους ἀπελαύνω, κ.τ.λ., and if on the one hand I do repulse them, they will themselves drive me out of the city.*——*ἐξελῶσι* is Attic fut. C. 200; K. 117, 1; Mt. 181, 2.

E. *ἡμῖν, for us, in respect to us,* is inserted simply to make the discourse more emphatic and subjective. C. 410, Note; K. 284, 10, d; Mt. 387.——*ἐξελθὼν*, sc. into exile.——*ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ, supposing that I spoke ironically.*

A. *ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος, κ.τ.λ., and that a life without investi-* 38
gation is not worth living, literally, not to be lived. This clause depends on *λέγω ὅτι*, and *ἀνεξέταστος*, contrary to the prevailing usage, is to be taken in an active sense.——*ταῦτα δ', this on the other hand.* *δέ* emphasizes the apodosis in the latter of the two supposed cases. Cf. Mt. 616, 3.

B. *ὅσα ἔμελλον ἐκτίσειν*, as much as I was about to pay, i. e. as much as I should be likely to be able to pay.——*οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐβλάβην* implies that he would have considered the loss of property, if he had it, no real loss. This accords with what he had said above (37, B), that he would not assess himself to the amount of *any evil*, for he did not deserve it.——*νῦν δέ . . . οὐ γὰρ, but now* I cannot amerce myself in a sum of money, *for I have not got it.*——*αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυᾶσθαι.* Intell. *φασί*, quod continetur præcedenti verbo *κελεύουσι*. Stallb.——*ἀξιόχρεῳ*. Cf. note, 20, E. The comparatively small fine in which Socrates here proposes to amerce himself (only half a talent, or about $500), and the whole strain of his remarks on the subject, prove that he was not in earnest. Accordingly the Apology ascribed to Xenophon denies that he proposed a counter and lower assessment. He was not really desirous to preserve his life. He must have foreseen, that his judges would not accept such a substitute for the death penalty,

which the accusers had named in their indictment. He must also have known, that his freedom of speech, his playful irony, and especially his assumption of entire innocence which merited reward instead of punishment, would provoke the hostility of those judges at least who had already pronounced him guilty, and, as they had to choose between the penalties proposed by the parties, they would certainly choose that of the accusers and put him to death. According to Diogenes Laertius, eighty who had voted for his acquittal, now passed over to the majority and voted for his death. Cf. Cic. Orat. 1, 54: Socratis responso sic judices exarserunt, ut capitis hominem innocentissimum condemnarent.

Here ends the second part of the Defence. The vote is now taken touching the penalty. Socrates is condemned to death by a majority of 83 votes. He then concludes his speech in a tone of conscious innocence and moral heroism, in which, as Cicero says, he appears, not so much in the attitude of a culprit or a suppliant before his judges, as of their master and lord.

C. Οὐ πολλοῦ . . . χρόνου. The remainder of the life of Socrates (now 70 years of age) was so short, that it was hardly worth their while to incur so much dishonor for the sake of extinguishing what would soon have terminated in the course of nature.——ὄνομα ἕξετε καὶ αἰτίαν, *you will have the name and blame*, both here in a bad sense, though often in a good one. For ὑπὸ, cf. note, 17, A.

D. τόλμης καὶ ἀναισχυντίας, i. e. what Socrates would consider audacity and shamelessness, viz., daring to say and do such things, whether true or false, noble or ignoble, as would disgrace him, while persuading them. Cf. ἐάν τις τολμᾷ πᾶν ποιεῖν, below, 39, A.

E. τότε, sc. while making my defence, before sentence was pronounced.——ἐκείνως, sc. ἀπολογησάμενος, *having defended myself in that way.*

B. ἅτε . . . ὤν, *as . . . being* = inasmuch as I am.——δεινοὶ 39
is the opposite of πρεσβύτης, and ὀξεῖς of βραδύς. The swifter pursuer, viz., vice, is represented as overtaking the swifter party, viz., the judges who condemned Socrates; while Socrates himself, tardy with years, is seized upon by the more tardy pursuer, viz., death.——ϑανάτου δίκην ὄφλων, *having incurred sentence of death.*——ὑπο τῆς ἀληϑείας, sc. as judge. Compare Maximus Tyrius (Diss. 9), where he says: Socrates was, indeed, put to death, but the Athenians were condemned, and God and truth was their judge.——ὠφληκότες μοχϑηρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν = *having been convicted of wickedness and injustice.*——μετρίως ἔχειν, *to be suitable*, i. e. well.

C. τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, the after this, i. e. the sequel, or consequence.——χρησμῳδοῦσιν, ὅταν μέλλωσιν ἀποϑανεῖσϑαι. This idea, that the soul, when about to leave the body, shows its divine nature and prophetic power, was widely prevalent among the ancients. Thus Patroclus predicts the death of Hector (Il. 16, 851 sqq.), and Hector prophesies the death of Achilles (Il. 22, 358 sqq.); cf. also Phæd. 84, E; Xen. Apol. 30; Cic. de Div. 1, 30; Sex. Empir. Math. 9, 20.——οἵαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε. For the double acc. cf. C. 435; K. 280, 1; Mt. 421, obs. 4.——τοῦ διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου, from giving proof of your life, i. e. *from the necessity of letting your manner of life be put to the proof.*

D. ἀποκτείνοντες ἀνϑρώπους, *by putting men to death.*

E. ἐν ᾧ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἄγουσι, *while the magistrates are busy, and I do not yet come, whither when I have come, I must be put to death*, i. e. before the Eleven (cf. note, 37, C) get ready to lead me away to prison.

A. τί ποτε νοεῖ, what in the world it means, or what can 40
be its meaning. Cf. note, 20, D.——ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί. He has habitually addressed the court hitherto as ἄνδρες Ἀϑηναῖοι. The change here is intentional, since that portion of the court

whom he now addresses were *judges* indeed, that is, administrators of *justice.*——ἡ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου, *for the customary prophetic voice of the divinity.* Cf. 31, D, note ibid. Schleiermacher considers ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου as a gloss, because Plato elsewhere calls the voice itself τὸ δαιμόνιον, and where a genitive of source is added to μαντική, φωνή, &c., it is not τοῦ δαιμονίου, but τοῦ θεοῦ. Stallbaum admits that the combination here is unusual, but does not, for that reason, feel at liberty to depart from the established reading.——καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς, *even on very trifling occasions.* πάνυ is often placed thus before the preposition for the sake of emphasis. ——ἅ γε δὴ οἰηθείη ἄν τις καὶ νομίζεται, *which one might certainly suppose to be, and are in fact usually considered.* The relative is the object of the first verb and the subject of the second. The former verb is optative, to denote what any one might naturally suppose; the other is indicative, to denote what is in fact the prevailing sentiment. The reader will observe the difference between οἶομαι and νομίζω here implied and habitually observed.

B. τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι. In a conversation with Hermogenes, recorded by Xenophon (Mem. IV. 8), Socrates assigns several reasons why, aside from his hopes for another world, he deemed it better for his happiness in this life, and better for his reputation, that he should die then rather than live to a more advanced age. Add to these the considerations touching a future life, which follow in the next chapter of the Apology, and we have the most complete demonstration of his deliberate preference to be condemned rather than to be acquitted, and thus a justification of the otherwise inexplicable manner and spirit of his defence.

C. Few passages in the Greek classics have been oftener cited, translated and commented upon in ancient or modern times, than the chapter on which we now enter. Cf. Plut.

Cons. ad Apol.; Xen. Cyrop. VIII. 7, 18 sqq.; Cic. Tusc. Quæst. 1, 41; also the Christian Fathers, Eusebius, Theodoret, &c., &c.——*δυοῖν γὰρ θάτερον.* Stallbaum remarks, that here we doubtless have the true Socratic doctrine of a future state, whereas the Phædo and other Dialogues exhibit Plato's views on the subject. Accordingly Xenophon in his Cyropædia, as above cited, makes Cyrus on his death-bed discourse in exact accordance with the passage before us.——*οἷον μηδὲν εἶναι, of such a nature as to be nothing*, i. e. to be annihilated. So below, D: *οἷον ὕπνος*, and E: *οἷον ἀποδημῆσαι.*——*κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα*, according to what is said, i. e. the common opinion.——*τῇ ψυχῇ*, dat. for the gen. C. 411; Mt. 389, 3.——*τοῦ τόπου.* The gen. of the *place from which*, without a preposition, may follow a verbal noun as well as a verb.——*τοῦ ἐνθένδε*, for *τοῦ ἐνταῦθα*, because of the motion expressed by *μετοίκησις.*——*εἴτε δὴ μηδεμία.* This *εἴτε* has its correlative in *εἰ δ' αὖ* below, E, which is only more emphatic than another *εἴτε.* Compare *οὔτε . . . οὐδέ γε*, 19, E, and note ibid.

D. *ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι* introduces a long and involved sentence. The force of the *ἂν* falls on *εὑρεῖν* several lines below, where it is repeated (cf. notes, 17, D, and 23, B). *οἶμαι* itself and *δέοι* are also repeated.——*μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώτην, not only a private individual.* C. 671, 12; K. 321, 3. The reader need not be informed, that by the great king the Greeks mean the king of Persia, the richest and most powerful sovereign with whom they had to do in all their early history. The comparison of death to night and sleep has always been, as it is now, common especially with the poets. Cf. Hom. Il. 14, 231; 16, 672; Od. 13, 80; Catul. 5, 5; Hor. Od. 1, 28, 15.

A. *εἰς Ἅιδου*, to Pluto's, sc. house or realm. So we omit 41
the word house after the owner's name, and the word church after the name it bears.——*Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυς*, nom. by attraction to the relative *οἵπερ.* Minos and Rhadamanthus

were brothers (hence closely connected by τε καὶ), both sons of Jove, and celebrated kings, judges and lawgivers, the former in Crete and the latter in the islands of the Ægean. Æacus, who reigned in Ægina, was also a son of Jupiter, and the father of Peleus and Telamon. Triptolemus was the favorite of Demeter, the inventor of the plough and agriculture, and the great hero in the Eleusinian Mysteries. We find Minos represented as performing the office of judge in the lower regions in the Homeric poems (Od. 11, 568 sqq.); Rhadamanthus in Pindar (Olymp. 2, 137 sqq.); when Æacus was first added to the number, we do not know. In the Gorgias (523, E), these three are represented as administering justice at the entrances to Tartarus and to the Isles of the Blessed: Rhadamanthus to souls from Asia, Æacus to those from Europe, and Minos, as president judge, to decide in doubtful cases. Triptolemus is assigned that office only in this passage, though in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter (153), he sits in judgment on earth; and as *others*, whose names are not mentioned, are here said to be judges in the lower world, we may perhaps suppose that the common opinion ascribed to Triptolemus and others the same office and occupation there, which they held on earth. The conception is, however, limited here to those early and just judges and lawgivers, whom the imagination of the Greeks had invested with the dignity of demigods (ὅσοι τῶν ἡμιθέων δίκαιοι ἐγένοντο ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῶν βίῳ).——ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἄν τις δέξαιτ' ἂν ὑμῶν; Quanti tandem æstimatis. So Cicero renders it. Tusc. Quæst. 1, 41, 98.——ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε, κ.τ.λ., *for to myself also the converse there would be delightful, where I might converse with Palamedes and Ajax the son of Telamon.* Both these Grecian heroes had come to a tragical end, the former at the hands of the army, the other by his own hands, in consequence of unjust decisions brought about by the wiles of Ulysses. The story

of Ajax is found in Homer (Od. 11, 541 sqq.); that of Palamedes in the Tragic Poets, especially Euripides.

B. *ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι . . . οὐκ ἂν ἀηδὲς εἴη.* This clause is explanatory of the foregoing, hence it is without a connective, and hence also the participle in the dative answering to *ἔμοιγε.* ——*τὸ μέγιστον* is in apposition with the following proposition. In this proposition, the participle *ἐξετάζοντα* is in the accusative agreeing with the subject of *διάγειν*, with which *οὐκ ἂν ἀηδὲς εἴη* is again understood.——*τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἀγάγοντα*, sc. Agamemnon, to see whether he was really as great, and Ulysses as wise, and Sisyphus as crafty, as the Poet represents them to have been. Hom. Il. 3, 178; Od. 9, 19; Il. 6, 153.

C. *ἀμήχανον ἂν εἴη εὐδαιμονίας, would be an immense* sum *of happiness.* The genitive is partitive. Or it can be, as Ast supposes, a genitive of specification = in respect to happiness. ——*τούτου γε ἕνεκα*, sc. for conversing with men and examining them—*they do not, methinks, for this put men to death there*, as they do here.——*ἕν τι τοῦτο = one thing*, viz., *this.* The *τι* first states it indefinitely; then *τοῦτο* is added to define it. Cf. Stallb. ad loc.

D. *ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμάτων, to be set free from the business and troubles of life.*

E. *ταὐτὰ ταῦτα λυποῦντες ἅπερ ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐλύπουν*, i. e. besiege them with warnings and expostulations. *λυπεῖν* here takes a double accusative, as a verb of *doing ill.* C. 435; K. 280, 2; Mt. 415.——*ἐὰν δοκῶσί τι εἶναι μηδὲν ὄντες, if they think they are something when they are nothing.* The same idea is expressed in the same words by Paul, Gal. VI. 3.

CRITO.

43 A. *τηνικάδε*, at this time of day, that is, at so early an hour. *τηνίκα* and its corresponding relative and demonstrative words, together with their derivatives, have respect, in Attic usage, not to time in general, but to the *hour of the day*.——*ἢ οὐ πρῷ ἔτι ἐστίν, or is it not still early in the morning?* Buttman writes *πρῲ* (without the iota subscript); Fischer *πρῶ*; the earlier editions *πρωΐ*, which Bekker, Ast and Stallbaum shorten into *πρῲ* after the authority of the poets and the old grammarians.——*πάνυ μὲν οὖν, certainly it is*, is the most common expression of full assent in Plato's Dialogues. Sometimes it stands in construction with a verb, as in Apol. 26, B, but more frequently by itself, as here. *πάνυ γε* is also frequent in affirmative answers, cf. Apol. 25, C. The *πάνυ* expresses assent, the *μὲν* and *γε* restriction, and *οὖν* accordance = certainly so far (it is) as you say.——*τηνίκα μάλιστα, what time of day about. μάλιστα*, with words of number, denotes uncertainty, or indefiniteness.——*Ὄρθρος βαθύς, very early dawn. πρῲ* is simply morning; *ὄρθρος* is the dawn or *rising* of the day. *βαθύς* adds emphasis, *very early*. We speak of midnight deep, deep night, &c. The Greeks extend the same figure to morning and evening—the former in its earliest, and the latter in its latest stages.——*ὑπακοῦσαι*, to *hearken* and hence *open* the door for admittance. *ὅπως* gives emphasis to the expression of surprise: I wonder *how it happened that* he was willing to admit you, sc. at so very early an hour, as he was not accus-

tomed to open the prison gate very early, cf. Phædo, 59, D. ——τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου. I have said in the Preface, *perhaps* the same cell, hewn out of the solid rock, near the old Agora, which now bears the name of "the Prison of Socrates." Professor Felton says: "*undoubtedly;* I read the Phædo there, and when I came to the passage where Crito says, *the sun is yet upon the mountains*, I stepped to the entrance of the cell, and lo! the shadows covered the valleys, but the sun still lingered on Mars' Hill, the Acropolis, and Lycabettus."——καί τι καὶ εὐεργέτηται, *and he has also been somewhat obliged by me.* For the omission of the augment. in εὐεργέτηται, see C. 188, N.; K. 126, R. 1; Mt. 167, 6.——Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι, *a considerable time since.*

B. εἶτα πῶς, *then how did it happen, that*, &c., expressive of surprise.——οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἤθελον, *I should not have myself preferred to be in so much sleeplessness and sorrow*, sc. if I had been at liberty to choose simply for *myself;* but for *your sake* I felt constrained not to disturb your quiet slumbers. This reason is implied here and more fully expressed below: ἐπίτηδές σε οὐκ ἤγειρον, ἵνα ὡς ἥδιστα διάγῃς.——ἐν τοσαύτῃ, sc. so much as I have suffered, while I have been watching your peaceful slumbers. τε *preceding* ἀγρυπνίᾳ shows that τοσαύτῃ belongs not only to ἀγρυπνίᾳ, but also to λύπῃ = so much both sleeplessness and sorrow.——ὡς ἡδέως = ὅτι οὕτως ἡδέως. So below, ὡς ῥᾳδίως = ὅτι οὕτω ῥᾳδίως. Stallb.——διάγῃς. The subjunctive after a past tense denotes continuance to the present time.——τρόπου, turn of mind, or manner of life, hence = *character*, Lat. mores. For the gen., see C. 372; K. 274, f; Mt. 366, 5. As to the sentiment, compare Xen. Mem. IV. 8, 2. ——τηλικοῦτον ὄντα, *a man of my age*, sc. 70, Apol. 17, D.

C. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐπιλύεται, κ.τ.λ., *but not at all does their age set them free from grieving at their present fortune*, literally, as to not grieving, or so as not to grieve. τὸ ἀγανακτεῖν is acc. of specification, and does not differ essentially from

ὥστε ἀγανακτεῖν. μὴ οὐχὶ = ne non, or quo minus. Instead of αὐτοὺς, αὐτοῖς was the reading previous to Bekker.——ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ. Cf. note, 18, A.——ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατ'. This is one of several ways in which the superlative is strengthened by the Greeks. The origin of the formula is variously explained. In such passages as this, it may be analyzed as Stallbaum does viz. = ἐν τοῖς βαρέως φέρουσιν ἐγὼ βαρύτατ' ἂν ἐνέγκαιμι. In other passages, τοῖς seems to be neuter, and to be used like a pronoun, i. e. ἐν τοῖς = ἐν τούτοις. Cf. C. 462, β; K. 239, R. 2; Mt. 290.——τίνα ταύτην, sc. φέρεις = τίς ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ ἀγγελία, ἣν φέρεις.——ἢ τὸ πλοῖον, κ.τ.λ., *or has the vessel arrived*, &c. The ἤ in such interrogative sentences is restrictive of a more general question, or corrective of the foregoing context = but why do I ask? The vessel here mentioned is that in which Theseus returned from Crete, bringing back in safety the seven young men and seven maidens, whom the Athenians were obliged to send every year as a tribute to Minos, the Cretan king. Ever after this unexpected deliverance, the same vessel (patched and repaired till its identity became a vexed question for the speculative philosophers) was sent every year in sacred procession to the island of Delos, as a thank offering to Apollo. And from the moment when the sacred stern was crowned with garlands till its return, it was unlawful to defile the purified city with any public execution. It so happened, that the vessel set sail for Delos the very day before the condemnation of Socrates. He thus gained a respite of some thirty days, which he spent in prison, but in free conversation with his friends. See the whole thing explained in full, Phædo, 58. Cf. also Xen. Mem. IV. 8, 2; Plut. Vit. Thes., &c.

D. δόκει μέν. μέν is not unfrequently used, especially after δόκει, οἶμαι, and the like verbs, without the corresponding δέ expressed, but implying some such clause as σαφῶς δ'οὐκ οἶδα. Here, however, δόκει μὲν is employed with that Attic

urbanity, which avoids positive assertions, even when no doubt is intended, for just below he says: δῆλον οὖν, ὅτι ἥξει τήμερον. Sunium was the south-eastern promontory of Attica. ——τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ. A formula of prayer or well-wishing, often used by the Greeks in entering upon any enterprise or at the mention of any anticipated event, equivalent to the Latin, quod bene vertat. The use of it by Socrates in this connection is a striking illustration of his cheerfulness and hopefulness in view of death.

A. που, *I suppose*, ni fallor.——τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ἢ ᾗ ἂν ἔλθῃ = 44 *the next day after the ship may arrive.* ὑστεραίᾳ is followed by ἤ because it involves a comparative.——Φασί γέ τοι δή, *so say, at least, to be sure, those who have the disposal of these things*, sc. the Eleven. φασί is emphatic, they *say* so to be sure, though Crito would fain doubt it and show them to be mistaken, if he can but persuade Socrates. The restrictive particles, γέ τοι = *so much at all events* cannot be denied, viz., that they *say* so. δή then positively *affirms* the same thing: they *certainly say* so. Cf. Arn. Gr. Pr. Comp. 191, 192, and Hermann ad Viger, p. 790.——τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας, the coming day, i. e. the day about to dawn = *to-day*.——τῆς ἑτέρας, the second day = *to-morrow*. Socrates means of course the same days which Crito above calls τήμερον and αὔριον.——ὀλίγον πρότερον, a little while ago, of course after midnight; dreams before midnight the ancients deemed false.——κινδυνεύεις = δοκεῖς in Attic writers. How it came to have that meaning, see explained in Stallb. ad loc., and in the Lexicons.——ἐν καιρῷ τινι, quite opportunely.

B. ἤματί κεν τριτάτῳ, κ.τ.λ. These are the words of Achilles declaring to Agamemnon his intention to return home to Phthia, and his expectation to arrive there on the third day. Hom. Il. 9, 363. Socrates finds in them a beautiful accommodation to his own departure to his heavenly home. This dream

is not to be set down as a mere fiction of Plato. Besides the general truthfulness and trustworthiness of this dialogue, Socrates was a notorious dreamer of dreams or seer of visions, and a full believer in their divine significance. Moreover, he was a great reader and admirer of Homer. What, then, could be more natural or probable, than that his approaching departure to another world, which he talked of by day and meditated on by night, should present itself before him in his dreams and clothe itself in the familiar language of the Homeric Poems.——*ἐναργὲς*, clear, i. e. easy to be understood.——*μὲν οὖν* = imo vero, *nay but*. Arn. Gr. Pr. Comp. 373.——*δαιμόνιε* is used as a form of address, in itself respectful, and in its own proper signification *only* respectful, yet sometimes applied in such a connection, and spoken in such a tone of irony or severity, that some lexicographers have erroneously concluded that it was in its nature a term of reproach, as well as of honor. Compare *ὦ μακάριε Κρίτων* below, and our *My dear sir, My excellent fellow*.——*ἔτι καὶ νῦν, yet even now*, implies that Crito had previously plied Socrates with unavailing arguments of the same kind.——*οὐ μία, not one merely*. Al. *οὐδεμία*.——*χωρὶς μὲν . . . ἔτι δὲ, besides in the first place* sustaining the loss of an invaluable friend, I shall *in the second place* incur the reproach of many. The unusual concurrence of *μὲν* and *δὲ* in the same proposition, sets forth strongly the *twofold* evil. The correction of Wolf, *τοῦ ἐστερῆσθαι* for *σοῦ ἐστερῆσθαι* of the MSS. is with good reason adopted in all the recent editions. ——*οὐδένα μή ποτε*. This combination has the same emphasis of negation as *οὐ μή* = *such as there is no reason to expect that I shall ever find*.——*ὡς οἷός τ' ὢν σε σώζειν*. The *ὡς* belongs with the participle *ὤν*, not, as Buttmann and some others have taken it, with the infinitive *ἀμελῆσαι*, and performs here the office which it usually performs with a participle, viz., of denoting the *ground or supposition* on which Crito would appear

to many to have neglected the preservation of the life of Socrates: *as if I was able*, i. e. *supposing that I was able to save you* —a supposition which, in this case, was contrary to the fact, since the inflexible will of Socrates rendered it impossible for Crito to save him. Cf. C. 640; K. 312, 6; Mt. 568.

C. *τίς ἂν αἰσχίων εἴη ταύτης δόξα, ἢ δοκεῖν, what reputation could be more dishonorable than this—than to be reputed.* Here the comparative is first followed by a genitive, and then by an explanatory clause with ἤ. C. 461, 3; K. 323, R. 5; Mt. 450. It will be observed, that δόξα and δοκεῖν have the same root.——*ὥσπερ ἂν πράχθῇ, just as they were done, however that may be.* ἄν denotes contingency, and may be expressed with ὥσπερ = *in whatever manner*, or with the verb = *however that may be.*

D. *αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα.* Al. δηλοῖ by conjecture. But the emendation is not necessary. The passage is explained by Stallbaum, Jacobs, and others, as an example of anacoluthon: Nam Crito quum additurus esset haec: *ὅτι ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐξειργασμένα ἐστίν*, constructione repente mutata, rem multo gravius eloquitur, dicens: *ὅτι οἷοί τέ εἰσιν οἱ πολλοί.* Stallb.——*εἰ γὰρ ὤφελον.* C. 599, N; K. 259, R. 6; Mt. 513, obs. 3.——*ἵνα . . . ἦσαν.* The past tense of the indicative here implies, that they are *not* able. C. 601, δ; K. 330, 5; Mt. 519.——*οὔτε γὰρ φρόνιμον, κ.τ.λ.* The noble sentiment is here implied, that so long as the multitude cannot alter a man's *character* for better or worse, all else is of no account. The concluding clause in this chapter, *ποίουσι . . . τύχωσιν*, means, that the multitude are governed by mere chance and caprice instead of fixed principle.

E. *ἆρά γε μὴ ἐμοῦ προμηθεῖ, do you not at least feel some solicitude for me*, &c. The particles imply a fear that he does. ——*οἱ συκοφάνται.* The word is well explained in the Lexicon of Liddell and Scott, and the class of men in Smith's Dictionary

of Antiquities.——*πράγματα παρέχωσιν, make trouble.*——*ἢ καὶ πᾶσαν, κ.τ.λ., either to lose even all our property, or at least large sums of money, or even to suffer some additional* heavier penalty, such as imprisonment, exile, or death, cf. below, 53, B. ——*ἔασον αὐτὸ χαίρειν, bid it farewell,* that is, dismiss the fear.

45 A. *ἡμεῖς γάρ που δίκαιοί ἐσμεν,* cf. C. 551; K. 307, R. 6. For *που,* cf. note, 44, A.——*μήτε τοίνυν φοβοῦ.* The sentence, interrupted by a long explanation, is resumed in *μήτε ταῦτα φοβούμενος,* below, B, and is there followed by the correlative clause, *μήτε ὃ ἔλεγες.*——*τούτους* is contemptuous, like the Latin iste, cf. below, 48, C: *τούτων τῶν πολλῶν,* and Demosthenes, passim.——*ὡς εὐτελεῖς,* sc. *εἰσιν, how easily they can be bought.* Crito knew this from his own experience, cf. Xen. Mem. II. 9, 1.——*ἐπ αὐτοὺς, for them,* sc. to bribe them.

B. *ὑπάρχει, is ready for your use. ἱκανά* is added to express the idea, that his property alone is, in his opinion (*ὡς ἐγῶμαι*), *sufficient.* Crito was wealthy, cf. note, 33, D.—— *ξένοι.* Simmias and Cebes were Thebans, cf. Phæd. 59, C.—— *ἀποκάμῃς, desist from the effort.* Crito takes for granted that, in itself considered, irrespective of the danger to his friends, Socrates must desire, and make effort, to save himself. *ἀποκάμνω* is more frequently followed by a participle, though sometimes, as here, by an infinitive. Cf. C. 633; K. 310. ——*ὃ ἔλεγες ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ,* cf. Apol. 37, C, D.——*ὅ τι χρῷο σαυτῷ, what to do with yourself.* Cf. C. 432; K. 278, 4; Mt. 409, 6.——*ἄλλοσε,* by attraction for *ἀλλαχοῦ.* C. 527, R.; K. 332, R. 13; Mt. 474.

C. *οὐδὲ δίκαιον. οὐδὲ* is emphatic, *not even right.*—— *σπεύσαιέν τε καὶ ἔσπευσαν.* See the same combination of the opt. with the ind.—of the probable with the actual—Apol. 40, A: *οἰηθείη ἄν τις καὶ νομίζεται.*

D. *οἰχήσει καταλιπών.* C. 637; K. 310, 4, 1; Mt. 559, c.

It is an emphatic form, as if Socrates were in *haste* to leave his children orphans. Observe the force of the ἐκ in ἐκθρέψαι and ἐκπαιδεῦσαι, to bring up and educate *completely.*——τὸ σὸν μέρος, *so far as you are concerned.* Orphans at Athens were provided for by the state, and intrusted to the care of the Archon Eponymus. Still they must of course be subjected to many inconveniences (cf. Hom. Il. 22, 490); and so far as *Socrates was concerned,* his children would be left *to do well or ill, just as they might chance to do.*——χρὴ. Al. χρῆν.——ῥᾳθυμότατα is the opposite of ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἀνδρεῖος.

E. Καὶ ἡ εἴσοδος τῆς δίκης, κ.τ.λ., *both the coming in of the case into court,* cf. Demos. adv. Phorm.: μελλούσης τῆς δίκης εἰσιέναι εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον.——ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσελθεῖν. He could have avoided coming to trial, either by flight and voluntary exile, or by inducing, as he might easily have done, the accusers to withdraw the charges before the trial had commenced.——αὐτὸς ὁ ἀγών, κ.τ.λ. Socrates did not employ advocates, or resort to any of the ordinary means of influencing the judges. ——κατάγελως. Cornar, with the approval of Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, and others, suggests that there is an allusion in this word to the absurd and ridiculous conclusion of a comedy, which has its three parts, the πρότασις, ἐπίτασις, and καταστροφή, corresponding with the εἴσοδος, ἀγών, and κατάγελως of the Socratic drama, as it is here represented.——διαπεφευγέναι ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν is epexegetical of τὸ τελευταῖον τουτί: *and finally this almost farcical conclusion of the matter, that it should seem to have escaped us through some sloth and unmanliness of ours.*

A. εἴ τι . . . ὄφελος ἦν. Cf. note, Apol. 28, B. The force 46
of the perfect is seen not only in βεβουλεῦσθαι, but also in πεπρᾶχθαι = *to have consulted, to have been done.*——ἀδύνατον, κ.τ.λ., *impossible and no longer practicable.*

B. ἡ προθυμία, κ.τ.λ. For the omission of the copula

(*ἐστὶν*), cf. C. 547; K. 238, R. 8; Mt. 306. For the sentiment compare the words of Paul to the Galatians, IV. 17: *καλὸν δε ζηλοῦσθαι ἐν καλῷ.*——*τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ.* The strongest argument, in other words, the truth, as it appears to his mind, after careful consideration, is here beautifully represented by Socrates as his best *friend*, and the only one to whom he yields a controlling influence.

C. *πλείω* limits *μορμολύττηται*, as it is construed by Stallbaum; not *ἐπιπέμπουσα*, as it is construed by Buttmann.——*δεσμοὺς καὶ θανάτους.* Observe the force of the plural, and compare Paul's emphatic enumeration of his sufferings, 2 Cor. XI. 23: *ἐν κόποις, ἐν πληγαῖς, ἐν φυλακαῖς, ἐν θανάτοις.*——*μετριώτατα σκοποίμεθα.* Cf. note, Apol. 39, B. This question, in many editions, is put into the mouth of Crito. But it seems more appropriate to Socrates, who, in the next sentence, answers himself, as he often does.——*ἀναλάβοιμεν*, *resume* for further consideration.——*ἑκάστοτε*, in every instance, sc. when we were discussing the subject.

D. *Κατάδηλος* is for *κατάδηλον*, being attracted by *λόγος*. C. 551; K. 329, R. 4; Mt. 297.——*ἄρα* = *forsooth, as it seems.* Cf. K. 344, 3, and note, Apol. 34, B.——*ἄλλως* = temere, *without reason.*——*ὧδε ἔχω*, sc. in danger of losing my life.——*τι λέγειν, to say something*, sc. to some purpose, of some importance, cf. Xen. Mem. II. 1, 12.

47 A. *ὅσα γε τἀνθρώπεια, in all human probability.*——*ἱκανῶς* is explained below by *καλῶς*.

B. *τοῦτο πράττων, practising this, making a business of it.* So *πρακτέον*, below. We see here Socrates's fondness for illustrations drawn from the common pursuits of life.——*καὶ ἐδεστέον γε, yes, and eat* and drink. *γε* = *yes.* So *καὶ υἱεῖς γε*, Apol. 34, D, might be rendered, *yes, and sons.* The eating and drinking here come within the province of the *ἰατρός*, as the gymnastic exercises come under the direction of the *παιδοτρίβης*.

D. *αἰσχύνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι.* These verbs are often followed, as they are here, by an accusative of the person *before whom* one *must be ashamed and afraid*, especially to do any thing dishonorable or wrong.——*ἐγίγνετο . . . ἀπώλλυτο.* The imperfect has reference to what *was said* in former discussions, cf. at the beginning of the chapter: *πῶς αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐλέγετο.*

E. *πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαϊόντων δόξῃ, by obeying not the opinion of the wise;* but of the unwise, is implied in the antithesis by the position of *μὴ*. Cf. Xen. Mem. III. 9, 6: *καὶ μὴ ἃ οἶδε δοξάζειν = not what he knows*, but what he does not know.——*ὃ . . . λωβᾶται, which the unjust injures.* The editions before Bekker changed *ὃ* to *ὅ*. But the MSS. all have *ὃ*, and *λωβᾶσθαι* may be followed either by the accusative or the dative.——*φαυλότερον* = cheaper, *less valuable*, the opposite of *τιμιώτερον*, below.

A. *τί . . . ἡμᾶς. τί* for *ὅ τι*, cf. Cr. 535; K. 344, R. 1; 48 Mt. 488, 1. For the two acc. cf. C. 435; K. 280, 2; Mt. 415.

B. *οὗτός τε ὁ λόγος*, κ.τ.λ., is correlative to *καὶ τόνδε αὖ σκόπει.* To the suggestion, that the multitude have power to put him to death, Socrates has a twofold answer: in the first place, that does not invalidate the argument which we have gone through with nor make it any less conclusive, or in any way different from what it was, before his life was endangered; and in the second place, he says, *consider also, whether this doctrine*, once admitted by us, *abides or not, that we must not set the highest value on mere living, but on living well.*——*τῶν ὁμολογουμένων, things that are generally agreed upon;* different from *τῶν ὡμολογημένων*, things that have been agreed upon in the discussion.

C. *ἀναλώσεως χρημάτων*, 44, E, seqq.; *δόξης*, 45, B, seqq.; *παίδων τρόφῆς*, 45, C, D.——*μὴ*, sc. *ὄρα.* C. 602, 3. *ὄρα* is expressed below, 49, D.——*ῥᾳδίως*, lightly, *rashly.*——*καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων γ' ἄν, yes, and would restore them to life again.*

For the force of ἄν with the participle, cf. C. 615, 2; K. 260, 5; Mt. 597, 1.——τούτων τῶν πολλῶν is added to express contempt, and, in connection with οὐδενὶ ξὺν νῷ, it implies, that it is characteristic of the multitude to act thus without reason.——ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ, *the argument so establishes the point.* This use of αἱρεῖ arises from its use to express a victory at the games, or a conviction in a court of justice. Cf. *ratio vincit*, Hor. Sat. 1, 3, 115, et al.——καὶ χρήματα τελοῦντες . . . καὶ χάριτας. Zeugma, τελοῦντες being strictly applicable only to χρήματα, and ἄγοντες being required with χάριτας.——καὶ αὐτοὶ, κ.τ.λ., *and* whether we shall do right *ourselves both in leading out* of prison, *and in being led out.*

D. μὴ οὐ δέῃ, κ.τ.λ., *we must not consider the question, whether we must die, if we remain in* prison *and keep quiet, nor* whether we must *suffer any thing else, however dreadful, rather than do wrong*, i. e. we must not take the *consequences* into the account at all, but only the question of right and wrong. Before μὴ οὐ, there is an ellipsis of a verb of seeing, or fearing, and the meaning is, I fear, that we must *not* take into account, etc. Cf. C. 602, 2, 3; K. 318, R. 6; Mt. 517, obs. 4.

E. ὡς ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῦ, κ.τ.λ., *as I esteem it of great importance to persuade you to do this, but not* to do it *against your will*, i. e. I am exceedingly desirous to pursue the course I am pursuing *with your consent* (*persuaso te*, so Ficinus and Bekker), and *not against your will.* Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, Elberling, and the majority of commentators, make σε the *subject* of πεῖσαι, and understand ἐμὲ as its object, and ἐμοῦ with ἄκοντος. But besides the improbability of πεῖσαι being *followed* by its subject, and *omitting* its object, it does not accord with the sentiments and character of Socrates that he should say, I deem it of great importance that you should persuade me to *leave the prison*, which would then be the meaning of the passage.——σοι ἱκανῶς, *to your satisfaction.*

A. *ἑκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι = ἑκόντας ἀδικεῖν δεῖν.* Cr. 642; K. 284, R. 6; Mt. 447. 4.——*καὶ πάλαι . . . ἄρα, and so for a long time we, men of such advanced years.* 49

B. *ἢ παντὸς μᾶλλον, or rather.*——*ὅμως, yet,* i. e. whatever may be the consequences.——*τυγχάνει ὄν, turns out to be.*——*ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται.* The general sentiment of antiquity not only justified but required retaliation, as just and manly, cf. Mem. Cap. III.: *αὕτη ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετή, ἱκανὸν εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν, καὶ πράττοντα τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς κακῶς.* Eurip. Fragm.: *ἐχθρὸν κακῶς δρᾶν ἀνδρὸς ἡγοῦμαι μέρος.* But Socrates in the Gorgias, 469, A, insists that it is far better to suffer wrong than to do wrong.

C. *οὐ φαίνεται, it seems not,* that is, it seems that we must in no case do an injury.——*οὐδ' ἂν ὁτιοῦν, κ.τ.λ., not even if he suffer any thing however severe by them.*——*κοινωνεῖς, whether you hold* these opinions *in common with me, and think as I do.*——*τῆς ἀρχῆς,* the *premise,* or *first principle* of the argument, sc. that it is never right to do an injury, &c. To *τῆς ἀρχῆς,* as the *premise, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο* stands opposed as the *conclusion.*

A. *ἀπίοντες ἐνθένδε, in going out hence,* sc. from prison. 50 This clause is to be connected, not only with *ποιοῦμεν,* but also with *ἐμμένομεν, whether in going out hence . . . we abide by what we have admitted to be right.*——*τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως, the commonwealth.* So Cic. in Verr. II. 46, 114; communi Siciliæ.——*ἄλλο τι ἢ = nonne, do you not.*

B. *ἀνατετράφθαι, be immediately subverted.* For this force of the *perfect,* cf. C. 584; K. 255, R. 7; Mt. 500.——*αἱ γενόμεναι δίκαι, the judgments that have been rendered.*

C. *ὅτι Ἠδίκει γὰρ ἡμᾶς.* The *ὅτι* in direct quotations is pleonastic. The *γὰρ* refers to an implied cause: we do right to escape, *for the state did us an injustice,* sc. when it pronounced sentence against us.——*τῷ ἐρωτᾶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι.* The reader will recognize here an allusion to the well-known

method of discussion, which was so characteristic of Socrates as to be called "the Socratic method."

D. *πρῶτον μέν*. The *second* question, which answers to this as the first, is found in *ἀλλὰ τοῖς πέρι τὴν τοῦ γενομένου τροφήν*, κ.τ.λ., and is introduced with *ἀλλὰ* instead of *ἔπειτα*, in consequence of the intervening question, *μέμφει τι*, κ.τ.λ.—— *ἐλάμβανε*, *imperfect* to denote the *process* through which the wife was obtained. The editions previous to Buttmann had *ἔλαβε*.——*ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ*, i. e. in physical and mental education, cf. Repub. 376, E: *ἡ μὲν* [*παιδεία*] *ἐπὶ σώμασι γυμναστική, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ ψυχῇ μουσική*. The former comprehended the whole *exercise* and *training* of the body, in which the Greeks so excelled; the latter the entire *discipline* and *culture* of the mind, or, as the word denotes, the department of the *muses*. The prominence which the Greeks gave to the cultivation of the *taste* and the *emotions*, helps to explain the name by which they called this department of education. Some writers add a third department, viz., *γράμματα*, letters, or primary education. Cf. Smith's Dic. of Antiqq., *Gymnasium*. Aristotle, in his Politics, VIII. 2, makes four departments, adding to letters, gymnastics, and music, the department of drawing and painting, *γραφική*.

E. *δοῦλος*. Cf. Cic. pro Cluentio, 53: Legum omnes *servi* sumus, ut liberi esse possimus.——*καὶ σὺ ταῦτα*, κ.τ.λ. Al. *καὶ σοὶ*. Both readings have good MS. authority. But the regular construction would be *δὲ*...*δίκαιον εἶναι*, and the *σὲ* is changed to *σὺ* by attraction to *οἴει*.——*ἦ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα σοι τὸν πατέρα*. The unusual position of *σοι* (hyperbaton) is explained by the fondness of the Greeks for bringing contrasted words into juxtaposition. *σοι* is dat. after *ἐξ ἴσου*.

51 A. *ἄρα*. Cf. note, 46, D.——*καὶ σὺ δὲ ἡμᾶς*, κ.τ.λ., is an emphatic repetition of *πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα*, &c., above.——*ὁ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελόμενος* is added in bitter irony.——

πατρὶς, *one's country*, indefinite, and hence without the article. So μητρός and πατρός above. Cicero (de Off. I. 17, 57) has a similar sentiment: cari sunt parentes, etc. Sed omnes omnium caritates patria una complexa est.

C. πείθειν depends on δεῖ, implied in ποιητέον.

D. τῷ ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι, *by having given liberty.*——δοκιμάσθῇ, when he has been examined and approved, i. e. admitted to the rank of a citizen, al. δοκιμάσῃ.——ἐξεῖναι depends on προαγορεύομεν.

E. ὡμολογηκέναι ἔργῳ denotes a "*tacit compact*," but one of a very different kind from that fiction, in which some political philosophers of modern times find the *origin* of society and government.——ἦ μὴν, *of a surety*. These particles are used especially in confirmation of an oath or promise, cf. Hom. Il. 1. 77; Xen. Anab. 2, 3, 27. Al. ἡμῖν. The present, πείθεσθαι, denotes *obedience* in general, or as a habit. Al. πείσεσθαι.

A. προτιθέντων ἡμῶν, κ.τ.λ., sets forth the peculiar rights 52 and privileges of an Athenian citizen in canvassing laws when they are proposed, and moving for their repeal afterwards, if they are found to be oppressive. προτιθέντων is better taken with πείθει, and ἐφιέντων with ποιεῖ, a new clause commencing with ἀλλὰ. The style is intentionally repetitious in imitation of the style of conversation.——ἐνέξεσθαι = *will be implicated in*, or *obnoxious to*. So ἔνοχος = obnoxious, cf. Xen. Mem. I. 1, 64: πῶς οὖν ἔνοχος ἂν εἴη τῇ γραφῇ.——ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα. Cf. note, 43, C: ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατ'.

B. διαφερόντως, *preëminently above*.——θεωρίαν, a *spectacle*, such as the games and religious festivals. As these were attended by the leading men from all Greece, the non-attendance of Socrates, with the single exception of going once to the Isthmian games, might well be remarked as an indication of singular satisfaction with Athens.——στρατευσόμενος. Cf. ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, Apol. 28, E, and note

ibid.——*ἐπιθυμία* first governs *πόλεως* and *νόμων* in the gen., and then is followed by the infin. *εἰδέναι*, with which is to be understood a pronoun in the acc. referring to those genitives, *a desire of another city or other laws—to know them.*

C. *τά τε ἄλλα καὶ*, *besides all the rest*, sc. of your acts, which prove your preference for Athens. Cf. note on *ἀλλά τε . . . καὶ*, Apol. 36, A.——*φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι*. Cf. note, Apol. 31, D.——*αἰσχύνει*, *respect*, lit., feel ashamed before.——*ἐντρέπει*, *regard*, lit., turn yourself towards.——*Ἄλλο τι οὖν ἂν φαῖεν ἤ*, *do you not then, they would say, violate*, &c., lit., do you do any thing else than violate. The *ἄν* would regularly follow *φαῖεν*; but when two clauses are incorporated in one (especially with *φαίη* or *φαῖεν*), the particle is often attracted out of its place, cf. Hermann on the particle *ἄν*.

E. *ἐν ἔτεσιν ἑβδομήκοντα*. Cf. Apol. 17, D.—— *οὔτε Λακεδαίμονα . . . οὔτε Κρήτην*. These states were often cited as models of law and order by Plato and other political philosophers of the day, cf. Repub. 544, C; Legg. 634.——*δή* = scilicet. *ἑκάστοτε* = quotiescunque de iis loqueris. Stallb.

53 A. *ἐὰν ἡμῖν γε πείθῃ*. Sub. *ἀλλ' ἐμμενεῖς*.

B. *τῇ τούτων πολιτείᾳ*, *to the polity of these* men, instead of these states, as if *πολίτων*, instead of *πόλεων*, had preceded. Examples of this figure (*synesis*) are frequent in Plato.—— *βεβαιώσεις τοῖς δικασταῖς*, *κ.τ.λ.*, that is, will confirm others in an opinion favorable to the judges, so that they will be regarded as having decided the case right.——*τάς τε εὐνομουμένας . . . τοὺς κοσμιωτάτους*, *the cities that have good laws, and the men who have the most regard for law and order.*——*τίνας λόγους*, *what discourses, Socrates? such forsooth as you utter here, that*, &c. *ἤ* is strictly *or*, and *ἀναισχυντήσεις διαλεγόμενος* is understood after it.——*ἂν φανεῖσθαι*. Cf. note on *ἂν . . . διαφθαρήσονται*, Apol. 29, C.

D. *ἀπαρεῖς*, *you will depart*, lit., carry away, remove.——

ἐκεῖ γὰρ . . . ἀκολασία. The Thessalians were infamous for their vices. Cf. Demos. Ol. I. 22: ταῦτα γὰρ (τὰ τῶν Θετταλῶν) ἄπιστα μὲν ἦν δήπου φύσει καὶ ἀεὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις; and Athenæus, VI. 260, B: ἀκόλαστοι καὶ περὶ τὸν βίον ἀσελγεῖς, and many other passages from different authors.——σκευήν, *a cloak* or wrapper sufficient to cover the whole body, as is implied in περιβέμενος. The word is often used of robes or costumes for the stage.——Διφθέρα is a *dress of skins*, worn by rustics, and hence peculiarly fit for a disguise.——Σχῆμα is also referred to the dress by Stallbaum, but it is better to take it in the more general sense of gait, or *personal appearance*, as the Latin *habitus* also is often used.

E. ἴσως, ἂν μή, κ.τ.λ., *perhaps not, if you do not offend any one; but if otherwise*, i. e. if you do offend any one, *you will hear*, &c.——ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσει, κ.τ.λ., *so you will pass your life in fawning upon everybody and being their humble servant—doing what, but feasting in Thessaly, having gone abroad for an entertainment, forsooth, into Thessaly.* The irony, which runs through the whole, is made more pungent by the contemptuous repetition of *Thessaly*.——ποῦ ἡμῖν ἔσονται? *what will become of them*—where shall we find them?

A. Ἀλλὰ δή = *at enim, at inquies.* Stallb.——τί δαί; 54 *why, pray?*——ἀπολαύσωσιν is, of course, ironical, as it often is taken in a bad sense.——ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὔ, *or not this indeed*, sc. ποιήσεις, i. e. you will not take your sons to Thessaly.——αὐτοῦ, *here*, in Athens.

B. οὔτε γὰρ ἐνθάδε . . . οὔτε ἐκεῖσε, *neither here* in this life . . . *nor when you come thither*, into another world. These two clauses beginning with οὔτε are correlative to each other, while those beginning with οὐδὲ are only emphatic additions to the former.

D. οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες, those who celebrate the rites of the Corybantes in the worship of Cybele in Phrygia. As these

rites were accompanied with noisy music and wild dancing, the Corybantes were an expressive figure of persons so inspired and possessed with certain ideas or feelings, as to be incapable of seeing or hearing any thing else. In the case of Socrates, it is the voice of the Laws, in other words, the voice of the God, that so rings in his ear and possesses his soul. The passage is one of singular beauty. The Laws stand before him personified, embodied, clothed with more than human authority. They reason with him. They expostulate with him on the folly and wickedness of the course which his friends are pressing upon him. They draw nearer and nearer to him, and speak in more earnest and commanding tones, till at length he can see and hear nothing else, and puts an end to the fruitless arguments and entreaties of his friends in those words of humble yet sublime piety: It is the voice of God—let us obey.

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